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Bradt: An Examination of the "Arising out of" and the "in the Course of"

AN EXAMINATION OF THE "ARISING OUT OF" AND
THE "IN THE COURSE OF" REQUIREMENTS
UNDER THE MINNESOTA WORKERS'
COMPENSATION LAW
by GENE P. BRADTt
In orderforan injuredemployee to receive a workers' compensation award,
the thjug must "arise out of and in the course of employment. " Use of
this simple phrasehas resulted in substantialuncertainty when appliedon
a case-by-case basis. The purpose of this Article is to eliminate some of
this confusion by demonstrating that the law interpreting the arising out of
and in the course of clause is readily reducible to principles and rules.
After tracing the history and rationale of workers' compensation, Mr.
Bradt discusses the various methodologies used to interpret the arisingout
of an in the course of requirement. He then examines in detail often recurring "time and place" and "'employee activity" problems and suggests
general rules to handle compensation problems that occur under these
headings.
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INTRODUCTION

"The few and seemingly simple words 'arising out of and in the
course of the employment' have been the fruitful (or fruitless)
source of a mass of decisions turning upon nice distinctions and
supported by refinements so subtle as to leave the mind of the
reader in a maze of confusion. From their number counsel can,
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"ARISING OUT OF" AND "IN THE COURSE OF"

in most cases, cite what seems to be an authority for resolving in

his favor, on whichever side he may be, the question in dispute."
Lord Wrenbury in Herbert v.
Samuel Fox & Co., [1916] 1
A.C. 405, 419.
"The statutory phrase 'arising out of and in the course of employment,' which appears in most workmen's compensation
laws, is deceptively simple and litigiously prolific."
Mr. Justice Murphy in Cardillo
v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,
330 U.S. 469, 479 (1947) (footnote omitted).

Because of the increasing number of work-related injuries during the Industrial Revolution, an equitable system for compensating injured employees was needed.' Although the early American
1. S.

HOROVITZ, CURRENT TRENDS

IN BASIC PRINCIPLES OF WORKMEN'S COM-

466-69 (1947). For a general discussion of public dissatisfaction with the handling of work-related accidents in the nineteenth century, see Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis.
327, 133 N.W. 209 (1911).
Numerous theories have been put forth to explain the reasons for the adoption of
workers' compensation statutes. Several authorities have indicated that workers' compensation laws were established after society realized the need for social insurance. See, e.g.,
Riesenfeld, Forty Years ofAmertan Workmen's Compensation, 35 MINN. L. REv. 525 (1951). In
this thought-provoking Article, Professor Riesenfeld states:
Workmen's compensation is basically a branch of social insurance....
The real characteristic of social insurance is the fact that the worker is entitled to
the benefits as a matter of right, irrespective of need; that the hazard which is
involved is a typified hazard of modern society: loss or reduction of earning
power; and that there is a certain standardization of benefits and de-technicalization in the procedure.
PENSATION

Id. at 530 (footnotes omitted). See also P.

NONET, ADMINISTRATIVE

JUSTICE

(1969).

Nonet quotes the 1915 chairman of the California Industrial Accident Commission as
writing that workers' compensation is founded on the
incontrovertible principle that society has the right to protect itself from those
influences which tend to force large numbers of persons below the poverty line,
thereby making them a menace to social order and social safety. This is why
society has said to its industries that they must take care of their own killed and
wounded.
Id. at 18-19.
Professor Larson has suggested that the theory supporting workers' compensation is
that it is a mechanism of
providing, in the most efficient, most dignified, and most certain form, financial
and medical benefits for the victims of work-connected injuries which an enlightened community would feel obliged to provide in any case in some less satisfactory form, and of allocating the burden of these payments to the most
appropriate source of payment, the consumer of the product.
I A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 2.20, at 5 (1978). Professor
Schneider concurs with this analysis. He believes that workers' compensation statutes
were meant "to shift the burden of accidental injuries from the workmen to the industry
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tort system provided compensation to some injured employees, the
common law's three evil sisters-contributory negligence, 2 the felrather than on society as a whole, and to treat the cost of personal injuries incidental to
the employment as a part of the cost of the business .... ." I W. SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 3, at 3-5 (perm. ed. 1941) (footnotes omitted).
Professors Blum and Kalven have suggested that workers' compensation legislation
came about as a "fringe benefit" of labor contracts:
Workmen's compensation can best be understood as a kind of "fringe benefit"
incorporated by law into the basic employment contract. The law in effect compelled the employer to provide, as a term of employment, an industrial accident
policy for his employees.
Several strands of thought support this perspective. In his highly regarded
case book on Agency, Roscoe Steffen groups materials so as to place workmen's
compensation as part of the employment relationship. He suggests that the legal
history of personal injuries to employees could easily have been different-that
courts could readily have handled the whole problem as an aspect of the employee's indemnity action against the employer for losses incurred in the course
of an agency relationship. There is a contemporary analogue in the tendency
today to use workmen's compensation as a base, and through collective bargaining to expand the benefits to cover unemployment, sickness and accidents off
work. What we wish to emphasize is that this continuum from statutory benefits
to collective bargaining agreements can be read backwards, so as to view the
whole as a part of the employer-employee contract. The distinctive quality is
that each of these forms of coverage is tied in to the employment nexus.
W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM 2627 (1965) (footnotes omitted).
Professor Boyd has suggested yet another approach. Because work-related injuries
are a constant occurrence directly associated with the cost of production, the employer
should bear the total cost of production including compensating employees for their injuries. See J. BOYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES TO WORKMEN UNDER MODERN INDUSTRIAL STATUTES § 5, at 12 (1913).
Finally, at least two commentators have suggested that workers' compensation
schemes were enacted to meet the needs of big business as much as those of injured employees. See Lubove, Workmen's Compensationand the Prerogativesof Voluntarism, 8 LAB. HIST.
254, 259 (1967); Weinstein, Big Business and the Origins of Workmen's Compensatton, 8 LAB.
HIST. 156, 160-61 (1967).
2. The rule of contributory negligence was established in Butterfield v. Forrester,
103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809). In that case, a plaintiff was injured by an obstruction in
the road. Judge Bayley concluded that because the plaintiff would have seen the obstacle
if he used ordinary care, he could receive no recovery. Id. at 927.
Later English cases that develop the doctrine include Bridge v. Grand Junction Ry.,
150 Eng. Rep. 1134 (Exch. Ch. 1838) and Davies v. Mann, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Exch. Ch.
1842).
During. the Industrial Revolution, the contributory negligence doctrine was so wellestablished that the Pennsylvania court stated: "It has been a rule of law from time immemorial, and is not likely to be changed in all time to come, that there can be no recovery
for an injury caused by the mutual default of both parties." Railroad Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa.
147, 149-50 (1854).
For a general discussion of the comparative negligence doctrine, see C. GREGORY,
LEGISLATIVE LOSS DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS (1936); C. HEFT & C. HEFT,
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL (rev. ed. 1978) (primarily Wisconsin law); V.
SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974) (text of the various statutes and good bibliography); G. WILLIAMS, JOINT TORTS AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE (195 1); Flem-
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low-servant rule, 3 and assumption of risk 4-prevented most employees from receiving any compensation after suffering working, Forward- Comparative Negligence At Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 239
(1976); Prosser, Comparative Negigence, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1953); Comment, Net Recovery
Comparative Neggence: The Reasonable Alternative, 6 WILLAMETTE L.J. 551 (1970).
For a history of the contributory negligence doctrine in Minnesota, see Note, Contribution and Indemnity-An Examination of the Upheaval inMinnesota Tort Loss Allocation Concepts, 5
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 109, 158 n.297 (1979).
3. In 1837 Lord Abinger invented the fellow servant exception to the rule of a
master's vicarious liability in Priestley v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Exch. Ch. 1837).
The fellow servant rule found its way into American common law in Chief Justice Shaw's
famous opinion in Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. 49 (1842). Under the
fellow servant rule, the employee assumed as a matter of law the risk that his fellow employees would be negligent. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at
528-29 (4th ed. 1971). Minnesota apparently adopted the fellow servant rule in Foster v.
Minnesota Central Ry., 14 Minn. 360, 363-64 (Gil. 277, 280-81) (1869).
In its earlier decisions, the Minnesota Supreme Court indicated that the rationale for
the fellow servant rule was that the master did not undertake to protect employees against
the negligence of coemployees, and that it would promote the safety of the public and of
all employees to make each employee watchful of the conduct of all employees. See Brown
v. Winona & St. P. R.R., 27 Minn. 162, 164, 6 N.W. 484, 485 (1880) (employer not an
insurer); Foster v. Minnesota Central Ry., 14 Minn. at 362 (Gil. at 279-80). Subsequently,
the Minnesota court indicated that
the true reason for its adoption was an economic one, in order to foster industries
by relieving the master from liability to any of his employees for personal injuries
due to the negligence of any other of his employees in the same industry. The
injustice of making this exception to the rule of respondeat superior is obvious,
thus compelling those who receive the lease from an industry to assume its
hazards to life and limb from the negligence of those over whom they have no
control and in whose selection they have no voice.
Headline v. Great N. Ry., 113 Minn. 74, 79-80, 128 N.W. 1115, 1116 (1910).
For a general discussion of the fellow servant doctrine, see Burdick, Is Law the Expression of Class Sefihness?, 25 HARV. L. REV. 349, 357-71 (1912); Powell, Some Phases of the
Law ofMaster and Servant. An Attempt at Rationahiation, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29-32 (1910).
See also W. DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 3-11 (1936). The
exceptions to the fellow servant rule are well explained in W. PROSSER, supra, at 529-30.
4. Although Cruden v. Fentham, 170 Eng. Rep. 496 (1798), is thought to be the first
case enunciating this defense, the doctrine received its greatest following after Lord Abinger's opinion in Priestley v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Exch. Ch. 1837). See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 528-29. In defining the application of assumption of risk, Lord
Abinger stated:
The servant is not bound to risk his safety in the service of his master, and may, if
he thinks fit, decline any service in which he reasonably apprehends injury to
himself: and in most of the cases in which danger may be incurred, if not in all,
he is just as likely to be acquainted with the probability and extent of it as the
master.
Priestley v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. at 1032-33. For a general discussion of this doctrine, see
Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk (pts. 1-2), 20 HARv. L. REv. 14, 91 (1906); Keeton,
Assumption ofRisk andthe Landowner, 20 TEX. L. REV. 562 (1942); Rice, The Automobile Guest
and the Rationale of Assumption of Risk (pts. 1-2), 27 MINN. L. REV. 329, 429 (1943); Wade,
The Place ofAssumption of Risk in the Law of Neghgence, 22 LA. L. REV. 5 (1961).
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related injuries.5 Due to the inequities abounding in the tortbased compensation system, Prussia began a limited workers' compensation system in 1838.6 Thus, the first compensation system
was established a mere four years before Chief Justice Shaw established the assumption of the risk defense,' and only one year after
Lord Abinger established the fellow-servant rule. 8
The American response to the plight of injured workers, however, was slower and less direct. 9 Through case law and the enactment of employer liability statutes, the defenses of contributory
5. See, e.g., W. DODD, supra note 3, at 1-52; 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 4.30. See
also Reel, Adminstrative Juries. A New Proposalfor Workmen's Compensation Cases in Oregon,
1975 INS. L.J. 294. One noted authority has stated that prior to the enactment of workers'
compensation legislation, 80% of all employee versus employer personal injury cases were
lost or uncompensated. In the remaining 20%, the doctor's bills, lawyer's fees and other
expenses "often ate up a substantial portion of the award." See S. HOROVITZ, supra note
1, at 467 & n.3 (citing W. DODD, supra at 21-22).
6. In outlining the history of the Prussian workers' compensation system, Professor
Larson states:
In 1838 . . . Prussia enacted a law making railroads liable to their employees (as well as passengers) for accidents from all causes except acts of God and
negligence of the plaintiff. In 1854 Prussia required employers in certain industries to contribute one-half to the sickness-association funds formed under various local statutes. In 1876 an unsuccessful voluntary insurance act was passed,
and finally, in 1884, Germany adopted the first modern compensation system,
thirteen years before England, twenty-five years before the first American jurisdiction, and sixty-five years before the last American state.
I A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 5.10, at 33.
The Prussian workers' compensation system, however, can be traced back prior to an
early Prussian law that provided:
The master was liable for the wergeld of the workman if the latter lost his life in
the service, and for the appropriate money-payment if he was injured, -- so far as
the injury could not be imputed to some third person for whom the master (who
had to answer for the misdeeds of his own people) was not responsible. If one
who was in the service of another lost his life by misadventure, by reason of a tree
or of fire or of water, the accident was imputed to the master as homicidium. If
one person sent another away or summoned him on the former's business and
the latter lost his life while executing the order, the former was taken as the causa
motis.
Wigmore, Responsibily for Tortious Acts. Its Histo,, 7 HARv. L. REV. 315, 317 n.6 (1894)
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
7. Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. 49 (1842). For a discussion of the
assumption of risk defense, see note 4 supra.
8. Priestley v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Exch. Ch. 1837). For a discussion of the
fellow servant rule, see note 3 supra. The following scholarly works examine the history of
workers' compensation laws: Grillo, Fifty Years of Workmen's Compensation--An Histon'ialReview, 38 CONN. B.J. 239 (1964); Larson, The Nature and Originsof Workmen's Compensation,37
CORNELL L.Q. 206 (1952); Malone, Damage Suits and the Contagious Principle of Workmen's
Compensation, 12 LA. L. REV. 231 (1952); Moreland, The General Development of Workmen's
Compensation Acts (pt. 1), 13 Ky. L.J. 20 (1924); Tousant, Histoy, Diagnosis and Prognosis of
the Workmen's Compensation Law, BOSTON BJ., Apr. 1957, at 9.
9. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 5.20.
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negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow-servant rule were at
least partially abrogated.' 0 Although Georgia passed a limited
compensation statute as early as 1855,"1 the British Employer's Liability Act of 188012 and the 1908 Federal Employer's Liability
Act,1 3 both of which made railroad employers liable for the negligence of their officers, agents, and employees, became the watersheds of their time.' 4 Subsequently, all states enacted workers'
compensation legislation.' 5 In so doing, most state statutes, in10. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 529-30. Professor Larson also notes that
many of the tort barriers that prevented injured employees from recovering at common
law had been partially struck down either by case law or by legislation prior to the inception of workers' compensation. Professor Larson suggests that this "precompensation legislation" did no more than restore "the employee to a position no worse than that of a
stranger injured by the negligence of the employer or his servants." 1 A. LARSON, supra
note 1, § 4.50. He concludes, however, that such precompensation legislation did not adequately protect employees and that "some entirely new principle was needed." Id. at 31.
11. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 4.50, at 30. This act only applied to railroads. Id.
12. Employer's Liability Act, 1880, 43 & 44 Vict., c. 42. For an examination of the
effect of this statute in the United States, see W. DODD, supra note 3, at 11-16.
13. Federal Employer's Liability Act of 1908,Pub. L. No. 60-100, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65
(1908) (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976)). Although the first federal act was
enacted in 1906, its effects were limited to common carriers engaged in interstate commerce, the District of Columbia, and the territories of the United States. See Employers'
Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 500 (1908). The 1908 Act covered employees of common
carriers for injuries sustained in interstate and foreign commerce. By 1910 most states had
some form of employer liability legislation. See W. DODD, supra note 3, at 13-14. Because
such acts still required proof of fault on the part of the employer, however, many employees suffered injuries and went uncompensated. See id.
14. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 4.50, at 29-31.
15. See id § 5.30 ("By 1920 all but eight states had adopted compensation acts, and
on January 1, 1949, the last state, Mississippi, came under the system.").
At first, the constitutionality of such acts was questioned. The first Maryland statute,
which provided for an accident fund for miners, was held unconstitutional in an unappealed lower court decision. See Franklin v. United Rys. & Elec. Co., 2 Baltimore City
Rep. 309 (1904). The leading United States Supreme Court decision upholding the constitutionality of a state workers' compensation act is New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243
U.S. 188 (1917). In that case, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the New
York compensation act on the theory that there was a "trade off" of tort for compensation
liability. See id. at 201. Few courts have had difficulty in deciding that state workers'
compensation acts in their entirety, or specific portions thereof, are constitutional.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently rejected arguments that workers'
compensation acts are unconstitutional. See, e.g., Boston & Maine R.R. v. Armburg, 285
U.S. 234, 237 (1932) (employer contended that act was unconstitutional because it denied
employer certain common law defenses); Booth Fisheries Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 271
U.S. 208, 209 (1926) (employer argued that act limited judicial review); Madera Sugar
Pine Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 262 U.S. 499, 500-01 (1923) (employer argued
that act deprived one of property without due process by requiring benefit payments to
nonresident alien dependents); Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1922) (employer argued that act compelling coverage by employers with more than a stated number
of employees was unconstitutional); Lower Vein Coal Co. v. Industrial Bd., 255 U.S. 144,
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cluding the 1913 Minnesota Act,16 borrowed an important phrase
from the 1897 English workers' compensation statute. 7 As a condition precedent to recovery, these statutes required employees to
prove that they suffered an injury "arising out of and in the course
146 (1921) (employer contended that act including only certain classes of employers such
as coal companies was unconstitutional); Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U.S.
400, 420 (1919) (principal contention of employers was that liability without fault was
unconstitutional); Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152, 156 (1919) (employee argued that act excepting from coverage certain employees such as farm laborers
was unconstitutional). But cf Gallegos v. Glaser Crandell Co., 388 Mich. 654, 668, 202
N.W.2d 786, 791 (1972) (according special treatment and classification to employees of
agricultural employer not accorded any other employer "is impermissible, clearly discriminatory, and has no rational basis").
The Minnesota Supreme Court has also sustained the Minnesota act against various
constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719
(1949) (act is adequate substitute for employee's right to sue for all damages); Ruud v.
Minneapolis St. Ry., 202 Minn. 480, 279 N.W. 224 (1938) (act does not violate equal
protection provisions of federal or Minnesota constitutions); Thornton Bros. v. Northern
States Power Co., 151 Minn. 435, 186 N.W. 863 (1922) (provision making third persons
liable for attorney fees in subrogation cases is constitutional); State ex rel. London & Lancashire Indem. Co. v. District Court, 139 Minn. 409, 166 N.W. 772 (1918) (provision creating conclusive presumption of widow's dependency upon husband constitutional);
Lindstrom v. Mutual S.S. Co., 132 Minn. 328, 156 N.W. 669 (1916) (application of act to
certain cases involving interstate commerce by water does not make act unconstitutional
in absence of federal regulation); Mathison v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 126 Minn. 286, 148
N.W. 71 (1914) (exclusion of certain employers and employees from operation of act
within legislative discretion).
On occasion, however, certain provisions of the Minnesota act have been found unconstitutional. See Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 215 N.W.2d 615 (1974) (abrogation of third party common law indemnity rights unconstitutional); Stevens v. Village of
Nashwauk, 161 Minn. 20, 200 N.W. 927 (1917) (provision allowing volunteer fire departments to determine for themselves whether to come within act is unconstitutional).
Most recently, in Tracy v. Streater/Litton Indus., 283 N.W.2d 909 (Minn. 1979), the
supreme court held that section 176.021, subdivision 3, which allows payment of workers'
compensation benefits for both permanent partial disability and either temporary total,
temporary partial, or permanent total disability, did not deny employers constitutional
due process by permitting an award for a functional loss as well as for a loss of earning
capacity. See id.at 913-16.
For an examination of the elaborate constitutional law arguments provoked by the
early acts, see S. HOROVITZ, supra note 1, at 465-71; S. HOROvrrZ, INJURY AND DEATH
UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 12-16 (1944); Daffer, The E ect of Federal Treaties on State Workmen's Compensation Laws, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 363 (1959); 13 OKLA.L. REV.
44, 44-46 (1960).
16. See Act of Apr. 24, 1913, ch. 467, 1913 Minn. Laws 675.
17. See Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, 60 & 61 Vict., c. 37, § 1.Under this Act,
employer liability for work-related injuries "depended not on who was at fault for the
accident, but on whether it arose out of the employment, while the employer was engaged
therein." S. HOROVITZ, supra note 1, at 469. A brief sketch of the political struggles over
the enactment of workers' compensation acts is set out in Riesenfeld, supra note 1, at 52529.
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of employment."' 8
Although at first blush this phrase appears simply worded, it has
been said that these words are "deceptively simple and litigiously
prolific," 19 and, as Lord Wrenbury succinctly noted, "give rise to a
mass of refinements so subtle as to leave the mind of the reader in
a maze of confusion. ' 20 Despite the litigation fostered by the arising out of and in the course of requirements, the present Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act retains these often misunderstood
terms. 2 ' The statute places the burden of proving these cumula18. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 6.10. "Forty-two states, and the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, have adopted the entire British Compensation
Act formula: injury 'arising out of and in the course of employment.' " Id. Minnesota is
included. MINN. STAT. § 176.021(1) (1978). Utah's statute changes the formula to "arising out of or in the course of" employment. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-45 (1974) (emphasis
added). West Virginia's statute reads: "in the course of and resulting from their covered
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978). Wisconsin provides compensation
employment ......
"[w]here, at the time of the injury, the employee is performing a service growing out of
and incidental to his employment." WIs. STAT. ANN. § 102.03(c)(1) (West 1973). Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington have discarded the "arising out of" idea altogether.
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.54 (Page Supp. 1979) ("Every employee, who is injured or who contracts an occupational disease . . . contracted in the course of employment . . . is entitled to receive . . . compensation."); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 431
(Purdon Cum. Supp. 1980-1981) ("Every employer shall be liable for compensation for
personal injury to, or for the death of each employee, by an injury in the course of his
employment."); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3b (Vernon 1967) ("If an employ6. . . sustains an injury in the course of his employment."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 51.32.010 (Cum. Supp. 1980-1981) ("Each worker injured in the course of his or her
employment.").
Regardless of the specific language connecting the injury to the employment, it would
appear that some type of link between the employment and the injury is necessary for a
state workers' compensation statute to be constitutional. See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 423 (1923) ("It may be assumed that where an accident is in no
manner related to the employment, an attempt to make the employer liable would be so
clearly unreasonable and arbitrary as to subject it to the ban of the Constitution. .. .
19. Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 479 (1947) (footnote omitted).
The difficulties inherent in attempting to formulate an all-inclusive definition of the
phrase has perplexed courts and commentators since its inception. In fact one commentator observed that "definitions and formula only multiplied the difficulties." Horovitz,
Modern Trends in Workmen's Compensatton, 21 IND. L.J. 473, 497-98 (1946). Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court specifically refused to give an all-inclusive definition in Novack v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 158 Minn. 495, 198 N.W. 290 (1924), when it stated:
We have heretofore declined to attempt to give a comprehensive definition
of this language which should include all cases embraced therein and with precision exclude those outside of its terms. We shall not attempt to do so now. It is
sufficient to say that each case that comes to us must stand on its own facts.
Id. at 498, 198 N.W. at 292.
20. Herbert v. Samuel Fox & Co., [1916] 1 A.C. 405, 419.
21. MINN. STAT. § 176.021(1) (1978).
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tive requirements on the employee. 22
At least two reasons exist for a scholarly analysis of these requirements. First, a comprehensive analysis of this topic, with special emphasis on Minnesota law, has never been undertaken.
Second, a critical examination of the Minnesota court's interpretation of the arising out of and in the course of requirements may
indicate a substantial deviation from prior well-reasoned constructions of this phrase. If this deviation exists, a determination of the
point of departure from prior law is essential to an understanding
of how this phrase is presently construed.
The focus of this Article is three-fold. First, the meaning of the
terms arising out of and in the course of will be analyzed by examining the guidelines that have been established to assist in the
proper application of the terms.2 3 Second, often-recurring time
and place problems will be examined, and suggested general rules
to handle compensation problems that occur under these headings
will be offered. 24 Finally, similar treatment will be given to compensation questions arising from employee activity problems. 25

II.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE "ARISING OUT OF" AND THE "IN
THE COURSE OF" REQUIREMENTS

A.

Interpreting the "4rising Out of" Requirement

Although the phrase "arising out of" refers to the causal connection between the employment and the injury, at least five different
lines of reasoning have been used to explain this often misunderstood term. 26 First, some courts have used the peculiar-risk doctrine to interpret their statutes. 2 7 Formerly the dominant rule, 28
22. See, e.g., MacNamara v. Jennie H. Boyd Trust, 287 Minn. 163, 166, 177 N.W.2d
398, 400 (1970) (burden of proof rests upon claimant); Ulve v. Bemidji Coop. Creamery
Ass'n, 267 Minn. 412, 419, 127 N.W.2d 147, 152 (1964) (burden of proving causal relationship rests with employee); Gerhardt v. Welch, 267 Minn. 206, 210, 125 N.W.2d 721, 724
(1964) ("burden rests on petitioner to establish ... the causal connection between the
compensable injury and subsequent death" (footnote omitted)).
23. See notes 26-79 infia and accompanying text.
24. See notes 80-308 infra and accompanying text.
25. See notes 309-558 th7fra and accompanying text.
26. See I A. LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 6.10-.60.
27. Id. § 6.20. In Robinson's Case, 292 Mass. 543, 198 N.E. 760 (1935), the employee,
a laborer, sought compensation for the loss of his right leg, which resulted from freezing
his right foot while working in cold weather. In denying compensation, the Massachusetts
court stated: "there is nothing to show that the employee was exposed to any greater risk
of freezing his foot than the ordinary person engaged in outdoor work in cold weather."
Id. at 546, 198 N.E. at 761.
28. See I A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 6.20.
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this approach required injured employees to prove that the harm
causing their injuries was peculiar to the job being performed at
the time of injury.2 9 Thus, even if the employment increased the
possibility of injury by lightning3° or other forces of nature, 3' an
injured employee might be denied compensation if a court concluded that all humanity was exposed to similar dangers.3 2 Because of the potential harshness resulting from its application, the
33
peculiar-risk doctrine is now virtually obsolete.
Second, many early courts applied a proximate cause test when
interpreting a statute's arising out of requirement. 34 Under this
29. See id.
30. See Netherton v. Lightning Delivery Co., 32 Ariz. 350, 355, 258 P. 306, 308 (1927)
(when the employee, by reason of employment, "is more exposed to injury by lightning
than are others in the same locality and not so engaged, the injury may be said to arise out
of the employment"); Wells v. Robinson Constr. Co., 52 Idaho 562, 567, 16 P.2d 1059,
1060 (1932) ("if it is not shown that the workman was exposed by reason of his employment to a danger greater than, or not common to, others in that locality, his accidental
death or injury by lightning stroke or the elements is not compensable"), overruled,Mayo v.
Safeway Stores Inc., 93 Idaho 161, 164-65, 457 P.2d 400, 403-04 (1969) (applying positional-risk test court overruled earlier decision); Fuqua v. Department of Highways, 292
Ky. 783, 785, 168 S.W.2d 39, 39-40 (1943) (injury "arises out of" only if "employment
exposes the servant to peculiar danger and risk of being struck by lightning, greater than
...).
that to which others of the public are exposed.
31. See Pattiani v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 199 Cal. 596, 603, 250 P. 864, 866
(1926) (fact that city suffered from typhoid fever epidemic at time claimant was there
constituted an exposure or risk common to all and not peculiar to or characteristic of
employment).
32. See I A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 6.20.
33. See id. §§ 6.20-30.
34. See io. § 6.60.
One important decision adopting this theory is Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487, 111
N.E. 379 (1916), in which the court stated, "The rational mind must be able to trace the
resultant personal injury to a proximate cause set in motion by the employment and not
by some other agency, or there can be no recovery." Id. at 495, 111 N.E. at 383. As late as
1974, the Tennessee Supreme Court denied compensation benefits apparently on the theory of proximate cause. See Hill v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 512 S.W.2d 560
(Tenn. 1974). In Hill the employee, a night watchperson, was crushed by the collapse of a
building hit by a tornado. In denying compensation, the court stated: "His employer by
the exercise of reasonable foresight could not have reasonably anticipated a tornado as a
result of Hill's employment." Id. at 562. The North Carolina Supreme Court appears to
have also briefly returned to this theory in Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 188 S.E.2d
350 (1972). In RobbMns fellow employees at a grocery store were murdered by the jealous
husband of one of the decedents. The jealous husband and his wife were having marital
problems, one problem being the wife's employment at the grocery store. The court reversed an award of compensation in part because the employer could not reasonably foresee this type of harm to an employee. See id. at 242, 188 S.E.2d at 356.
In at least one recent case, the Minnesota court appeared to use the proximate cause
theory. In Epp v. Midwestern Mach. Co., 296 Minn. 231, 208 N.W.2d 87 (1973), an over-
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approach, two requirements had to be met: the injury producing
harm had to be a foreseeable hazard of the claimant's employment; 35 and, there could be no intervening cause breaking the
chain of causation leading to the injury. 36 Some courts applying
this approach held that work-related injuries, when caused by
"acts of God," were never compensable because these acts were
intervening causes. 3 7 Fortunately, this theory has few adherents
38
today.
Third, some courts have formulated what Professor Larson refers to as an "actual risk" doctrine. 39 This rather liberal theory
supposedly does not consider whether there is something about the
employment that increases an employee's exposure to the injury
beyond that of the public generally or the employee apart from
the work. 40 Instead, the focus of this approach centers on whether
the-road truck driver was required to lay over because the return shipment would not be
released immediately. The employee was killed at 2:30 a.m. walking back from a tavern
to his motel. In upholding an award of compensation, the court stated:
The commission surmised that employee "to pass some time---during a considerably long waiting period-crossed the road to the tavern and had some drinks
until closing time." The record, therefore, is sufficient to support the conclusion
that the employer contemplated, because of.the work schedule of the employee, that
he would be exposed to the hazards of being upon a highway at any hour of the
day or night, either driving his truck or having to cross it for meals, refreshments,
or to return to his motel room. Accordingly, we cannot say that employee's activity was unreasonable and that the risk to which he was exposed did not directlyilow as
a naturalincident of his employment under the circumstances of this case.
Id. at 234-35, 208 N.W.2d at 89 (emphasis added).
35. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 6.60.
36. Id.
37. Id. § 6.60, at 3-6 & n.13.
38. See id. § 6.60.
39. See id. §§ 6.40, 8.43. For an example of a case directly adopting Professor Larson's
"actual risk" theory, see Crane Rental Serv, v. Rutledge, 219 Tenn. 433, 410 S.W.2d 418
(1966). Several cases also appear to use this theory, but do not refer to it by name. See
Harding Glass Co. v. Albertson, 208 Ark. 866, 868-69, 187 S.W.2d 961, 962 (1945) ("we
think the better rule . . . is that a heat prostration . . . sustained by a workman or employee, while engaged in the employment . . . whether due to unusual or extraordinary
conditions or not, is deemed an accidental injury"); Hughes v. Trustees of Saint Patrick's
Cathedral, 245 N.Y. 201, 202-03, 156 N.E. 665, 665 (1927) ("Although the risk may be
common to all who are exposed to the sun's rays on a hot day, the question is whether the
employment exposes the employee to the risk."); Deziley v. Semet-Solvay Co., 272 A.D.
985, 985, 72 N.Y.S.2d 809, 810 (1947) ("It cannot be gainsaid but that decedent's employment exposed him to the hazard which was his undoing, and in such a case . . . that
characterizes the fatal accident as one arising out of the employment."); Eagle River Bldg.
& Supply Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 199 Wis. 192, 196, 225 N.W. 690, 691 (1929) ("It
makes no difference that the exposure was common to all out-of-door employments in that
locality in that kind of weather. The injury grew out of that employment and was incidental to it. It was a hazard of the industry.").
40. See note 39 supra.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol6/iss3/2

12

Bradt: An Examination of the "Arising out of" and the "in the Course of"
19801

"ARISING OUT OF" AND "IN THE COURSE OF"

the harm was in fact caused by a risk of employment at the time of
injury. 4 1 If the injury is found to have been caused by a risk of
is proper even if the injury is caused
employment, compensation
42
by an act of God.

Fourth, Professor Larson indicates that a few courts have
adopted a positional-risk test. 43 Under this test, compensation is
appropriate if an injury occurs because the claimant's employment
resulted in placement where the injury occurred. 44 Although few
jurisdictions have totally accepted this view, 45 it has been used to
justify compensation on a regular basis in raving lunatic4 6 and
stray bullet 4 7 situations. Additionally, positional risk is the com41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 6.50. Although none of the cases Professor Larson refers to have expressly used the words "positional risk," a few of the cases appear to
use this theory without referring to it by name. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 81 Colo. 233, 234, 254 P. 995, 995 (1927) ("since Oakley's employment required
him to be in a position where the lightning struck him, there was a causal relation between
employment and accident, so that the latter may be said to arise out of the former and
therefore the judgment should be affirmed"); Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Co.,
199 La. 720, 6 So. 2d 747 (1942). The Harvey court commented:
And, when one finds himself at the scene of [the] accident, not because he voluntarily appeared there but because the necessities of his business called him there,
the injuries he may suffer by reason of such accident 'arise out of' the necessity
which brought him there, and hence 'arise out of' his employment, if it so be
that he was employed and his employment required him to be at the place of the
accident at the time when the accident occurred.
In determining, therefore, whether an accident 'arose out of' the employment, it is necessary to consider only this: (1) Was the employee then engaged
about his employer's business and not merely pursuing his own business or pleasure; and (2) did the necessities of that employer's business reasonably require
that the employee be at the place of the accident at the time the accident occurred?
. . . It was his employer's business which called him to the place and time of
the accident and not his own pleasure or business; and hence his injuries arose
out of his pursuit of his employer's business ....
Id. at 730, 6 So. 2d at 750 (emphasis in original) (quoting Kern v. Southport Mill, 174 La.
432, 438-39, 141 So. 19, 21 (1932)).
44. See note 43 supra.
45. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 6.50.
46. Id.; see, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hampton, 414 S.W.2d 712, 715 (Tex. Civ. App.
1967) (analyzing several cases awarding compensation in "lunatic" situations).
47. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 6.50; see Christiansen v. Hill Reproduction Co., 262
A.D. 379, 29 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1941), aft'd, 287 N.Y. 690, 39 N.E.2d 300 (1942). The Christiansen court commented:
We can see no reasonable or sensible distinction between the case of an employee, at the time engaged on the mission of his employer, who comes to his
death by the bullet of a gunman on the public highway and one who, likewise
employed, meets the identical fate in a public tavern. . . . He lost his life
through the act of a lunatic or a criminal at a place where his employer directed
him to be for the purpose of promoting the latter's interests.
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monly accepted basis for street-risk coverage. 48
Finally, most jurisdictions have adopted the increased-risk doctrine. 49 Under this approach, compensation is proper if two requirements are met: the injury must arise out of a hazard
increased by the employment;5 0 and, such injury cannot be common to the public in general. 5'
Minnesota cases appear to require the employee to satisfy the
increased-risk doctrine, 52 except in street-risk cases when the positional-risk test is used. 53 Under the Minnesota approach, the increased-risk test is satisfied if there is something, a condition or
incident, 54 about the employment that increases the employee's exposure to the injury beyond that of the public generally 55 or the
262 A.D. at 384-85, 29 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
48. Street risks include all perils normally associated with a street. "Under this test, if
the employment occasions the employee's use of the street, the risks of the street are the
risks of the employment, and . . . [i]t is quite immaterial whether the nature of the employment involves continuous or only occasional exposure to the dangers of the street." 1
A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 9.40 (footnote omitted).
In Bookman v. Lyle Culvert & Road Equip. Co., 153 Minn. 479, 190 N.W. 984
(1922), the court indicated that it has
definitely committed itself to the doctrine that an injury to an employe, engaged
in his employer's service in a duty calling him upon the street, by what is usually
called a street risk to which his work subjects him, arises as a matter of law out of
his employment, although others so employed, or the public using the streets, are
subject to such risks.
Id. at 481, 190 N.W. at 984.
For a general discussion of the street-risk doctrine, see 1 A. LARSON, supra, §§ 9.00.50; 6 W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, §§ 1694-1697.
49. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 6.30, at 3-4 & nn.10-10.1; see Reich v. A. Reich &
Sons Gardens, Inc., 485 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. App. 1972) (employee's presence in field during
storm increased risk of injury).
50. See I A. LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 8.41-.42.
51. See id.
52. See, e.g., Fisher v. Fisher, 226 Minn. 171, 32 N.W.2d 424 (1948) (salesman exposed
to special hazard while watching client umpire baseball game); Olson v. Trinity Lodge
No. 282, A.F. & A.M., 226 Minn. 141, 32 N.W.2d 255 (1948) (exposure to icy sidewalk
held special hazard); Stenberg v. Raymond Coop. Creamery, 209 Minn. 366, 296 N.W.
498 (1941) (employee's death resulting from either fall or heart attack held compensable
and risk of his employment); Lickfett v. Jorgenson, 179 Minn. 321, 229 N.W. 138 (1930)
(employee's death from lightning held a special risk).
53. See Auman v. Breckenridge Tel. Co., 188 Minn. 256, 246 N.W. 889 (1933) (injury
to employees from stray bullet held not in course of employment); Bookman v. Lyle Culvert & Road Equip. Co., 153 Minn. 479, 190 N.W. 984 (1922) (employee injured while
mailing employee's letters held in line of employment); note 48 supra and accompanying
text.
54. See, e.g., Olson v. Trinity Lodge No. 282, A.F. & A.M., 226 Minn. 141, 32 N.W.2d
255 (1948).
55. See, e.g., id. at 147, 32 N.W.2d at 259; Lickfett v. Jorgenson, 179 Minn. 321, 323,
229 N.W. 138, 138 (1930).
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56
employee apart from the work.
Regardless of which theory is employed it is crucial to realize
that satisfying the arising out of requirement alone will not assure
compensation. 57 Not only must an employee prove an injury arising out of employment, but the injury must also be shown to have
58
arisen in the course of employment.

B. Interpretihg the "in the Course of" Requirement
The "in the course of" requirement refers primarily to the time,
place, and circumstances surrounding the employee's injury. 59 In
56. Fisher v. Fisher, 226 Minn. 171, 174, 32 N.W.2d 424, 426 (1948); Stenberg v.
Raymond Coop. Creamery, 209 Minn. 366, 371, 296 N.W. 498, 500-01 (1941).
57. Professor Schneider has commented:
[T]here must be a conjunction of the two requirements to permit a recovery of
compensation. "The two elements must co-exist. They must be concurrent and
simultaneous. One without the other will not sustain an award; yet the two are
so entwined that they are usually considered together in the reported cases."
6 W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1,§ 1542, at 3-4 (footnotes omitted).
Similarly, Professor Malone comments, "[t]he requirement, then, is dual, and it must
be satisfied in loto.
It is not enough that the accident either happened during the course of
employment or that it arose out of it. It must do both." Malone, The Limits of Coverage in
Workmen's Compensation- The DualRequirement Reappraised,51 N.C.L. REv. 705, 717 (1973)
(emphasis in original).
The dual requirement concept, however, has not been without its critics. Professor
Bohlen strongly urged that "all accidents occurring during the course of the employment
should be covered without further inquiry." Id. (footnote omitted). In sharp contrast to
Professor Bohlen's suggestion, is the proposed 1955 Department of Labor's Workers' Compensation Statute. This proposed model statute was released for discussion purposes only,
and was the brain child of Professor Larson, then Under Secretary of Labor. That statute
indicated compensation would be proper anytime the arising out of test was met. See id. at
717-18.
Professor Malone offers a third alternative. He suggests that the dual requirements of
arising out of and in the course of may be best visualized as two circles with arising and in
the course of as their centers. These circles not only overlap to give coverage, but often
interact. See id. at 723-28. Interestingly, Professor Malone states that he and Professor
Larson "arrived at this conclusion independently at about the same time. Larson's persuasive explanation is in terms of a suggested 'quantum theory.' " Id. at 728 n.40. For
further discussion of Professor Malone's concept of overlapping and interacting compensation spheres, see Malone, Some Recent Developments in the Substantive Law of Workmen's Compensation, 16 VAND. L. REV. 1039, 1050-51 (1963). For a discussion of Professor Larson's
"quantum theory," see IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 29.00-.10 (1979).
58. See 6 W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, § 1542; Malone, The Limits of Coverage in Workmen's Compensation--The Dual Requirement Reappraised supra note 57, at 717-18.
59. See Swenson v. Zacher, 264 Minn. 203, 207, 118 N.W.2d 786, 789 (1962) ("[Tlhe
term 'in the course of' refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the accident causing
the injury."). Professor Larson indicates that "fain injury is paid [si ] to arise in the course
of the employment when ittakes place within the period of the employment." I A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 14.00. Similarly, Professor Schneider states, "[i]n
the course of employment points to the time, place, and circumstances under which an accident takes
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Minnesota special emphasis is given to the time, place, and circumstances requirement because the statutory definition of "personal injury" provides:
"Personal injury" means injury arising out of and in the course
of employment . . . but does not cover an employee except

while engaged in, on, or about the premises where his services
require his presence as a part of such service at the time of the
injury and during the hours of such service. 6°
Although this statute would appear to prohibit compensation
unless an injury occurs on the employment premises during the
regular hours and duties of employment, it has not been so construed. 61 Rather, any act outside an employee's regular duties is
compensable if undertaken in good faith to advance the employer's interest. 62 This is true even if the employee's assigned
place, and simply means 'While the employment was in progress.'" 6 W. SCHNEIDER,
supra note 1, § 1542(c), at 19-20.
60. MINN. STAT. § 176.011(16) (1978).
61. See, e.g., Blattner v. Loyal Order of Moose, 264 Minn. 79, 117 N.W.2d 570 (1962)
(allowing compensation for injury that occurred while waiting for a ride home); Nelson v.
City of St. Paul, 249 Minn. 53, 81 N.W.2d 272 (1957) (allowing compensation for injury
that occurred while walking to work); Olson v. Trinity Lodge No. 282, A.F. & A.M., 226
Minn. 141, 32 N.W.2d 255 (1948) (same).
In B/attner the court commented:
The term "hours of service" must not be construed so narrowly as to include
only that for which the worker is paid or only those moments which he actually
spends at a shovel, machine, or workbench. An injury to a workman may arise
out of and in the course of his employment even if he is not actually working at
the time of his injury.
264 Minn. at 83, 117 N.W.2d at 573 (quoting Olson v. Trinity Lodge No. 282, A.F. &
A.M., 226 Minn. 141, 145, 32 N.W.2d 255, 258 (1948)).
The Ne/son court indicated:
The statutory limitation . . .that the accidental injury to be compensable must
occur during the hours of service is to be given a liberal and reasonable construction
so as to include during such hours a reasonable time for ingress after the employee, having put aside his own independent purposes, has come to a point
which is not only immediately adjacent to the working premises but also within
the range of hazards peculiarly associated with the employment.
249 Minn. at 56-57, 81 N.W.2d at 276 (emphasis in original).
62. See, e.g., Riley v. Perkins, 282 Ala. 629, 213 So. 2d 796 (1968) (per curiam) (seller
of cotton seed meal injured while unloading truck); Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 50 Ariz. 509, 73 P.2d 700 (1937) (stock boy injured while killing scorpion); Swenson v. Zacher, 264 Minn. 203, 118 N.W.2d 786 (1962) (cook injured while
investigating backyard noises); Beam v. State Workmen's Compensation Fund, 261 S.C.
327, 200 S.E.2d 83 (1973) (teachers killed in automobile accident while driving to professional meeting). According to Professor Larson, "[an act outside an employee's regular
duties which is undertaken in good faith to advance the employer's interests, whether or
not the employee's own assigned work is thereby furthered, is within the course of employment." IA A. LARSON, supra note 1,§ 27.00 (1979).
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work is not being furthered. 63 Moreover, the time when the employee is serving the employer need not coincide with the period
for which wages are paid. 64 The reasons for this rather liberal interpretation appear to be two-fold. First, the arising out of and in
the course of requirements are liberally interpreted in favor of injured employees. 65 Second, a reason never expressly stated, but
implicit in several cases, is that when an injury clearly arises out of
employment, the in the course of requirement sometimes is relaxed. 66 Nelson v. City of St. Paul6l affords an excellent illustration
of how a strong arising situation can bootstrap the in the course of
63. See, e.g., Swenson v. Zacher, 264 Minn. 203, 210, 118 N.W.2d 786, 791 (1962)
(employer's interests served by cook investigating backyard noises); IA A. LARSON, supra
note 1, § 27.00 (1979).
64. Professor Larson indicates that as a general rule:
Injuries incurred by an employee while leaving the premises, collecting pay,
or getting his clothes or tools within a reasonable time after termination of the
employment are within the course of employment, since they are normal incidents of the employment relation. Injuries before actual hiring are not compensable, but hiring is not deemed to depend on paper formalities such as signing
the payroll and withholding slips.
1A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 26.00 (1979).
In Blattner v. Loyal Order of Moose, 264 Minn. 79, 117 N.W.2d 570 (1962), the court
said, "[t]he test is whether the accident occurred at a time when the employee was being of
service to the employer, which may or may not coincide with the period for which wages
are paid." Id. at 81, 117 N.W.2d at 572.
65. The Minnesota Supreme Court on numerous occasions has held that the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act should be liberally interpreted to provide benefits for
injured workers. See, e.g., Epp v. Midwestern Mach. Co., 296 Minn. 231, 233, 208 N.W.2d
87, 88 (1973) (per curiam); Sandmeyer v. City of Bemidji, 281 Minn. 217, 221, 161
N.W.2d 318, 320 (1968); Jonas v. Lillyblad, 272 Minn. 299, 301, 137 N.W.2d 370, 372
(1965).
In Epp the court stated:
The Workmen's Compensation Act, which provides benefits for an employee's death "arising out of and in the course of employment,"... is a highly
remedial statute and should not be construed so as to deny benefits unless it
clearly appears that the conduct which results in death does not come within the
protection of the act.
296 Minn. at 233, 208 N.W.2d at 88 (citing Sandmeyer and Jonas).
66. Professor Malone indicates that "a very strong showing on the during-course-of
side of the ledger can so operate as to offset a decided weakness on the arise-out-of side of
the balance sheet." Malone, Some Recent Developments in the Substantive Law of Workmen's
Compensation, supra note 57, at 1050. Cases that appear to support Professor Malone's
theory include Zytkewick v. Ford Motor Co., 340 Mich. 309, 65 N.W.2d 813 (1954), Nelson v. City of St. Paul, 249 Minn. 53, 81 N.W.2d 272 (1957), and Meo v. Commercial Can
Corp., 76 NJ. Super. 484, 184 A.2d 891 (Bergen County Ct. 1962), afd,80 N.J. Super. 58,
192 A.2d 854 (App. Div. 1963). Professor Larson discusses a "quantum theory" of workconnection in which the course-of-employment and arising-out-of tests are to be applied
independently, and deficiencies in the strength of one test can be made up by strength in
the other test. See IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 29.00-.10 (1979).
67. 249 Minn. 53, 81 N.W.2d 272 (1957).
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requirement into a compensable event. 68 In Nelson the employee,
a school teacher, was walking toward her schoolhouse between
8:45 and 9:00 a.m. when she sustained an injury. 69 Although
classes began at 9:00 a.m., she was required to be at school by 8:45
a.m. to hand out school-supplied playground equipment.7 0 Before
she reached the school playground, the employee was struck by a
baseball batted from within the playground. 7" Despite the fact
that the claimant had neither reached her employer's premises nor
72
had formally begun working, the court awarded compensation.
Courts in other jurisdictions, at least implicitly, also have recognized that a very close relationship between the "arising out of"
hazard and the worker's job may compensate for glaring short73
comings with reference to the "in the course of" requirement.
Similarly, when an accident clearly arises "in the course of" em74
ployment the "arising out of" requirement may be relaxed.

The next two sections of this Article will analyze the most difficult and often recurring compensation problems that plague the
legal scholar and practitioner in their efforts to determine whether
68. See generaly 1A A. LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 29.00-.10 (1979); Malone, Some Recent
Developments in the Substantive Law of Workmen's Compensation, supra note 57, at 1049-52.
69. See 249 Minn. at 55, 81 N.W.2d at 275.
70. See td. at 54, 81 N.W.2d at 275.
71. See id. at 55, 81 N.W.2d at 275.
72. See id. at 58-59, 81 N.W.2d at 277.
73. For example, in Meo v. Commercial Can Corp., 76 N.J. Super. 484, 184 A.2d 891
(Bergen County Ct. 1962), aJ'd,80 N.J. Super. 58, 192 A.2d 854 (App. Div. 1963), the
injured employee was the supervisor of the employer's factory. Because of a labor dispute
and ensuing strike, the injured employee was engaged in strikebreaking activities on behalf of the employer. See id. at 486, 184 A.2d at 892. While Meo attempted to enter his
car to drive to work several disgruntled strikers assaulted and severely beat him. See id. at
488, 184 A.2d at 893. Although the injury occurred at home, compensation was awarded.
See id. at 491, 184 A.2d at 895. Compare id with Corcoran v. Teamsters & Chauffeurs Joint
Council No. 32, 209 Minn. 289, 297 N.W. 4 (1941) (labor organizer, after being
threatened for union activity, entitled to compensation benefits when killed at home by
unknown assailant).
In Zytkewick v. Ford Motor Co., 340 Mich. 309, 65 N.W.2d 813 (1954), the injured
employee, a factory worker, died of cyanide poisoning. The court indicated that there was
sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the view that the cyanide accidently came in
contact with decedent's body as a result of his work environment. See id. at 318-19, 65
N.W.2d at 818. After arriving home in apparent good health the employee died from the
poisoning after undressing for bed. See id. at 312-13, 65 N.W.2d at 815.
74. Employee horseplay injuries provide an excellent illustration of this concept. See,
e.g., Cunning v. City of Hopkins, 258 Minn. 306, 103 N.W.2d 876 (1960) (employee riding
in truck playfully threw raincoat over windshield resulting in collision; compensation
awarded). The horseplay doctrine is discussed in notes 498-536 infra and accompanying
text.
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an injury arises out of and in the course of employment.7 5 Because
in most instances the arising out of and in the course of requirements are too closely interwoven to be examined separately,7 6 this
Article will group its analysis along time and place,7 7 and employee-activity problems. 78 The general rules that have been developed to alleviate the difficulties presented by these problem
79
areas are examined below.
III.

TIME AND PLACE PROBLEMS

A.

The "Coming and Going" Rule

In Minnesota, as in the vast majority of jurisdictions, injuries
received while going to or returning from work are generally noncompensable.8 0 Numerous exceptions to the "coming and going"
75. See notes 80-558 mnfiaand accompanying text.
76. The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the difficulty of examining independently each side of the "arising out of" and "in the course of" coin in Lange v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 257 Minn. 54, 99 N.W.2d 915 (1959):
[A]s used in the Workmen's Compensation Act the term "in the course of" refers
to the time, place, and circumstances of the accident, whereas the term "arising
out of" relates to the causal connection between the employment and the injury.
As applied in some factual situations, however, the two concepts are so closely
interwoven that an attempt to adhere to technical distinctions serves little purpose.
Id. at 56, 99 N.W.2d at 917 (footnote omitted).
77. See notes 80-308 infa and accompanying text.
78. See notes 309-558 infra and accompanying text.
79. See notes 80-558 znfa and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Reeves v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 50 F. Supp. 772, 773 (N.D. Tex. 1943)
(applying Texas law); Johnson v. Clark, 230 Ark. 275, 276, 322 S.W.2d 72, 73 (1959);
Satack v. State, 275 N.W.2d 556, 557 (Minn. 1978); Johannsen v. Acton Constr. Co., 264
Minn. 540, 545, 119 N.W.2d 826, 829 (1963).
Several rationales for the coming and going rule have been expressed. First, during
the travel to and from work the employer exerts no control over the employee's activities.
See, e.g., Morris v. Hermann Forwarding Co., 18 N.J. 195, 200, 113 A.2d 513, 515 (1955)
("Complications in the factor of employer control constituted 'one reason why compensation statutes have never attempted to cover the journey to and from work in ordinary
cases.' "). Second, any exposure to the risk of travel to and from employment attaches to
the claimant merely as a member of the traveling public and not as an employee. See 8 W.
SCHNEIDER, supra note 1,§ 1710, at 7. Third, the relationship of employer and employee
is suspended during the time the employee travels to and from employment. See 1d. Finally, the coming and going rule represents workable line drawing in determining compensation disputes. See I A. LARSON, supra note 1,§ 15.11.
Notwithstanding the above rationales, the coming and going rule has been subjected
to harsh criticism. Roscoe Pound has argued:
If one had to classify this case under one of the accepted exceptions to the "going
and coming rule" it would not be difficult to do so.... It is time the "going
and coming rule" and the endless distinctions for getting around it, which have
grown out of it and darken counsel in plain cases, was given up.
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rule, however, have been judicially8 l or legislatively 2 created in
order to avoid the sometimes harsh results that follow from its
strict application. 3 Exceptions to the rule have been allowed
when the employer regularly furnishes the employee transportation to and from work,8 4 when the nature of the employee's job
necessitates travel,8 5 when the employee sustains an injury while
traveling a route that is a reasonable ingress to or egress from the
employer's premises, 6 and when the employee is exposed to a spePound, Comments on Recent Important Workmen's Compensation Cases, 15 NACCA L.J. 45, 86-87
(1955).
Similarly, Professor Horovitz has indicated:
The rule has been a source of injustice to injured workers for many years. It has
put upon them the burden of proving an exception to this narrow court-made
rule. It should be abandoned in favor of deciding liberally in each case whether
the journey and injury in question arose "in the course of" the employment.
Horovitz, Workmen's Compensation: Half Centug of.udicial Developments, 41 NEB. L. REV. 1,
52 (1961). Professor Horovitz has advocated that employees should be protected "for a
reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises." S. HOROVITz,
supra note 15, at 161 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). This view has been
soundly criticized by Professor Larson because it provides no standards by which to test
"reasonableness." See I A. LARSON, supra, § 15.12.
Interestingly, the coming and going rule appears to be an Anglo-American rule that
has been rejected by several European countries. Professor Riesenfeld indicates that
France and Germany have rejected the rule. See Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Compensation for Industral Accidents Here and Abroad, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 531, 549 (1954).
81. Professor Horovitz lists six recognized exceptions to the coming and going rule:
(1) [I]f the employee is on the way to or from work in a vehicle owned or supplied by the employer. . . ; (2) if the employee is subject to call at all hours or at
the moment of injury; (3) if the employee is traveling for the employer. . . ; (4)
if the employer pays for the employee's time from the moment he leaves his
home to his return home; (5) if the employee is on the way home to do further
work at home . . . ; (6) where the employee is required to bring his automobile
to his place of business for use there.
S. HOROVIZ, supra note 15, at 162-65.
82. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 176.011(16) (1978) ("Where the employer regularly furnishes transportation to his employees to and from the place of employment such employees are subject to this chapter while being so transported."); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.03(1)(c)(1) (West 1973), which provides:
Every employe going to and from his employment in the ordinary and usual
way, while on the premises of his employer, or while in the immediate vicinity
thereof if the injury results from an occurrence on the premises, shall be deemed
to be performing service growing out of and incidental to his employment ....
Id.
83. For a general discussion of the exceptions to the coming and going rule, see I A.
LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 15.12-.54; 8 W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, §§ 1711-1751; Note,
Workmen's Compensation-The "Going and Coming" Rule and Its Exceptions in Kentucky, 47 Ky.
L.J. 420 (1959).
84. See notes 88-140 'nfla and accompanying text.
85. See notes 141-97 infia and accompanying text.
86. See notes 198-224 infia and accompanying text.
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cial hazard while traveling to the employment. 87
I.

Employer Furmshed Transportation

In Nesbitt v. Twin City Forge & Foundry Co.,88 the employment
contract specifically provided for free transportation from the end
of the nearest streetcar lot to the employer's premises.89 While riding to work in a conveyance furnished by the employer and under
the employer's control, the employee sustained an injury. 90 The
Nesbitt court, in denying compensation, based its holding on the
ground that the restrictive clause in the Minnesota statute "[n]ot
to cover workmen except while engaged in, on or about the premises," prevented recovery for injuries sustained while an employee
rode to the employer's premises, even when riding in a conveyance
furnished by the employer. 9 1 In so holding, the Aesbit'l court recognized that the rule was otherwise in some jurisdictions that did not
have such a restrictive clause, 92 and expressly invited legislative
'93
consideration of the matter for "the attention it merits."
The Minnesota Legislature responded to that invitation in 1923
by adding language to the statutory predecessor of section 176.011,
subdivision 16,94 which, in its present form, provides: "[w]here the
employer regularly furnished transportation to his employees to
and from the place of employment such employees are subject to
this chapter while being so transported." 95
So formulated, the 1923 amendment requires that four conditions be satisfied before compensation may be awarded. First, the
transportation must be "regularly furnished. '96 Second, the employee's injury must be traced to the employer's "transportation."' 9 7 Third, the transportation must be furnished "to and from
the place of employment. 98 Finally, the injury must have oc87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See notes 225-37 infta and accompanying text.
145 Minn. 286, 177 N.W. 131 (1920).
See id. at 288, 177 N.W. at 131-32.
See id'. at 288, 177 N.W. at 132.
Id. at 290-91, 177 N.W. at 132-33.
See id. at 290, 177 N.W. at 132.
Id. at 291, 177 N.W. at 133.
See Act of Apr. 27, 1923, ch. 300, § 14, 1923 Minn. Laws 398, 409 (current version

at MINN. STAT. § 176.011(16) (1978)).
95. MINN. STAT. § 176.011(16) (1978).

96. See notes 101-28 infra and accompanying text.
97. See notes 129-33 tinfa
and accompanying text.
98. See notes 134-36 infta and accompanying text.
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curred while the employee was "being so transported." 99 Each of
these requirements will be individually examined. 1° °
a.

"'RegularlyFurnished"

The first case to examine the "regularly furnished" requirement
was Gehrke v. Wess. t0 ' In Gehrke a construction worker's dependents brought suit under the wrongful death statute after the employee was killed while being transported from a work site to a

construction camp at the end of a work day.' 0 2 Interestingly, the
employer's defense was that the employee's dependents' sole remedy was under the workers' compensation act, because the death
was compensable under section 176.011, subdivision 16.103 The
Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with the employer in holding

that, although the statute applied only when the transportation is
"regularly furnished," the requirement "does not require a formal

contract between employer and employe, nor does it require that
the transportation occur 'during the hours of service.' "104
The next case to examine the "regularly furnished" concept was
HardwareMutual Casualy Co. v. Ozmun.' 0 5 In Ozmun, as in Gehrke,
the employee sought to recover in tort for a personal injury sustained while riding home in the employer's vehicle. 1°6 The employer argued that the employee's sole remedy was under the
workers' compensation law.' 0 7 Occasionally, the employer drove
the employee within two blocks of her home after work. ,08 On the
date of the injury, because of inclement weather, the employer decided to drive the employee to a point less than one block from her
99. See notes 137-40 inra and accompanying text.
100. See notes 101-40 infa and accompanying text.
101. 204 Minn. 445, 284 N.W. 434 (1939).
102. See id. at 445-47, 284 N.W. at 434-35.
103. See id. at 447, 284 N.W. at 435. Precisely what effect the employee's desire to
bring a common-law action may have had on the court's construction of the phrase "regularly furnished" is uncertain. Professor Larson with keen insight has observed:
When the person relying upon the employment relation is not an employee seeking compensation, but an employer seeking a defense to a common-law suit, it
should not be thought surprising if a court is somewhat more exacting in the
evidence it will accept to establish an employment agreement by implication.
IC A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 47.42(a) (1980).
104. 204 Minn. at 448, 284 N.W. at 436.
105. 217 Minn. 280, 14 N.W.2d 351 (1944).
106. See id. at 282, 14 N.W.2d at 353.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 281-82, 14 N.W.2d at 352-53.
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home.10 9 This necessitated crossing railroad tracks where the accident occurred.' 10
In reaching its decision, the Ozmun court construed the phrase
"regularly furnished" as follows:
[Tihe word fmi'hes implies that the employer by affirmative
act provides or makes available to his employes regular transportation to and from their work as an incident of the employment. Mere permissive riding on the employer's vehicles not
affirmatively provided as such transportation is not sufficient.
The word regularly connotes that an occurrence is according to
an established and arranged plan or rule and not to unexplained or irrational variation."'
Based on this construction, the Ozmun court held that the employee could sue her employer in a common-law tort action because transportation was never furnished the employee." 2 Rather,
the employee was merely permitted to ride in the automobile as a
"courtesy."" 3
The Ozmun court's questionable requirement that the furnishing
of transportation must be made pursuant to "an incident of the
employment" was blown out of proportion in a 1972 decision.
Under the rule enunciated in Bonfig v. Megarry Bros., 114 the employer must regularly furnish transportation to an employee, and
the "furnishing" must be "made pursuant to an understanding or
agreement, expressed or implied, that 'being so transported' was a
condition of the employment relationship" before liability
arises.' 1 5 While the former requirement finds support in the statute, 1 6 the latter clearly does not." 7 Section 176.011, subdivision
16 contains no requirement that the transportation must be furnished pursuant to an understanding that the transportation be
furnished as a condition of the employment relationship."18 Consequently, the Bonfig rule should be modified by abrogating its sec109. See id. at 282, 14 N.W.2d at 353.
110. Steeid.
111. Id. at 285, 14 N.W.2d at 354 (emphasis in original).
112. See id. at 286-88, 14 N.W.2d at 355-56.
113. Id. at 286, 14 N.W.2d at 355.
114. 294 Minn. 180, 199 N.W.2d 796 (1972).
115. Id. at 182, 199 N.W.2d at 798.
116. MINN. STAT. § 176.011(16) (1978) provides in relevant part: "[W]here the employer regularly furnished transportation to his employees to and from the place of employment such employees are subject to this chapter while being so transported."
117. See id.
118. See id.
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ond requirement for compensation. This result would be
consistent with the rulings in a number of jurisdictions that have
questioned the correctness of requiring employees to prove that
transportation was furnished pursuant to an understanding that
the furnishing of transportation was a condition of the employment relationship." 9 Professor Larson also has questioned this requirement on the basis that the reason for allowing compensation
in employer-furnished transportation situations is the increased
risk of employment that falls within the ambit of the employer's
20

control. 1

Fortunately, a 1977 Minnesota case can be interpreted as laying
2 ' the
to rest the second part of the Bonfig rule. In Lehn v. K2ad1,
court upheld an award of compensation to an employee injured
while riding home with the employer.122 The employer had been
driving the employee to and from work for almost two months because, "if I bring the son of a bitch to work I'll know he's here
everyday."

23

Two reasons exist for viewing Lehn as abrogating Bonfig's second
requirement. First, the Lehn court emphasized that the employee
sustained his burden of proof merely by testifying that the furnishing of transportation benefited the employer. 24 Second, the compensation court's 125 decision in Lehn indicated compensation was
proper because the employee proved the transportation was pro119. See, e.g., City of San Francisco v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 61 Cal. App. 2d
248, 142 P.2d 760 (1943); Micieli v. Erie R.R., 131 N.J.L. 427, 37 A.2d 123 (1944); Glaser
v. Ideal Guar. Roofing Co., 221 A.D. 434, 223 N.Y.S. 237 (1927).
120. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 17.40, at 4-204 to -207.
121. 312 Minn. 557, 250 N.W.2d 846 (1977) (per curiam).
122. See id. at 557-58, 250 N.W.2d at 847.
123. Id. at 559, 250 N.W.2d at 848.
124. See id. at 558, 250 N.W.2d at 848. It should be noted, however, that the Lehn
court commented in a footnote: "coverage has been denied upon a finding that the employee was transported merely for his own convenience, as a permissive use and not as a
matter of right under the employment contract." Id. at 558 n.2, 250 N.W.2d at 848 n.2
(citing Bonfig). The effect of this language is, at best, uncertain.
125. "Compensation court" is used throughout this Article to refer to the entity denominated "Industrial Commission" from 1921 to 1967, "Workmen's Compensation
Commission" from 1967 to 1975, "Workers' Compensation Board" from 1975 to 1976, and
"Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals" from 1976 to the present. See Act of Mar. 15,
1921, ch. 82, § 66(k)(1), 1921 Minn. Laws 90, 126 (Industrial Commission), as amended by
Act of May 27, 1967, ch. 1, § 7, 1967 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1991, 1993 (Workmen's Compensation Commission), as amended by Act of June 2, 1975, ch. 271, § 3(47), 1975 Minn.
Laws 742, 746 (Workmen's Compensation Board), as amendedby Act of June 4, 1975, ch.
359, § 23, 1975 Minn. Laws 1168, 1189 (Workmen's changed to Workers'), as amended by
Act of Apr. 3, 1976, ch. 134, § 78, 1976 Minn. Laws 316, 345 (Workmen's Compensation
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vided pursuant to an understanding or agreement that it was
given as a condition of the employment. 126 In affirming the compensation court's decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not
indicate that the employee had to prove that there was an understanding or agreement that the transportation was furnished as a
condition of the employment relationship. 127 Consequently, the
present rule in Minnesota appears to be that injuries sustained
while traveling to or from work in an employer-provided vehicle
are compensable if such transportation is regularly furnished and
1
under the employer's control.

b.

28

"Transportation"

In addition to construing the phrase "regularly furnished"'' 29 the
court in Bonfig v. Megarry Bros. 130 also examined the term "transportation." In Bonfig the employer, a highway construction contractor, provided its employee, a supervising foreman, with a truck
for use in performance of his duties and for his personal use in his
off-hours.13 ' The employee died in a motor vehicle accident while
driving the company truck back to his motel after attending a so1 32
cial dinner for off-duty employees sponsored by the employer.
The supreme court affirmed the compensation court's decision
that the death did not arise out of and in the course of employment, in part because the employee simply was not involved in an
accident while riding in employer furnished "transportation."
The supreme court indicated that when an employee uses the employer's motor vehicle for his own convenience, and not for a special errand on behalf of the employer, compensation is
33

improper. 1

The Bonfig construction of the term "transportation" is correct
because merely permitting employees to use company vehicles
Court of Appeals) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 176.011, subd. 6(1) (1978) (Workers'
Compensation Court of Appeals)).
126. See 312 Minn. at 558, 250 N.W.2d at 847.
127. Although proof of an understanding or agreement may not be required, the burden is on the employee to prove that "transportation was regularly furnished as a condition of employment." Id. at 559 n.3, 250 N.W.2d at 848 n.3.
128. See ia. at 558-59, 250 N.W.2d at 848.
129. See notes 114-18 supra and accompanying text.
130. 294 Minn. 180, 199 N.W.2d 796 (1972).
131. 294 Minn. at 181, 199 N.W.2d at 798.
132. Id. at 181-82, 199 N.W.2d at 798.
133. Id. at 183-87, 199 N.W.2d at 799-801 (distinguishing cases involving traveling
employees such as salesmen).
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does not provide a sufficient nexus between an injury and the performance of service for the employer. Moreover, there is obvious
inequity in extending coverage to those employees fortunate
enough to be given employer vehicles, while those employees who
have to rely on their own vehicles or public transportation when
traveling to their employment remain unprotected.
c.

""To andfrom the Place of Employment"

No Minnesota cases appear to have hinged on the court's treatment of the phrase "to and from the place of employment." The
only case in which this phrase may have been given any treatment
is HardwareMutual Casualty Co. v. Ozmun. 134 The decision in Ozmun,
however, rested in large part on the court's definition of the phrase
"regularly furnished."1 35 Consequently, it is difficult to determine
what importance, if any, the employer's transportation of the employee from the employment location to a distance approximately
one block from her home may have had. Because the Ozmun court
determined that the employee had not sustained an injury compensable under section 176.011, subdivision 16,136 it could be argued that unless the transportation was provided from the
employer's facilities directly to the employee's residence, compensation is improper. Certainly, the increased risk of injury to which
the employee is subject is not lessened by the employer's decision
to provide transportation only part of the way to the employee's
residence. Therefore, the mere fact that the employer does not
provide transportation all the way "to and from the place of employment" should not prevent compensation in appropriate situations.
d

"While Being So Transported"

Not surprisingly, compensation in many cases will turn on how
the phrase "while being so transported" is construed. The most
important Minnesota case interpreting the quoted phrase is Markof
v. Emerahte Surfacing Products Co. 13 7 In Markof the employee regularly received a ride home from his employer. After alighting from
134. 217 Minn. 280, 14 N.W.2d 351 (1944).
135. See notes 105-13 supra and accompanying text.
136. See 217 Minn. at 283-86, 14 N.W.2d at 354-55. The Ozmun court also considered
the infrequency of the rides and the fact that the employee was the sister of the employer.
See id. at 285-86, 14 N.W.2d at 354.
137. 190 Minn. 555, 252 N.W. 439 (1934).
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the employer's truck and taking two or three steps across the highway the employee was struck and seriously injured by an automobile. In upholding an award of compensation, the court, quoting
from an early Virginia case, that stated "the transportation of this
claimant to his home was not completed until he had reached a
point which exempted him from the risks incident to that particu39
larjourney."'3 Although Justice Stone wrote a stinging dissent,
the Markof interpretation of the phrase "while being so transported" is logically consistent with the theoretical underpinnings
of our workers' compensation system.' 4 0 Therefore, the Markoff
rule, although nearly four decades old, continues to have its original validity and should be followed in appropriate situations.
2.

Travel as a Part of Service
a.

The General Rule

When the employee receives a substantial payment or reimbursement for travel expenses,' 4 , or payment for the time spent
traveling, 42 the entire journey normally will be in the course of
138. Id. at 559, 252 N.W. at 441 (quoting Scott v. Willis, 150 Va. 260, 265, 142 S.E.
400, 401 (1928)).
139. Id. at 561-62, 252 N.W. at 441-42 (Stone, J., dissenting).
140. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947) (employee was
member of a car pool that employer subsidized); Van De Walle v. American Cyanamid
denied, 414 U.S. 1067 (1973) (employer paid travel allowCo., 477 F.2d 20 (5th Cir.), cert.
ance for employees' unscheduled emergency trips to plant); Bell v. General Am. Transp.
Corp., 52 Ala. App. 118, 290 So. 2d 184 (1973) (employer agreed to pay employee's mileage costs); Zenith Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation App. Bd., 66 Cal. 2d 944,
428 P.2d 606, 59 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1967) (additional $10 per day wages paid as an inducement to work at job site 130 miles from employee's home); Swartzer v. Food Fair Stores,
Inc., 175 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1965) (employee agreed to transfer to another company store only
if employer paid transportation costs); Marshall v. Tribune-Star Publishing Co., 251 Ind.
557, 243 N.E. 761 (1969) (employee, required to drive own car, was paid $5 expense allowance every two weeks); Western Elec. Co. v. Engleman, 13 Md. App. 374, 283 A.2d 437
(1971) (travel allowance paid pursuant to union contract); Lundgaard v. State, 306 Minn.
421, 237 N.W.2d 617 (1975) (employee paid 10 cents per mile for travel expenses); Reading & Bates, Inc. v. Whittington, 208 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1968) (employee paid $2 per day
for travel expenses); Ellingson v. Crick Co., 166 Mont. 431, 533 P.2d 1100 (1975) (employee paid $5 per day travel allowance); Filson v. Bell Tel. Laboratories, Inc., 82 N.J.
Super. 185, 197 A.2d 196 (App. Div. 1964) (employee reimbursed for travel at 8 1/2 cents
per mile); 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 16.30. But see Funk v. A.F. Scheppmann & Son
Constr. Co., 294 Minn. 483, 199 N.W.2d 791 (1972) (compensation denied to employee
furnished with pickup truck, together with payment for its operation); Norvill v. Paul
Hardeman, Inc., 377 P.2d 208 (Okla. 1962) (employee paid $2 per day travel allowance to
work at remote missile site denied compensation).
142. See, e.g., Serrano v. Industrial Comm'n, 75 Ariz. 326, 256 P.2d 709 (1953) (claim-
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employment. Professor Larson indicates that this rule is justifiable
because "employment should be deemed to include travel when
43
the travel itself is a substantial part of the service performed.'
Two recent Minnesota cases apparently follow the general rule.
In 1975 the court decided Lundgaardv. State. 144 In Lundgaard the
claimant was employed to give lectures on emergency health
care. 45 On the day of the injury, she drove from Minneapolis to
Bemidji, a distance of approximately three hundred miles, to participate in a seminar.146 The employee received twenty dollars an
hour and ten cents per mile for compensation. 4 7 On her journey
back to Minneapolis, the employee was injured in an automobile
collision. 48 In reversing the compensation court's denial of compensation, Justice Scott succinctly commented, "The ride home
49
was as much a part of the errand as the ride to Bemidji."'
Three years earlier, in Funk v. A.F Scheppmann &Son Construcion
ant received an additional one hour's pay each day for travel and subsistence expense);
Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 151 Colo. 320, 377 P.2d 745 (1963)
(employee received one hour's travel time per day to drive to remote missile site); Whaley
v. Steuben County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 139 Ind. App. 520, 221 N.E.2d 435
(1966) (employee paid $15 during time available for emergency calls and if called, received hourly rate from time of emergency call until time he returned home); Reading &
Bates, Inc. v. Whittington, 208 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1968) (compensation proper when employee received travel pay at time of injury); I A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 16.20.
143. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 16.30, at 160. Professor Larson also notes that if the
distance is not great, compensation may still be appropriate if special circumstances surround the injury. See id. at 172. For example, in Katz v. Katz, 137 Conn. 134, 75 A.2d 57
(1950), the employer promised to provide transportation for an employee with a weak
heart as an inducement to persuade the employee to remain with the company after it
moved across town. Subsequently, on a day when no transportation was available, the
employee was struck by a car on his way to catch a bus. The court affirmed an award of
compensation because the employer failed to provide the agreed upon transportation and
had directed the employee to take a bus. In obeying the employer's instructions, the employee was acting within the course of his employment. See id. at 139, 75 A.2d at 59-60.
See also Ellingson v. Crick Co., 166 Mont. 431, 533 P.2d 1100 (1975); McMillen v. Arthur
G. McKee & Co., 166 Mont. 400, 533 P.2d 1095 (1975). In both Ellingson and McMillen
the Montana Supreme Court held that although travel payments to the employees were
not intended as compensation for time spent traveling, the employment agreements in
each case specifically stated that a travel allowance was to be paid. Therefore, the injuries
suffered by the employees were compensable. See Ellingson v. Crick Co., 166 Mont. at
432-33, 533 P.2d at 1101; McMillen v. Authur G. McKee & Co., 166 Mont. at 405-06, 533
P.2d at 1098.
144. 306 Minn. 421, 237 N.W.2d 617 (1975).
145. See id. at 422, 237 N.W.2d at 618.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. Id. at 424, 237 N.W.2d at 619.
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Co.,'

50

the court, in a per curiam opinion, reversed an award of

compensation to an employee injured in a traffic accident. The
employee, working on a construction project in Iowa, was permitted to use his employer's truck to visit his family in Minnesota on
weekends. 15 1 The court indicated that an award of compensation
was improper because the trip was made for the employee's "personal convenience."' 152 The distinguishing feature between Lundgaard and Funk is the court's recognition in the latter case that
injuries received on personal missions do not fall within the ambit
of the travel as a part of service rule even if the employer furnishes
the mode of transportation.
b.

Travehng Employees

As a general rule, a traveling employee, for example a salesperson, is in the course of employment continuously during a business.
trip. 5 3 Logic supports this rule. First, the traveling employee's
vehicle may be viewed as a fragment of the employer's premises
throughout the trip. 54 Second, even when traveling employees
150. 294 Minn. 483, 199 N.W.2d 791 (1972) (per curiam).
151. See id. at 483-84, 199 N.W.2d at 792. Besides furnishing the employee with a
pickup truck to perform his job and travel to his home, he was given expense money for
the pickup truck's operation. See id.
152. Id. at 484-85, 199 N.W.2d at 792-93.
153. See, e.g., Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 147 Colo. 309,
363 P.2d 646 (1961) (overseas employee killed while deviating from travel made pursuant
to company orders); C.A. Dunham Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 16 Il1. 2d 102, 156 N.E.2d
560 (1959) (traveling employee killed when bomb exploded in airplane); Widman v. Murray Corp. of America, 245 Mich. 332, 222 N.W. 711 (1929) (traveling employee injured on
train platform); Epp v. Midwestern Mach. Co., 296 Minn. 231, 208 N.W.2d 87 (1973)
(over-the-road truck driver killed while walking to motel); Snyder v. General Paper Corp.,
277 Minn. 376, 152 N.W.2d 743 (1967) (traveling salesman choked to death while entertaining customer); Stansberry v. Monitor Stove Co., 150 Minn. 1, 183 N.W. 977 (1921)
(traveling salesman killed in hotel fire); Lewis v. Lowe & Campbell Athletic Goods Co.,
247 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. 1952) (traveling salesman killed in auto accident near his home);
West Tenn. Nix-A-Mite Sys., Inc. v. Funderburk, 208 Tenn. 381, 346 S.W.2d 250 (1961)
(truck driver killed in collision when he returned to his route after stop at dance hall).
In Snyder, the court affirmed an award of compensation for an employee's fatal injury
while eating at a restaurant while on a trip with a prospective customer. In so holding, the
court stated:
Employees whose work entails travel away from the employer's premises are
held in the majority of jurisdictions to be within the course of their employment
continuously during the trip, except when a distznct departure on a personal errandis
shown. Thus, injuries arising out of the necessity of sleeping in hotels, or eating
in restaurants away from home are usually held compensable.
277 Minn. at 379, 152 N.W.2d at 746 (emphasis by the court) (quoting IA A. LARSON,
supra note 1, § 25.00 (1979)).
154. Professor Larson indicates that "[the employer] has, in a sense, sent the employee
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are not driving vehicles they may be viewed as carrying on their
55
employer's business until the return trip has been completed.
Thus, when a traveling employee is struck by an automobile while
traveling between his hotel and a restaurant, 56 slips in a hotel
bathtub, 5 7 or suffers injury as a result of a fire in a hotel, 58 an
award of compensation is proper.
As with most general rules, the exceptions make its application
difficult. 59 If the employee is on a distinct departure or on a personal mission when injured, the in the course of requirement will
not be satisfied.160 Thus, if a traveling salesman decides to spend
his time visiting a female companion while waiting for a train and
dies in a car accident while journeying to his companion's aparthome on a small ambulatory portion of the premises, just as the sailor on a British ship is
conceived to be on a little floating fragment of Britain herself." 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1,
§ 17.10, at 180.
155. See generally id.§ 17.00.
156. See, e.g., Crees v. Sheldahl Tel. Co., 258 Iowa 292, 139 N.W.2d 190 (1965); Epp v.
Midwestern Mach. Co., 296 Minn. 231, 208 N.W.2d 87 (1973); Robinson v. Federal Tel. &
Radio Corp., 44 N.J. Super. 294, 130 A.2d 386 (1957); Robards v. New York Div. Elec.
Prods., Inc., 33 A.D.2d 1067, 307 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1970); Shelton v. Standard Ins. Co., 389
S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 1965).
157. See Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Adler, 340
F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Miller v. F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 3 N.Y.2d 654, 48
N.E.2d 296, 171 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1958). But see Paduano v. New York State Workmen's
Compensation Bd., 30 A.D.2d 1009, 294 N.Y.S.2d 318 (1968), aJ'd, 25 N.Y.2d 669, 254
N.E.2d 776, 306 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1969) (compensation denied on ground that employee's
bathtub fall was a personal act).
158. See, e.g., California Cas. Indem. Exch. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 5 Cal. 2d
185, 53 P.2d 758 (1936); Brown v. Palmer Constr. Co., 295 A.2d 263 (Me. 1972); Stransberry v. Monitor Stove Co., 150 Minn. 1, 183 N.W. 977 (1921); Burton v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 31 A.D.2d 557, 294 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1968), afd, 24 N.Y.2d 1016, 250 N.E.2d 243,
302 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1969); IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 25.10 (1979).
159. See Gumbrill v. General Motors Corp., 216 Minn. 351, 13 N.W.2d 16 (1944);
Lunde v. Congoleum-Nairn, Inc., 211 Minn. 487, 1 N.W.2d 606 (1942).
In Gumbrll the court stated:
It is true that . . . a traveling employe is considered as carrying on his employer's business at any time he is in his prescribed territory. This cannot be
construed, however, as meaning that in all circumstances an employe is covered
by the workmen's compensation act from the time a special errand or mission
starts until it is completed. As stated in Lunde v. Congoleum-Nairn . . . .
"Such argument assumes that itis impossible for a traveling man, even though
he be otherwise and mostly engaged on his employer's business, to so depart
therefrom on an enterprise of his own as to put him for the time being beyond
coverage of the law. Obviously he may do so."
216 Minn. at 352-53, 13 N.W.2d at 17-18. The Lunde court stated that the argument that
time and place factors are decisive "ignores the real determinant, which is the employe's
activity of the moment." See 211 Minn. at 489, 1 N.W.2d at 607.
160. See note 159 supra.
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ment, his widow is not entitled to compensation benefits. 16 1 Similarly, if a traveling employee is seriously injured while driving
several miles out of his way to view the wreckage of an aircraft,
162
compensation will be denied.
Determining when a traveling employee's activity is reasonable,
or when such an employee is on a distinct departure or on a personal mission, presents a challenge to the fact-finder. The only
guidance offered by the Minnesota court may be gleaned from a
1973 decision. In Epp v. Midwestern Mach'negy Co., 163 the court apparently indicated that if an employer could foresee the hazard
causing the traveling employee's injury, then such an injury arises
out of and in the course of employment. 64 Although the foresee161. See Lunde v. Congoleum-Nairn, Inc., 211 Minn. 487, 1 N.W.2d 606 (1942). Here,
claimant, the widow of a traveling salesman killed in an automobile accident, sought
workers' compensation benefits. Id. at 487-88, 1 N.W.2d at 606. On the fatal day, decedent was in Minneapolis attending a sales conference. Id. Having completed his employment functions, decedent was to return by train to Fargo, leaving Minneapolis at 11 p.m.
Id. The intervening hours before the train left were to be spent with a friend and two
women. On their way to pick up the women, the fatal automobile accident occurred. Id.
at 488, 1 N.W.2d at 606-07. In denying compensation the court stated:
For relator, it is insisted, with misplaced confidence, that as [a] matter of
law compensation should be granted under the rule of the "traveling men's
cases." e.g., Howlett v. Midwest Distributors, Inc .....
Precisely, the argument is that "so long as Lunde did the natural and customary thing which any
salesman would do who had a roving commission such as his, and had four
hours' time to kill waiting for a train, he was covered by the [compensation]
Act."
Such argument assumes that it is impossible for a traveling man, even
though he be otherwise and mostly engaged on his employer's business, to so
depart therefrom on an enterprise of his own as to put him for the time being
beyond coverage of the law. Obviously he may do so. Upon abundant evidence,
the triers of fact have found that Mr. Lunde did just that.
Basically, the argument for relator is wrong in its seeming assumption that
factors of time and place are decisive. It ignores the real determinant, which is
the employe's activity of the moment. Mr. Lunde's activity of the moment was
wholly his own and, as found below, beyond the scope of his employment. That
a traveling salesman is within his own "territory" does not bring all his actions
away from home within the compensation act. The risks of diversions on errands
and for reasons personal to him are not all occupational as [a] matter of law.
There is no suggestion that either of the ladies was a prospective buyer of insurance or linoleum. It would strain both credulity and generosity to hold that the
fatal mishap arose out of and in the course of the employment of either Lunde or
Foster. Too reasonable is the conclusion that course of employment of both was
left for the time being for a detour leading to pleasure rather than business effort.
Id. at 488-90, 1 N.W.2d at 607 (brackets in original).
162. See Laerd v. Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 17 Minn. Workmen's Comp. Dec. 46 (1951); cf.
Rhea v. Overholt, 222 Minn. 467, 25 N.W.2d 656 (1946) (traveling salesman injured while
stopped at tavern to answer a "call of nature" not entitled to compensation benefits).
163. 296 Minn. 231, 208 N.W.2d 87 (1973).
164. In Epp an over-the-road truck driver, required to lay over because his return ship-
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ability test may provide courts with a broad tool with which to
mold their opinions, it sacrifices certainty and does violence to
prior interpretations of section 176.011, subdivision 16.165 Moreover, the foreseeability test is inappropriate in a "no-fault" compensation system and fosters litigation because of the necessity of a
hind-sight application. A more appropriate test would be to consider whether the employment is the predominant factor in exposing an employee to a hazard that is peculiar to the employment in
a different manner and to a greater degree than if he had been
pursuing his personal affairs. This test, although apparently in16 7
consistent with Epp, 1 6 6 finds support in prior Minnesota law
and, more importantly, preserves the integrity of section 176.011,
subdivision 16.
c.

Travel Between Work Places

Perhaps the most well-established exception to the coming and
going rule is the rule that an injury arises out of and in the course
of employment if it occurs while an employee journeys along a
68
public road between two portions of the employer's premises.'
ment was not ready, was killed at 2:30 a.m. walking back from a tavern to his motel. In
upholding an award of compensation the court stated:
The commission surmised that employee "to pass some time---during a considerably long waiting period--crossed the road to the tavern and had some drinks
until closing time." The record, therefore, is sufficient to support the conclusion
that the employer contemplated, because of the work schedule of the employee, that
he would be exposed to the hazards of being upon a highway at any hour of the
day or night, either driving his truck or having to cross it for meals, refreshments,
or to return to his motel room. Accordingly, we cannot say that the employee's
activity was unreasonable and that the risk to which he was exposed did not directl ow
as a natural incident of his employment under the circumstances of this case.
Id. at 234-35, 208 N.W.2d at 89 (emphasis added).
165. In several traveling salesperson cases prior to Epp, the employee's injury was
probably foreseeable; nevertheless, compensation was denied. See Rhea v. Overholt, 222
Minn. 467, 25 N.W.2d 656 (1946) (traveling salesman injured while stopped at tavern to
answer a "call of nature"); Gumbrill v. General Motors Corp., 216 Minn. 351, 13 N.W.2d
16 (1944) (traveling salesman injured while alighting from car outside restaurant); Lunde
v. Congoleum-Nairn, Inc., 211 Minn. 487, 1 N.W.2d 606 (1942) (traveling salesman waiting for train after business meeting killed while on personal errand).
166. See 296 Minn. at 234, 208 N.W.2d at 89.
167. Several prior Minnesota cases support the use of such a test. See, e.g., Lickfett v.
Jorgenson, 179 Minn. 321, 323, 229 N.W. 138, 138 (1930); State exrel. Peoples Coal & Ice
Co. v. District Court, 129 Minn. 502, 503-04, 153 N.W. 119, 120 (1915).
168. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 15.14; 8 W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, § 1737; see, e.g.,
Raytheon Co. v. McLellan, 304 F. Supp. 433 (D. Mass. 1969); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 756, 172 P.2d 1 (1946); Kuharski v. Bristol Brass
Corp., 132 Conn. 563, 46 A.2d 11 (1946); Kaycee Coal Co. v. Short, 450 S.W.2d 262 (Ky.
1970); State Ins. Fund v. Industrial Comm'n, 15 Utah 2d 363, 393 P.2d 397 (1964).
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Moreover, the mere fact that an employee travels across a route
that has been forbidden will not automatically preclude an award
of compensation, 6 9 nor will the use of a longer or less convenient
route than necessary prevent compensation if a distinct departure
from employment has not occurred.

70

The "travel between work place" rule has, however, resulted in
some conflict between authorities in situations involving travel between parking lots and the employment premises.' 7 1 Apparently,
if the parking lot is owned or maintained by the employer most
courts will grant compensation for injuries suffered while traveling
between the employment premises and parking lot.172 Conversely,
if the parking lot is not owned by the employer, most courts will
deny compensation for injuries received while traveling to or from
the employment premises.

73

The Minnesota rule in this area is unclear. The lei-ding Minnesota case discussing the parking lot question is Gofv. FarmersUnion
Accounting Service, Inc. 174 In Goffthe employee was killed while proceeding directly across the street-not at a crosswalk-to a parking
lot made available to employees through an "understanding" between the owner of the parking lot-also owner of the building ini
169. See Herbst v. Hat Corp. of America, 130 Conn. 1, 31 A.2d 329 (1943); 8 W.
supra note 1, § 1737, at 181. For a general discussion of the consequences of
employee misconduct, see notes 498-558 infra and accompanying text.
170. See Mitchell v. Mitchell Drilling Co., 154 Kan. 117, 114 P.2d 841, 844 (1941);
Dennis v. Sinclair Lumber & Fuel Co., 242 Mich. 89, 91-92, 218 N.W. 781, 782 (1928);
Meyer v. Royalton Oil Co., 167 Minn. 515, 208 N.W. 645, 645 (1926); 8 W. SCHNEIDER,
supra note 1, § 1737, at 181. For a general discussion of the consequences of employee
deviation, see notes 283-308 'nfta and accompanying text.
171. See I A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 15.14, at 36-40. Compare Lewis v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 559, 542 P.2d 225, 125 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1975) (compensation granted to employee injured while proceeding along public streets from employer's
parking lot to office) with Osborn v. Industrial Comm'n, 50 Il. 2d 150, 277 N.E.2d 833
(1971) (compensation denied to employee injured while crossing public street that separated factory and employer-owned parking lot).
172. See, e.g., Lewis v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 599, 542 P.2d
225, 125 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1975); Campbell v. Gates Rubber Co., 526 P.2d 679 (1974);
Proctor-Silex Corp. v. DeBrick, 253 Md. 477, 252 A.2d 800 (1969); Lewis v. Walter Scott
& Co., 50 N.J. Super. 283, 141 A.2d 807 (1958); Willis v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 3 Or.
App. 565, 475 P.2d 986 (1970); 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 15.14, at 36.
173. See Dinsmore's Case, 143 Me. 344, 62 A.2d 205 (1948); Taylor v. Albain Shirt Co.,
28 N.C. App. 61, 220 S.E.2d 144 (1975), cert. denied, 289 N.C. 302, 222 S.E.2d 703 (1976); 1
A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 15.14, at 36-40; cf. Goff v. Farmers Union Accounting Serv.,
Inc., 308 Minn. 440, 241 N.W.2d 315 (1976) (employees allowed to use parking lot owned
by employer's landlord) (per curiam).
174. 308 Minn. 440, 241 N.W.2d 315 (1976) (per curiam).
SCHNEIDER,
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which the employer leased its office-and the employer. 75 In affirming an award of compensation, the court stated: "In view of
the relative proximity of the parking lot to the . . . building, as

well as this habitual use by the employees, we conclude that the
board's determination that this route constituted a 'special hazard'
of decedent's employment and an injury resulting therefrom is
compensable must be affirmed.'

1

76

Because of the above-quoted language, one could theorize that
liability was assessed for either of two reasons. 177 The court may
have adopted the rule that any parking lot used by employees with
employer consent may be considered an extension of the employer's premises. If so, all injuries sustained by an employee when
traveling between such a "premises" and the employer's plant
would apparently be compensable. On the other hand, the court's
reference to the special hazard encountered by the employee in
crossing the street may have been the reason for assessing liability.
Although the mere crossing of a public street could hardly be considered a "special hazard,"'' 78 predicating liability upon that theory, instead of the parking lot rule, would result in better policy
because the parking lot in Goff was neither owned nor maintained
by the employer.
d

Special ErrandRule

When an employee is injured while going to or returning from
175. See id. at 440-41, 241 NtW.2d at 316-17.
176. Id. at 443, 241 N.W.2d at 318.
177. Interestingly, the employee's attorney in Gofargued on appeal:
Thus, there are two theories upon which respondent may prevail in this matter.
First, by adoption of the rule. . . that a parking lot maintained by an employer
for use of his employees is considered a premises, and that the general rule is an
employee injured while traveling between two premises of his employer is injured in an activity arising out of and in the course of his employment.
The instant case also fits within the special hazard doctrine which has been
accepted in Minnesota ....
Respondent's Brief at 12, Goff v. Farmers Union Accounting Serv., Inc., 308 Minn. 440,
241 N.W.2d 315 (1976).
178. In Blanks v. Oak Ridge Nursing Home, 281 N.W.2d 690 (Minn. 1979), the court
recognized that crossing an ordinary public street was not a "special hazard" by noting
that:
[Tihe hazard to which relator was exposed was not one incident or causally related to her employment but instead one no greater than that to which all others
not so employed would be exposed if they chose to traverse the boulevard. Her
claim that the frontage road was in effect on employees' parking lot, bringing the
case within the rule of Goff. . . is not persuasive . . ..
Id. at 690.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol6/iss3/2

34

Bradt: An Examination of the "Arising out of" and the "in the Course of"
19801

1ARISING OUT OF" AND ",V THE COURSE OF"

emergency work or a special mission performed on behalf of the
employer, the "coming and going" rule is not applicable. 17 9 In
Minnesota the special-errand doctrine was first recognized in the
80
1935 decision of Nehring v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. '
In Nehring the employee, an electrician, was requested by his em-

ployer to report to work on Sunday to replace a fuse.' 8 ' While en
route home on a motorcycle, the employee was killed in a collision
with an automobile. 182 In affirming an award of compensation,
the Niehrig court held that an off-duty employee called to do an
errand or perform a special mission is deemed to be within the
scope of employment from the moment he leaves his home until
18 3
his return after completion of the mission.

Although subsequent Minnesota decisions have followed this
doctrine, 18 4 the Minnesota court did not outline the requirements
for its application until 1963. In Youngberg v. Don/in Co., 185 the
court indicated that a three-prong test had to be met before an
employee's injury fell within the ambit of the special-errand doctrine. 18 6 First, the employer must make an express or implied re179. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. Oates, 225 Ark. 682, 284 S.W.2d 637 (1955); Jonas v.
Lillyblad, 272 Minn. 299, 137 N.W.2d 370 (1965); Flanders v. Hoy, 230 Pa. Super. Ct.
322, 326 A.2d 492 (1974); 1 A. LARSON, supra note I, § 16.10. See generaly Patterson v.
Whitten, 57 Ala. App. 297, 328 So. 2d 301 (1976).
180. 193 Minn. 169, 258 N.W. 307 (1935).
181. See id. at 170, 258 N.W. at 307.
182. See id.at 170, 258 N.W. at 307-08.
183. The Nhring court, quoting from an earlier United States Supreme Court decision,
stated:
While service on regular hours at a stated place generally begins at that place,
there is always room for agreement by which the service may be taken to begin
earlier or elsewhere. Service in extra hours or on special errands has an element
of distinction which the employer may recognize by agreeing that such service
shall commence when the employe leaves his home on the duty assigned to him
and shall continue until his return. . . . In such case the hazards of the journey
may properly be regarded as hazards of the service and hence within the purview
of the compensation act.
Id. at 173-74, 258 N.W.2d at 309 (quoting Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 288 U.S. 162, 16970 (1933)).
184. See Cosgriff v. Duluth Firemen's Relief Ass'n, 233 Minn. 233, 46 N.W.2d 250
(1951) (employee instructed to attend out-of-town meeting awarded compensation for injuries and disability sustained); Oestreich v. Lakeside Cemetery Ass'n, 229 Minn. 209, 38
N.W.2d 193 (1949) (compensation awarded when employee sustained injuries resulting in
death while deviating from special errand for personal business).
185. 264 Minn. 421, 119 N.W.2d 746 (1963).
186. The Youngberg court stated:
From an examination of the authorities which discuss the so-called special
errand rule it appears that it has been applied where (a) there is an express or
implied request that the service be performed after working hours by an employee who has fixed hours of employment; (b) the trip involved on the errand

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1980

35

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 2
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

quest that the service be performed after working hours by an
employee who has fixed hours of employment.18 7 Second, the trip
must be an integral part of the service performed.' 8 Finally, the
work performed must be special and not work that is regular and
recurring during the normal hours of employment. 8 9
The requirement that the trip must be an integral part of the
service performed appears to have been abrogated by Jonas v. Lil.blad. 9° In Jonas an employee had gone back to his employer's
hotel after his normal working hours to shut off a stoker. The employee was struck by an automobile while crossing an intersection
on the way home. In affirming an award of compensation, the
court emphasized that the dominant consideration in special-errand cases is two-fold. First, the service an employee performs
must be made after working hours.' 9' Second, the service performed can be neither regular nor recurring during the employee's
normal hours of employment.' 92 Jonas should be interpreted as
eliminating Youngberg's second requirement, the meaning of which
was, at best, unclear.
Perhaps the most difficult application of the special-errand doctrine occurs in situations in which the completion of the mission is
at issue. For example, in Bengston v. Greening,' 93 the employee, a
bookkeeper, who normally worked a five-day week, was requested
to work on Saturday to assist an accountant preparing the employer's income tax report. 9 4 After the work was completed, the
employee's husband drove her home., 95 After getting out of the
automobile in front of her home, the employee crossed a public
sidewalk and sustained an injury when she slipped and fell. '96 The
Bengston court, in rejecting the argument that such a mission is
complete when the employee arrives home, stated that "[h]er walk
be an integral part of the service performed; and (c) the work performed, although related to the employment be special in the sense that the task requested
was not one which was regular and recurring during the normal hours of employment.
Id. at 425, 119 N.W.2d at 749.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. 272 Minn. 299, 137 N.W.2d 370 (1965).
191. See id. at 305, 137 N.W.2d at 374.
192. See id.
193. 230 Minn. 139, 41 N.W.2d 185 (1950).
194. See id.at 140, 41 N.W.2d at 186.
195. See id.
196. Id.
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from the car to the house was occasioned by the errand."1 97 The
author suggests that affording employees on special errands the
same protection that is afforded traveling salesmen would relieve
the dilemma. Absent a deviation, the employee, when responding
to a special call of the employer, would be covered from the time
he initiates the journey until he has safely returned to his point of
departure.
3.

Safe Ingress to or Egressfrom Employment Rule

Certainly one of the more confusing exceptions to the coming
and going rule is the requirement that employers furnish their employees safe ingress to or egress from their employment premises 98
Much of the confusion can be traced to two factors. First, the safe
ingress and egress rule and the special-hazard doctrine are often
interwoven in muddled opinions. 99 Second, at least in Minnesota,
the premises concept has never clearly been defined.
As a general rule, the employment premises are coterminous
with the area devoted by the employer to the industry with which
the employee is associated .2 ° Thus, if the employee works in a
factory the premises will include everything within the factory
fence. 20 ' Parking lots maintained, owned, or leased by the employer also are considered to be part of the premises20 2 even when
separated from the employer's main premises. 20 3 Similarly, an employer who rents office space in a building may be liable to employees who sustain injuries in the halls, common stairs, lobbies,
elevators, or vestibules in which the employer may be deemed to
197. Id.
198. See Simonson v. Knight, 174 Minn. 491, 219 N.W. 869 (1928).
199. The special hazard doctrine is examined in notes 225-37 hnfra and accompanying
text.
200. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 15.41.
201. Id. Indeed, it may even include the fence itself. Id. § 15.41, at 4-59 n.i; see Nelson
Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Shatwell, 203 Okla. 417, 222 P.2d 750 (1950) (compensation awarded to
employee injured while climbing employer's fence as was customary when main gate was
locked).
202. See Lewis v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 559, 542 P.2d 225,
125 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1975); Campbell v. Gates Rubber Co., 526 P.2d 679 (Colo. App.
1974); Proctor-Silex Corp. v. DeBrick, 253 Md. 477, 252 A.2d 800 (1969); Lewis v. Walter
Scott & Co., 50 N.J. Super. 282, 141 A.2d 807 (1958); Willis v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 3
Or. App. 565, 475 P.2d 986 (1970); 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 15.14.
203. See, e.g., Goff v. Farmers Union Accounting Serv. Inc., 308 Minn. 440, 241
N.W.2d 315 (1976) (per curiam); Van Deusen v. County of Onondaga, 45 A.D.2d 794, 357
N.Y.S.2d 155 (1974); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 12 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 502, 316 A.2d 673 (1974).
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4

Illustrative of the safe ingress and egress rule in Minnesota is
Simonson v. Knight.20 5 In Simonson a restaurant employee who customarily entered and departed from the back door of the restaurant and traveled across the rear of the lot on which the restaurant
was located, fell into an excavation on the lot. 20 6 In reversing the

compensation court's order denying compensation, the court held
that the route of ingress and egress was an incident of employment, and as such, was part of the "working premises" on which
20 7
the hazards encountered were employment related.
Although Professor Horovitz and a few courts have advocated
the position that employers should protect employees for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises, 20

this is not the rule in Minnesota. Persuasive reasons for not

adopting Professor Horovitz's proposal are illustrated by recent
20 9
cases from New Jersey and Michigan.
In DiNardo v. Newark Board of Education,210 the employee was in-

jured after work when her heel caught in a crack in a public sidewalk adjacent to the school building in which she was
employed. 2 t ' At the time of the injury, the employee was on her
way to a bus stop. 2 12 The New Jersey court indicated that com-

pensation was proper for several reasons, emphasizing that the employee was in an area where she might reasonably be and was
therefore a reasonable distance away from the employer's premises.

2 13

204. See In re Harlow's Case, 345 Mass. 765, 186 N.E.2d 925 (1962) (lobby); Lammering v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 464 S.W.2d 511 (Mo. App. 1971) (elevator); Cerria v.
Union News Co., 31 N.J. Super. 369, 106 A.2d 745 (1954) (common stairs); Podhoretz v.
Rubinstein, 35 A.D.2d 1042, 316 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1970) (vestibule); McGrath v. Chautauqua County Home, 31 A.D.2d 577, 294 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1968) (hallway).
205. 174 Minn. 491, 219 N.W. 869 (1928).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 492-93, 219 N.W. at 870-71.
208. See S. HOROVITZ, supra note 15, at 161; Horovitz, supra note 80, at 49-52.
209. See notes 210-18 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
210. 118 N.J. Super. 536, 289 A.2d 259 (1972) (per curiam).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. The DiNardo court commented:
[P]etitioner's accident arose out of the employment since it resulted from a risk
reasonably incidental thereto, to-wit: a crack in the sidewalk over which she was
required to travel in making her work-connected trip to and from work, and that
it arose in the course of her employment since she was then doing what one so
employed might reasonably do within the time during which she was employed
and at a place where she might reasonably be during that time.
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Similarly, in Fischer v. Lincoln Tool & Die Co., 2 14 the employee,
while proceeding to his employer's premises, slipped and fell on
some ice on a public sidewalk adjacent to the employer's property.2 1 5 The Michigan court held that compensation was proper
because it was reasonable for the employer to expect its employees
2 16
to park in a public street.
As Professor Larson notes in discussing the DiNardo and Fischer
cases, "there is no stopping the process started by these decisions
short of complete demolition of the premises rule. '2 17 Professor
Larson also indicates that the apparent reasonableness test of
DiNardo and Fischer contains nothing to justify differentiating
between fifty and 200 feet.2 1 8 Although it is just as "reasonable" to

expect that an employee will drive to work, an injury suffered in
an auto accident fifty feet from the plant should not be compensable. Neither the reasonableness of the employee's activity nor the
ability of the employer to foresee the activity should be the determinative factor.
Fortunately, the Pandora's box containing DiNardo and Ficher
has not been opened by the Minnesota Supreme Court. Indeed,
implicit in two recent Minnesota decisions is a rejection of the
"reasonableness" test. In Satack v. State,21 9 the court denied compensation to a state employee who fell on a public sidewalk located
on state-owned property approximately ten feet away from the entrance to the building in which she worked. 220 The court denied
compensation because the employee had not yet reached the emId.
214. 37 Mich. App. 198, 194 N.W.2d 476 (1972) (per curiam).
215. Id. at 199, 194 N.W.2d at 477.
216. Id. at 199, 194 N.W.2d at 477-78.
217. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 15.12.
218. See id. Professor Larson comments:
Now suppose claimant has parked his car in the public street six blocks from the
school. Can walking to this parking space be distinguished from walking to a
bus stop? Michigan, in Fischer, has already given an answer. Indeed, suppose
claimant is not walking to a.car or bus at all, but simply walking home. Assuming the distance is no greater than that to the bus stop, how can this claimant be
denied compensation merely because he did not happen to need vehicular transportation? Next suppose that the walking distance is a little longer than that to
public transportation-is the court going to draw some imaginary line and say
that only the first six blocks are covered? If a seven-block case comes up, will the
court have the audacity to issue a denial, when only one bock [si] separates the
two cases?
Id.
219. 275 N.W.2d 556 (Minn. 1978).
220. Id. at 557.
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22

ployer's premises. '
Subsequently, in Blanks v. Oak Ridge Nursing Home,22 2 the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed a decision denying compensation to
an employee who rode to work with a coemployee who parked on
the street in front of the employer's premises. The employee sustained an injury when she fell on a grassy area between the street
and sidewalk in front of the employer's premises.2 23 The court emphasized that the hazard to which the employee was exposed was
not related to her employment and was no greater than the hazard
to which all other members of the public would be exposed if they
chose to travel the boulevard in front of the employer's premises.

22 4

In summary, the two most recent Minnesota Supreme Court decisions indicate that the "safe ingress and egress rule" is limited in
its application to injuries occurring on the employer's premises.
The court has refrained from carving out exceptions on the basis of
such an illogical and ill-defined distinction as reasonable proximity.
4.

Special Hazard Exception

Many jurisdictions, including Minnesota, have formulated a
general rule that when an employee is injured on a roadway that is
principally an avenue of ingress to or egress from the employer's
premises and the roadway is located in such a manner that
hazards encountered on it are peculiar to the employment, injuries
suffered because of the "special hazard" will generally be compensable.

22 5

The Minnesota rule in this area is unsettled because of the apparent inconsistent results in two supreme court cases. InJohannsen
v. Acton Construction Co., 226 an employee, injured during his lunch
hour while traveling over a roadway leading from his employer's
premises, was allowed compensation because the recognized use of
the roadway to and from the employment exposed him to a special
221. Id. at 557-58.
222. 281 N.W.2d 690 (Minn. 1979) (per curiam).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 159 (1928); Jaynes v. Potlatch
Forests, Inc., 75 Idaho 297, 299, 271 P.2d 1016, 1019 (1954); Johannsen v. Acton Constr.
Co., 264 Minn. 540, 550-51, 119 N.W.2d 826, 832 (1963); 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1,

§ 15.13.
226. 264 Minn. 540, 119 N.W.2d 826 (1963).
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later, however, in
hazard peculiar to his employment.2 27 One 22year
Bronson v. Joyner's Silver & Electroplating,Inc., a on almost identical
facts, compensation was denied. 229 The only apparent factual distinction between Johannsen and Bronson was that in Johannsen the
roadway had been barricaded to the public and marked "Private
Property. No Thoroughfare. ' 230 In Bronson, on the other hand, the
employee and four coemployees were killed when their automobile
was struck by a train while they were driving over a roadway used
23
by the general public.

1

The feature distinguishing Johannsen from Bronson may mean
that the Minnesota court has adopted the public versus private
road doctrine.2 32 Under this doctrine, compensation is allowed for
injuries that occur on private property and is denied for those injuries that occur on public property such as a sidewalk or public
street.2 3 3 This distinction finds its greatest support in a Lord Cozens-Hardy decision in which he held that an employee on a public
with no rights
road must be viewed as a member of the public,
2 34
contract.
employment
an
by
conferred
being
Although Lord Cozens-Hardy's reasoning may be appealing because of its simplicity, it has correctly been rejected by most
courts 23

5

and commentators 23 6 because "workmen's compensation

problems cannot be solved by mechanical applications of law relating to rights in land, trespass, license and the like."'237 Consequently, if the Minnesota court in Bronson did adopt the private
versus public way distinction it would do well to repudiate this
mechanical and often unfair doctrine.
227.

See ia. at 550-51, 119 N.W.2d at 832.

228. 268 Minn. 1, 127 N.W.2d 678 (1964).
229. Id. at 7, 127 N.W.2d at 682; see Brief for Appellant at 10-11, Bronson v. Joyner's
Silver & Electroplating, Inc., 268 Minn. 1, 127 N.W.2d 678 (1964) (containing chart listing similarities between Bronson and Johantuen).
230. See 264 Minn. at 542, 119 N.W.2d at 827.
231. See 268 Minn. at 2, 127 N.W.2d at 679.
232. This doctrine is discussed in I A. LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 15.20-.21.
233. See id.
234. See Longhurst v. John Stewart & Son, Ltd., [1916] 2 K.B. 803, 805, a d, (1917]
A.C. 249.
235. See Jaynes v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 75 Idaho 297, 299, 271 P.2d 1016, 1019 (1954)
(not sound to say that employee on public highway is always there as member of public);
Brienza v. LeChase Constr. Corp., 17 A.D.2d 83, 85, 230 N.Y.S.2d 362, 363 (1962) (mere
designation as public street is not sufficient reason to deny claimant's right to compensation).
236. See, e.g., 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 15.21.
237. Id.
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Dual Purpose Trips

Because a subjective determination of an employee's state of
mind is frequently required, a trip made for both business and personal reasons, commonly referred to as a dual-purpose trip, 238
presents challenges when an attempt is made to determine
whether an injury was suffered in the course of employment. Illustrative of the dual-purpose problems that may occur are situations
in which an employee is requested by the employer to drop a letter
in a mailbox on the employee's way home; 239 a salesperson is in-

jured on the way home after spending the evening in an inn where
he spent a few minutes trying to sell some of his employer's products to the inn owner; 240 or, a sorority house mother is injured in a
238. See generally id. §§ 18.00-.44; 7 W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, §§ 1690-1693.
239. See Locke v. County of Steele, 223 Minn. 464, 470, 27 N.W.2d 285, 288 (1947)
(awarding compensation to employee who slipped and fell on ice while attempting to mail
letter). On similar facts, the South Carolina Supreme Court denied compensation. See
Mims v. Nehi Bottling Co., 218 S.C. 513, 63 S.E.2d 305 (1951) (denying compensation to
employee who stopped at laundry before he reached mailbox and was killed from explosion at laundry). In Bookman v. Lyle Culvert & Road Equip. Co., 153 Minn. 479, 190
N.W. 984 (1922), the posting of the employer's mail always coincided with the employee's
homeward trip. Interestingly, in awarding compensation to the employee injured while
driving home, the Bookman court did not do so based on the dual purpose rationale. Instead, the Bookman court regarded the case as falling within the ambit of the street-risk
rule. For an explanation of the street-risk rule, see notes 48, 53 supra.
240. See McCarty v. Twin City Egg & Poultry Ass'n, 172 Minn. 551, 216 N.W. 239
(1927). In McCarty the claimant left his home a few hours before midnight with a drunken
companion and drove 15 miles to a local inn for the alleged purpose of attempting to sell
the innkeeper some of his employer's products. In denying compensation, the MCarty
court stated:
That a servant with a fixed salary should of his own motion start out on work for
his employer after ten o'clock at night and invite a drunken person as a companion is not the ordinary occurrence. When, in addition thereto, it is considered
that in the morning relator would necessarily pass Hugo in going to his employer's office for instruction as to the day's work, it seems incredible that he
would have taken a journey some 15 miles late at night to interview a restaurant
keeper at Hugo.
Id. at 553, 216 N.W. at 239-40. Other courts have also denied compensation when there
was little evidence of actual performance of a business function, or when the employee's
business dealings appeared to be an afterthought. See Simmons v. F.W. Dodge Corp., 270
Ala. 616, 617, 120 So. 2d 921, 922 (1960) (denying compensation when employee's automobile accident occurred at 2:00 a.m. after a night of partying); Johnson v. McGehee
Bros. Furniture Co., 256 So. 2d 741, 742 (La. App. 1971) (denying compensation when
employee's automobile accident occurred after employee left a bar); Leigh v. Dix, 284
A.D. 919, 921, 134 N.Y.S.2d 494, 495 (1954) (per curiam) (denying compensation when
factory superintendent appeared to visit company official on a social matter); Kuethe v.
State, 191 Neb. 167, 168, 214 N.W.2d 380, 381 (1974) (per curiam) (state investment officer's dependents denied compensation when employee's accident occurred while driving
home from a day of golf with a business acquaintance).
In the most recent Minnesota case presenting the problem of a mixed purpose, talk-
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fall while on her way to purchase first-aid supplies for the house
241
and to attend a religious ceremony.
Most courts resolve the dual-purpose question by applying the
lucid formula expounded by Justice Cardozo in Marks' Dependents
v. Gray.24 2 In Marks a plumber's helper, who was planning to drive
to a neighboring town to meet his wife, was requested by his employer to repair some plumbing in that town. 243 The work would
not have justified a special trip for the sole purpose of repairing the
plumbing.244 Shortly after starting on this trip, the employee was
fatally injured in an automobile accident. In denying compensation, Justice Cardozo stated:
We do not say that service to the employer must be the sole
cause of the journey, but at least it must be a concurrent cause.
To establish liability, the inference must be permissible that the
trip would have been made though the private errand had been
canceled . . . . The test in brief is this: If the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, he is in the course of his
employment, though he is serving at the same time some purpose of his own. . . . If, however, the work has had no part in
creating the necessity for travel, if the journey would have gone
forward though the business errand had been dropped, it
would have been canceled upon failure of the private purpose,
though the business errand was undone, the travel is then per24 5
sonal, and personal the risk.
ing business during a social activity, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld an award of
dependency benefits to the employee's widow. See Titus v. Fox Chem. Co., 254 N.W.2d 74
(Minn. 1977) (per curiam). In Ttus the sole salesperson of a drug manufacturer was killed
while on his way to a restaurant to dine with a possible customer and another friend. The
employee and the two people he was going to meet at the restaurant planned on attending
an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting that night. Arguably, the burden of proof required by
the Titus court is in marked contrast with the court's earlier decision in McCary.
241. See Kaplan v. Alpha Epsilon Phi Sorority, 230 Minn. 547, 42 N.W.2d 342 (1950),
in which the court stated:
The rule as above stated clarifies the controlling principles applicable to the instant case. Assuming that relator here left the sorority house for the dominant
purpose of attending religious services at Temple Israel for her own personal
reasons, her accidental injuries, nevertheless, arose out of and in the course of her
employment if at the time of the accidtt, as a deviationfrom her own personalmission, she
was in the act of going to the drugstore to obtain bandagesfor her employer.
Id. at 552, 42 N.W.2d at 346 (emphasis in original).
242. 251 N.Y. 90, 167 N.E. 181 (1929). Justice Cardozo's Marks formula has received
universal praise from commentators. See, e.g., I A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 18.12.
243. See id. at 92-93, 167 N.E. at 182.
244. See id.
245. Id. at 93, 167 N.E. at 183. Perhaps the best example of a case in which the Marks
test was correctly applied to allow compensation is Irwin-Neisler & Co. v. Industrial
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Justice Cardozo's dual-purpose rule allows compensation when the
business portion of the trip would have been made in spite of the
failure or absence of the private purpose. 246 Conversely, the trip
will be viewed as a personal journey, and compensation denied, if
the trip would have been made in spite of the failure or absence of
the business purpose and would have been dropped in the event of
247
the failure of the private purpose to occur.
Interestingly, some courts, although purporting to follow the
Marks rule, have interpreted Justice Cardozo's test to be one of
249
dominant or principal purpose.2 48 Butler v. Nolde Brothers is illustrative of this interpretation. In Butler the employee, a route salesperson, was fatally injured on a dual-purpose trip. The Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia, although purporting to adopt the
Marks test, denied compensation, stating that the employee's fatal
injury was incurred on a trip "for the principal purpose of a social
visit with his friends . * . and with the incidental purpose of collecting from them for deliveries . . . previously made. ' 250 The

court never adequately considered the question of whether the trip
Comm'n, 346 Ill. 89, 178 N.E. 357 (1931) (per curiam). There, an employee who was
about to leave for a vacation was requested by his employer to stop on his way back and
make a study of why a product was not selling well in a particular area. While returning
home from his vacation and after completing the requested sales study, he was injured in
an automobile collision. In awarding compensation, the court stated that if the employee
had not made the sales study someone else would have been sent to do the same job.
For additional cases awarding compensation under this theory, see Anchorage Roofing Co. v. Gonzales, 507 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1973) (business purpose of flight was compensable despite three-mile deviation to explore future hunting area); U.S. Fiber Glass Indus. v.
Uland, 127 Ind.App. 278, 206 N.E.2d 385 (1965) (employment created necessity to travel
to football game); Rau v. Crest Fiberglass Indus., 275 Minn. 483, 148 N.W.2d 149 (1967)
(business trip would have been made even if trip had not coincided with personal errand);
Downs v. Durbin Corp., 416 S.W.2d 242 (Mo. App. 1967) (orders to take lumber home
before delivering it to employer's place of business justified compensation after accident on
employee's homeward route). For well-reasoned decisions denying compensation based on
the Marks theory, see Manolakis v. Edison S.S. Corp., 15 A.D.2d 845, 224 N.Y.S.2d 519
(1962) (claimant's injury in employer's summer home not compensable); Humphrey v.
Quality Cleaners & Laundry, 251 N.C. 47, 110 S.E.2d 467 (1959) (compensation denied to
employee killed in own automobile being used to transport incidentally some cash of employer's).
246. See I A. LARSON, supra note 1,§ 18.12.
247. See id.
248. See Pohler v. T.W. Snow Constr. Co., 239 Iowa 1018, 1022, 33 N.W.2d 416, 419
(1948) (special errand for employer is essential character of trip); Kaplan v. Alpha Epsilon
Phi Sorority, 230 Minn. 547, 550, 42 N.W.2d 342, 344 (1950) (dominant-purpose test);
Butler v. Nolde Bros., 189 Va. 932, 939, 55 S.E.2d 36, 43 (1949) (primary purpose of trip
was personal and noncompensable).
249. 189 Va. 932, 55 S.E.2d 36 (1949).
250. Id. at 943, 55 S.E.2d at 41.
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25
would have been made if the social visit had been cancelled. 1
The dominant or principal-purpose formulation is an inaccurate
and undesirable interpretation of the Marks rule. Justice Cardozo,
in expounding this rule, specifically stated that an injury incurred
on a trip in which a business purpose was a concurrent cause is

compensable. 252

He defined concurrent cause as a cause that

would have necessitated making the trip even if the personal objective were no longer present. 253 When this formulation is correctly
applied, it does not require that the motives of the employee be
weighed for the purpose of ascertaining the most important or
compelling cause of the journey. 254 Yet, under the dominant purpose construction, a court must apply this highly subjective test in
25 5
determining if the injury is compensable.

Other courts have adopted the "no nice inquiry" approach to
the dual-purpose problem. 25 6 Under this rule, "no nice inquiry
will be made to determine the relative importance of a concurrent
business and personal motive.

'2 57

It is probable that courts that

have adopted this approach have done so in reaction to the dominant or principal-purpose interpretation of the Marks test. For example, in Cook v.Highway Casualty Co.,25 8 the Florida Supreme
251. The Butler court indicated that although there was a business purpose, the business was such that it could have been accomplished equally as well at the time the employee normally transacted such business. Because the business could have been done at
another time, the court concluded that the trip on which the employee was fatally injured
was "more of a personal than a business nature." Id. at 942, 55 S.E.2d at 41. However, as
Professor Larson has succinctly pointed out:
[I]t is not necessary, under this formula, that, on failure of the personal motive,
the business trip would have been taken by this particularemployee at this particular
tine. It is enough that someone sometime would have had to take the trip to
carry out the business mission. Perhaps another employee would have done it;
perhaps another time would have been chosen; but if a special trip would have
had to be made for this purpose, and if the employer got this necessary item of
travel accomplished by combining it with this employee's personal trip, it is accurate to say that it was a concurrent cause of the trip, rather than an incidental
appendage or afterthought.
1 A. LARSON, supra note 1,§ 18.13 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
252. See Marks' Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. at 93, 167 N.E. at 183.
253. See id.
254. See I A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 18.13.
255. See id.
256. See Phoenix Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 31 Cal. 2d 856, 858, 193
P.2d 745, 747 (1948); Cook v. Highway Cas. Co., 82 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. 1955); Brookhaven Steam Laundry v. Watts, 214 Miss. 569, 575, 55 So. 2d 381, 390 (1951), rev'd, 59 So. 2d
294 (1952); Tallent v. M.C. Lyle & Son, 187 Tenn. 482, 483, 216 S.W.2d 7, 9 (1948).
257. Cook v. Highway Cas. Co., 82 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. 1955).
258. 82 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1955).
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Court, in adopting the "no nice inquiry" rule, stated:
[T]he decisions of those courts which do not require the commission to weigh the business and personal motives and determine which is the dominant or compelling cause of the trip, are
more consistent with the remedial purposes of our workmen's
compensation act than is the more stringent rule of Marks' Dependents v. Gray . . . and we agree . . . that "no nice inquiry"
will be made to determine the relative importance of a concur259
rent business and personal motive.
The "no nice inquiry" approach, to the extent that it eliminates
the weighing of motives, is consistent with the Marks rule. 26° Nevertheless, this approach should be rejected because it supplies no
positive test with which to solve the many questions that are constantly arising. Moreover, the "no nice inquiry" rule could conceivably allow recovery even if the business purpose was
infinitesimal.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has handled the dual-purpose
problem in different ways. Initially, it formulated the "ordinary
occurrence" theory. 26 1 Under this approach, unless undertaking
the employer's business was an ordinary occurrence of the trip,
compensation would be denied. 262 In McCarty v. Twin City Egg &
Poultg Association,2 63 an employee who left his home about 10:00
p.m. with a drunken companion and drove fifteen miles to a restaurant, for the alleged purpose of seeing the restaurant owner on
business for his employer, was injured in a car accident. 264 Denying compensation, the court stated:
That a servant with a fixed salary should of his own motion
start out on work for his employer after 10:00 at night and invite a drunken person as a companion is not the ordinmy occurrence. When, in addition thereto, it is considered that in the
morning relator would necessarily pass Hugo in going to his
employer's office for instruction as to the day's work, it seems
incredible that he should have taken a journey some 15 miles
259. Id. at 682.
260. See generatly I A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 18.13.
261. See McCarty v. Twin City Egg & Poultry Ass'n, 172 Minn. 551, 553, 216 N.W.
239, 239 (1927) ("That a servant with a fixed salary should of his own motion start out on
work for his employer after ten o'clock at night and invite a drunken person as a companion is not the ordina y occurrence.") (emphasis added).
262. See id.
263. 172 Minn. 551, 216 N.W. 239 (1927).
264. See id. at 553, 216 N.W. at 240.
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late at night to interview a restaurant keeper at Hugo. 265

Subsequently, in Olson v. Trni Lodge,266 the Minnesota
Supreme Court adopted the dominant or principal-purpose
rule.26 7 In Olson the employee had but a single destination, the
employer's lodge building, to which he was en route for the two
distinct purposes of personally enjoying the comforts of his private
room as well as the labors of tending the employer's furnace. 268 In
awarding compensation, the court stated:
If a movement on the part of an employe is undertaken from a
mixture of motives, the major motive or dominant purpose
thereof, as a general rule, controls in determining whether an
injury sustained in the course of such movement arises out of

26 9
and in the course of his employment.
As previously mentioned, the dominant or principal-purpose
formulation is an inaccurate and undesirable interpretation of the
Aarks rule. 2 70 Fortunately, in a 1967 decision, the Minnesota
Supreme Court directly adopted the Marks rule. In Rau v. Crest
Fiberglass Industres,27 ' the employee, a bookkeeper and secretarytreasurer of the employer, received express instructions to deliver
to a creditor an important contract evidencing security for a
debt. 272 The employee, after delivering the contract and purchasing a bottle of liquor,2 73 was injured in an automobile accident as
she drove toward a restaurant to purchase lunch for her children.
Citing Marks, the Minnesota Supreme Court indicated that the
injury was compensable because work would have necessitated the
employee's errand even had her personal purposes been aban2 74
doned.

265. Id. at 553, 216 N.W. at 239-40 (emphasis added).
266. 226 Minn. 141, 32 N.W.2d 255 (1948).
267. Id. at 146, 32 N.W.2d at 258 (dominant purpose controls in determining whether
injury arises out of and in the course of employment).
268. See id.
269. Id.
270. See notes 248-55 supra and accompanying text.
271. 275 Minn. 483, 148 N.W.2d 149 (1967).
272. See id. at 484, 148 N.W.2d at 150-51.
273. See id.
274. See id. at 485-86, 148 N.W.2d at 151-52. In Williams v. Hoyt Constr. Co., 306
Minn. 59, 237 N.W.2d 339 (1975), however, the Minnesota Supreme Court may have
returned to the dominant-purpose rule when in dictum it stated:
The dominant-purpose rule was developed to deal with travel having both personal and business purposes. The employee is covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act if the business purpose is the dominant one. The cases cited by
relator in support of her contention that the decedent was protected by the dominant-purpose rule are not controlling here, for none of them deals with situa-
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Properly applied, the Marks test establishes workable limitations
and, at the same time, furthers the humanitarian purpose 275 of the
Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act. Accordingly, the Minnesota court should follow the precedent established in Rau.
C

Home as Work Place

Employees who perform work at home may sustain an injury
during the coming and going trip or during the performance of the
work itself. The dual-purpose doctrine is a reliable guide for indicating when compensation is proper as to the coming and going
aspect. 2 76 If the work being performed is done at home solely betions where one employee engages in two separate and distinct trips; rather, they
all involve travel undertaken for the purpose of conducting both business and
personal errands, with the personal errand requiring only a slight deviation in
time and space from the business errand. A severable side trip, such as is present
in this case, will defeat the application of the dominant-purpose rule.
Id. at 69-70, 237 N.W.2d at 346 (footnotes omitted). If so, the Minnesota Supreme Court
is misconstruing the Marks test.
275. See S. HOROVITZ, supra note 1, at 470, in which he states:
[C]ompensation laws were enacted as a humanitarian measure, to create a new
type of liability-liability without fault-to make the industry that was responsible for the injury to bear a major part of the burdens resulting therefrom. It was
a revolt from the old common law and creation of a complete substitute therefor.
Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court has on several occasions indicated its agreement with
Professor Horovitz's comments. See, e.g., Cunning v. City of Hopkins, 258 Minn. 306, 103
N.W.2d 876 (1960), in which the court stated:
The history of the legislation resulting in our Workmen's Compensation Act, and
the beneficial and humane purposes intended by the statute, call for a liberal
construction of this law. Clearly, the legislature never intended that the injured
employee should be met in his application for compensation with stringent and
technical rules and regulations. It was the legislative intent from the beginning
that he should receive his just desserts without the burden of expensive litigation.
Id. at 317-18, 103 N.W.2d at 884.
276. Professor Larson explains:
As to the going and coming trip, the basic mixed-purpose doctrine will once
more be found the most reliable guide. Although it is not always referred to in
the opinions, it adequately explains most of the cases in this area, both those
awarding compensation and those denying it.
1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 18.31, at 4-260 (footnotes omitted). Professor Larson's analysis is adequately borne out by case law. See, e.g., Allen's Dairy Prod. Co. v. Whittington's
Dependents, 230 Miss. 285, 92 So. 2d 842 (1957) (milk salesman killed on way home where
he made out daily reports; compensation awarded); Gennarelli v. Spruce-Up Cleaners,
Inc., 34 A.D.2d 1075, 312 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1970) (tailor who worked at home killed on journey home; compensation proper); Meyer v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 425 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.
1968) (compensation awarded service supervisor who performed part of duties at home
and part at employer's factory).
In questions involving the employee's home as a work place, however, the only Minnesota decision, Corcoran v. Teamsters & Chauffeurs Joint Council No. 32, 209 Minn.
289, 297 N.W. 4 (1941), did not use a dual-purpose analysis. Rather, the supreme court
focused upon the quantity and regularity of the work performed at home, and the special

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol6/iss3/2

48

Bradt: An Examination of the "Arising out of" and the "in the Course of"
1980]

"9'ARISING OUT OF" AND "IN THE COURSE OF"

cause of convenience to the employee, however, the coming and
going is not a business trip within the meaning of the dual-purpose
rule. 2 77 In these instances, only the actual performance of the
work itself falls within the course of employment requirement.2 78
If the injury occurs while the business activity is actually being
performed at home, compensation is proper.2 79 This is so even
though the service being performed at home is casual or is of relatively little importance. 28 0 Illustrative of this general rule is Kossack
v. Town of Bloomfield. 28 ' In Kossack a policeman was injured while
cleaning his gun at home. Although the policeman probably
would not have been granted compensation if he was injured while
driving home, the actual cleaning of the gun brought the injury
28 2
within the scope of the compensation act.
D.

Devitations

As a general rule, deviation from a business trip for personal
reasons takes an employee out of the course of employment until
the business trip is resumed, 28 3 unless the deviation is so minimal
as to be disregarded as insubstantial.2 8 4 Thus, an employee travelcircumstances of the employee's union job that made it necessary for him to perform work
at home.
277. For example, injuries incurred by teachers on their way to school are not compensable because work performed at home is for the convenience of the employee. See, e.g.,
Wilson v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 16 Cal. 3d 181, 545 P.2d 225, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 313 (1976); Stoskin v. Board of Educ., 11 Md. App. 355, 274 A.2d 397 (1971). See
also I A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 18.33, at 4-273.
278. See notes 279-82 tnfa.
279. See American Red Cross v. Wilson, 257 Ark. 647, 519 S.W.2d 60 (1975); Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Henderson, 37 Ga. App. 238, 139 S.E. 688 (1927); Kossack v.
Town of Bloomfield, 63 N.J. Super. 322, 164 A.2d 653 (Essex County Ct. 1960); 1 A.
LARSON, supra note 1, § 18.34.
280. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 18.34.
281. 63 N.J. Super. 322, 164 A.2d 653 (Essex County Ct. 1960).
282. See id. at 322-25, 164 A.2d at 654-55; 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 18.34, at 4-275.
283. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 19.00; see Bailey v. Industrial Comm'n, 2 Ariz. App.
518, 410 P.2d 140 (1966); General Plant Protection Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 146 Colo.
191, 192-94, 361 P.2d 138, 138-39 (1961); Woodley v. Rossi, 152 Conn. 1, 202 A.2d 136
(1964); Falkum v. Daniel Starch & Staff, 271 Minn. 277, 135 N.W.2d 693 (1965); Wolverton v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 254 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). For a
general discussion of the deviation doctrine, see I A. LARSON, supra, §§ 19.00-.63; 7 W.
SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, §§ 1680-1687; Comment, 'Deviation From Route and Return'in Michz'gan Workmen's Compensation Cases, 17 U. DET. L.J. 26 (1953).
284. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 19.00; see Nehring v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.,
193 Minn. 169, 258 N.W. 307 (1935); Johnson v. Johnson, 30 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec.
304 (1978).
In Nehring the employee was returning home after responding to his employer's spe-
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ing for business purposes will journey outside the coverage of the
Workers' Compensation Act if a severable sidetrip is made. As
Chief Justice Sheran succinctly noted in Wiliams v. Hoyt Construclion Co., 2a5 coverage in these situations "is suspended until the em-

ployee completes the sidetrip or resumes travel toward his business
goal.

' 28 6

The Minnesota rule is consistent with the majority rule

that, according to Professor Larson, requires an employee who has
made a personal sidetrip, to "get back on beam" before being
28
deemed to have resumed the business trip.

7

Illustrative of the general rule is Mi//s v. Standard Parts Service
Co.,288 in which the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the com-

pensation court's decision not to award benefits to an employee
who, as the president of a savings and loan association, sustained
an injury while returning to work from a luncheon appointcial request to replace a fuse. On this journey he "stopped at a wayside store, bought some
bananas and ice cream, mounted the motorcycle, and proceeded toward home" when he
was fatally injured. 193 Minn. at 170, 258 N.W. at 307. The court affirmed an award of
compensation stating, "[t]hat the employee stopped at a store on the way home to buy and
take home some ice cream and fruit cannot be regarded as a departure from his employment. The store was on the road he was traveling, and the stop was but momentary." Id.
at 174, 258 N.W. at 309.
In Johnson the compensation court commented:
It is difficult for us to acknowledge that an employee, who was instructed to
travel in a northeasterly direction some six miles by his employer, can subsequently travel almost five miles south, drink beer, start back on what appears to
be a trip home for dinner, still be four plus miles south of his original departure,
and some ten miles from his destination, can be considered in the scope and
course of employment. . . . It appears clear to us that the employee, Kent
Johnson, deviated from his duties when he embarked upon the sojourn to
Storm's Bar. His return to his duties did not commence when he left Storm's Bar
some four plus miles south of his original departure point. The employee deviated from his employment ...
We do notfrndfour plus miles to be an i'substantialdeviation.
30 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 306-07 (emphasis added).
285. 306 Minn. 59, 237 N.W.2d 339 (1975).
286. Id. at 69, 237 N.W.2d at 346. See also Funk v. A.F. Scheppmann & Son Constr.
Co., 294 Minn. 483, 199 N.W.2d 791 (1972) (per curiam); Johnson v. Range Blacktop Co.,
278 Minn. 288, 153 N.W.2d 823 (1967); Peterson v. Taylor, 255 Minn. 220, 96 N.W.2d
247 (1959); Kiley v. Sward-Kemp Drug Co., 214 Minn. 548,9 N.W.2d 237 (1943); Cavilla
v. Northern States Power Co., 213 Minn. 331, 6 N.W.2d 812 (1942); Dahley v. Ely &
Walker, 196 Minn. 428, 265 N.W. 284 (1936) (per curiam); Hasslen v. Carlson & Hasslen,
180 Minn. 473, 231 N.W. 188 (1930); State exrel. Niessen v. District Court, 142 Minn. 335,
172 N.W. 133 (1919).
287. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1,§ 19.35, at 4-337. See also Retail Credit Co. v. Coleman, 227 Miss. 791, 86 So. 2d 666 (1956); Allison v. Brown & Horsch Insulation Co., 98
N.H. 434, 102 A.2d 493 (1954); White v. Frank Z. Sindlinger, Inc., 30 NJ. Super. 525,
105 A.2d 437 (1954); Clark v. Burton Lines, Inc., 272 N.C. 433, 158 S.E.2d 569 (1968).
288. 269 Minn. 501, 131 N.W.2d 546 (1964).
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ment. 28 9 Although the employee testified that he had discussed
banking business during lunch, 29° the court denied compensation
stating:
If the dominant purpose of the luncheon meeting was personal,
Mills was not in the course of his employment when he slipped.
Even though it be reasoned that the luncheon meeting represented a deviation from a business-connected walk from one
store location to the other, Mills would not have returned to the
direct route between these places of business until he reached
the south curbline of Laurel. He was hurt at a place where he
29 1
would not have been if the direct route had been followed.
Traveling salespeople are also subject to the personal sidetrip
rule. 292 For example, in Rhea v. Overho/t, 293 the employee, a travel-

ing salesman, was engaged in the business of writing hail insurance. 294 His working territory was "wherever they sent me in the
state of Minnesota. '295 The employer furnished the employee
with an automobile. 296 On the day of his injury, the employee
went to the employer's office to receive sales instructions.2 97 After
receiving the instructions, the employee remained at the office until 4:00 and then left for a municipal parking lot, unlocked his car,
and placed in it his portfolio containing the instructions pertaining to his work in the designated territory. 29 The employee then
locked his car and started for a local clothing store where he had
left five recently purchased shirts for alterations. 299 On the way
back to the parking lot, the employee stopped at a tavern to an289. See id'. at 502, 131 N.W.2d at 547.
290. See id. at 50 -03, 131 N.W.2d at 547-48.
291. Id. at 503, 131 N.W.2d at 548.
292. See Rhea v. Overholt, 222 Minn. 467, 25 N.W.2d 656 (1946); Lunde v. Congoleum-Nairn, Inc., 211 Minn. 487, 488-89, 1 N.W.2d 606, 607 (1942).
Although traveling salespeople are subject to the personal sidetrip rule they are generally covered by the compensation act under the Howlete rule. In Howlett v. Midwest
Distribs., Inc., 202 Minn. 247, 277 N.W. 913 (1938), the Minnesota court stated:
When the employer's business requires an employe to travel in a specified
territory, it is the duty of the employer to afford the employe an opportunity of
returning from the territory under the employer's protection. A traveling employe is in the course of his employment on the return trip from his territory as
well as on the outward trip.
Id. at 251, 277 N.W. at 915.
293. 222 Minn. 467, 25 N.W.2d 656 (1946).
294. See id. at 468, 25 N.W.2d at 657.
295. Id. at 468-69, 25 N.W.2d at 657.
296. See id.at 469, 25 N.W.2d at 657.
297. See id.
298. See id.
299. See id.
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swer a "call of nature. 3 0 0 While alighting from the tavern, the
employee fell and sustained an injury. 30 Although the compensation judge found the employee to have sustained an injury that
arose out of and in the course of employment, both the compensation court and the Minnesota Supreme Court denied compensation. 30 2 In so holding, the supreme court accepted the employer's
argument that after the employee left the parking lot and went to
the clothing store to get the shirts, there was a deviation from the
employment, and that such a deviation was continuous until the
time when the employee returned to the parking lot where his car
30 3
was located.
Similarly, in Kayser v. Carson P'rte Scott & Co.,3 ° 4 another traveling salesperson was denied compensation because he departed on a
personal errand. 30 5 In Kayser the employee drove his daughter to a
3 6
town in which he did not contemplate selling any merchandise. 0
On his way back from the personal errand to the town in which he
was to transact business, the employee was involved in a car accident resulting in his death. 30 7 In affirming the compensation
court's decision denying compensation, the court stated:
That [the] deceased intended to transact business of his employer at New Ulm upon his return has no effect on the conclusion to be reached. That call had nothing to do with the trip to
Pipestone, and he did not enter the course of his employment
merely upon the fulfillment of his personal errand in Pipestone
and the start of his return trip . . . . In any event, the only
travel required by the employment on the day in question was
to New Ulm and return. The travel to Pipestone and return
was his own and so were the risks. Being on his own business on
the outgoing trip, he was still on that business while returning,
at least until he reached New Ulm [the original point of departure] 308
Although the result in cases like Kayser may seem harsh, the
strict geometrical theory gives consistency and predictability to the
law. Therefore, deviation cases should be decided by examining
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id. at 470, 25 N.W.2d at 657.
See id.
Id. at 469, 473, 25 N.W.2d at 657, 659.
See id. at 471-73, 25 N.W.2d at 658-59.

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

203 Minn. 578, 282 N.W. 801 (1938).
See id. at 582, 282 N.W. at 803-04.
See id. at 579-80, 282 N.W. at 802-03.
See id. at 580, 282 N.W. at 802.
Id. at 582, 282 N.W. at 803.
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the geometric path the employee followed while performing the
requested task.
IV.
A.
Injuries caused

EMPLOYEE ACTIVITY PROBLEMS

Inj'uries Resultng from Acls of Nature
310
by lightning, 30 9 exposure,

windstorms, 31 1

earthquakes, 31 2 and other acts of nature31 3 have produced disa309. Compare State ex rel. Peoples Coal & Ice Co. v. District Court, 129 Minn. 502, 153
N.W. 119 (1915) (awarding compensation to employee struck by lightning while taking
shelter under a tree) with J.I. Case Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 36 Il1. 2d 386, 223 N.E.2d
847 (1966) (compensation denied employee struck by lightning in employer's warehouse)
and Schmidt v. Adams & Sons Grocer Co., 377 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. App. 1964) (compensation denied employee struck by lightning while loading employer's truck) and Lickfett v.
Jorgenson, 179 Minn. 321, 229 N.W. 138 (1930) (compensation denied employee struck by
lightning while working with a road construction crew).
310. Compare Larke v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 90 Conn. 303, 310-12, 97 A.
320, 322-23 (1916) (awarding compensation to insurance solicitor required to travel in
very cold weather while attempting home solicitations) and Petitt v. Ben F. Walker Framing Co., 176 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1965) (heart attack suffered as a result of heat prostration
compensable) and American Freight Forwarding Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 31 111. 2d
293, 296-97, 201 N.E.2d 399, 401 (1964) (awarding compensation to employee suffering
frostbite after working nine and one half hours in subzero weather) and State ex rel. Nelson
v. District Court, 138 Minn. 260, 164 N.W. 917 (1917) (awarding compensation to janitor
who suffered frostbite while shoveling employer's walk) and Mead v. Missouri Valley
Grain, Inc., 178 Neb. 553, 134 N.W.2d 243 (1965) (employee required to work in unprotected box cars in below zero weather entitled to compensation benefits) and Globe Co. v.
Hughes, 442 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tenn. 1969) (when work exposes employee to long hours of
freezing weather compensation proper) with Phillips v. Borg-Warner Corp., 32 Ohio St.
2d 266, 291 N.E.2d 736 (1972) (exposure to extreme cold weather not an injury even when
resulting in derangement of bodily functions) and Weicher v. Insurance Co. of North
America, 434 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. 1968) (compensation denied to employee suffering
from severe heat exhaustion) and Robinette v. Kayo Oil Co., 210 Va. 376, 171 S.E.2d 172
(1969) (death resulting from pneumonia caused by several days exposure to rain and snow
not compensable).
311. Compare Mobile & O.R. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 28 F.2d 228 (E.D. Ill. 1928)
(applying Illinois law) (denying compensation to employee injured in windstorm) and Decatur-Macon County Fair Ass'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 69 Ill. 2d 262, 371 N.E.2d 597
(1977) (caretaker of fairgrounds killed by tornado, award of compensation reversed) and
Crow v. Americana Crop Hail Pool, Inc., 176 Neb. 260, 125 N.W.2d 691 (1964) (compensation denied to insurance adjuster killed by tornado while driving to town pursuant to
employer's instructions) with Inland Steel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 41 Ill. 2d 70, 241
N.E.2d 450 (1968) (windstorm blew roof on employee; compensation proper) and Arrington v. Goldstein, 23 N.J. Super. 103, 92 A.2d 630 (1952) (employee injured in windstorm
entitled to compensation) and Merrill v. Penasco Lumber Co., 27 N.M. 632, 638-39, 204 P.
72, 74 (1922) (compensation proper when presence of trees increased dangerous effect of
windstorm).
312. Compare Enterprise Dairy Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 202 Cal. 247, 259 P. 1099
(1927) (per curiam) (awarding compensation to employee injured in earthquake) and
London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 202 Cal. 239, 259 P.
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greement among the courts on the question of whether compensation is appropriate. 31 4 In determining the compensability of
injuries caused by these forces, courts have essentially used three
3 5
theories-increased risk, actual risk, and positional risk. '
The Minnesota rule is set forth in State ex rel. Peoples Coal &Ice

Co. v. District Court. 316 In Peoples Coal &Ice Co., an ice deliveryman
was struck by lightning while on his route. In commenting on the
appropriate test for compensation the court stated:
If the deceased was exposed to injury from lightning by reason
of his employment, something more than a normal risk to
which all are subject, if his employment necessarily accentuated
the natural hazard from lightning, and the accident was natural to the employment, though unexpected or unusual, then a
finding is sustained that the accident from lightning was one
"arising out of employment. ' '31 7
The Peoples Coal & Ice Co. court followed the well established
increased-risk rule3' 8 in allowing compensation, stating "the necessity of prompt daily deliveries required the drivers to complete
1096 (1927) with cf. Whetro v. Awkerman, 383 Mich. 235, 174 N.W.2d 783 (1970) (dictum). In Whetro the Michigan Supreme Court in a plurality opinion held that acts of God
"whether it be a tornado, lightning, earthquake, or flood" are compensable if they are
"the occasion of the injury." Id. at 241-43, 174 N.W.2d at 785-86. Chief Justice Brennan's
dissenting opinion indicated, however, that such injuries are not compensable in the absence of proximate causation. See id. at 249-50, 174 N.W.2d at 787 (Brennan, C.J., dissenting).
313. Compare Roe v. Boise Grocery Co., 53 Idaho 82, 21 P.2d 910 (1933) (salesman
contracted Rocky Mountain spotted fever when trip required travel into territory infested
with woodticks; compensation proper) and Engels Cooper Mining Co. v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 183 Cal. 714, 192 P. 845 (1920) (compensation proper for employee
contracting influenza while caring for ill coemployees at direction of company superintendent) and Lothrop v. Hamilton Wright Organizations, Inc., 45 A.D.2d 784, 356 N.Y.S.2d
730 (1974) (death benefits awarded after decedent contracted infectious hepatitis in foreign country with unsanitary conditions) and Herdick v. New York Zoological Soc'y, 45
A.D.2d 120, 356 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1974) (compensation granted employee contracting tuberculosis from infected animal at zoo) with Pattiani v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 199 Cal.
596, 250 P. 864 (1926) (denying compensation to employee contracting typhoid fever in
city in which said fever was rampant) and Richardson v. Greenberg, 188 A.D. 248, 176
N.Y.S. 651 (1919) (denying compensation to stableman for infectious disease contracted
from diseased horse).
314. For a general discussion of the compensability of injuries resulting from acts of
nature, see Davis, Workmen's Compensation, 34J. AM. TRIAL LAw. A. 229, 334 (1972); Comment, Workman's Compensation Claims Arsing Out of Injuries Caused by Lightning, 15 ALB. L.
REV. 177 (1951).
315. See generally I A. LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 6.50, 10.00-.33(d).
316. 129 Minn. 502, 153 N.W. 119 (1915).
317. Id. at 503-04, 153 N.W. at 119.
318. See, e.g., Bales v. Covington, 312 Ky. 551, 554, 228 S.W.2d 446, 448 (1950); Kaiser
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their routes in substantial disregard of weather conditions." 31 9 As
indicated by the Peoples Coal & Ice Co. decision, the determining
factor in granting compensation under the increased-risk test is a
greater likelihood of injury to an employee than to the general
public; 320 if employment subjects an employee to additional dan32
ger, compensation is proper. '
Unfortunately, there is little uniformity among courts that adhere to the increased-risk theory; opposite results have been
reached in seemingly indistinguishable fact situations. 322 The inconsistency in this area is probably due to differing definitions of
the scope of the term "general public. ' 323 For example, the Massachusetts court denied compensation to a laborer whose foot froze
324
while he worked outside before dawn in extremely cold weather
because "in the performance of his work, there is nothing to show
that the employee was exposed to a greater risk of freezing his foot
than the ordinary person engaged in outdoor work in cold
weather. '3 25 On the other hand, the Texas court took a more liberal view when it allowed compensation to the widow of an em326
ployee who died from a heat stroke:
In the case before us the very work which the deceased was
doing for his employer exposed him to greater hazard from heat
stroke than the general public was exposed to for the simple
reason that the general public were not pushing
wheelbarrow
327
loads of sand in the hot sun on that day.
Most courts, however, have required that the hazard be more directly connected with the job. Heat from molten lead, 328 reflected
sunlight, 329 and objects that attract lightning 330 have been found
v. Industrial Comm'n, 136 Ohio St. 440, 442, 26 N.E.2d 449, 451 (1940); 1 A. LARSON,
supra note 1, § 8.11.
319. 129 Minn. at 502-03, 153 N.W. at 119.
320. See id. at 503-04, 153 N.W. at 119.
321. Id.; see 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 6.30.
322. See notes 309-15 supra and accompanying text.
323. See I A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 8.42.
324. Robinson's Case, 292 Mass. 543, 198 N.E. 760 (1935).
325. Id. at 545-46, 198 N.E. at 761.
326. American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Webster, 118 S.W.2d 1082 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
327. Id. at 1085-86.
328. See Fields v. Tompkins-Johnston Plumbing Co., 224 N.C. 841, 32 S.E.2d 623
(1945).
329. See McNeil v. Omaha Flour Mills Co., 129 Neb. 329, 261 N.W. 694 (1935).
330. In the following cases compensation was granted because metal was found to have
attracted lightning: Hassell Iron Works Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 70 Colo. 386, 201 P.
894 (1921); City of Atlanta v. Parks, 60 Ga. App. 16, 21-22, 2 S.E.2d 718, 722 (1939);
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to be risk-increasing factors. The Minnesota Supreme Court has
also had little difficulty in finding additional job-related hazards.
For example, the Peoples Coal &Ice Co. court indicated that an iron
fence near the employee may have attracted the lightning. 33'
Interestingly, while professing to follow the increased-risk rule,
some courts have established a "contact-with-the premises" exception. 3 32 Under this exception, when an employee has been injured
by contact with part of the occupational surroundings, regardless
of the actuating force, a sufficient causal relation is established and
increased risk need not be shown. 333 This doctrine is well illustrated by a statement from the House of Lords: "If [a] bomb injures a workman directly he must show special exposure; if it
injures him indirectly by bringing the roof down on him he can
recover unconditionally.

''

34

While the contact-with-the premises exception has never been
directly adopted in Minnesota, the Minnesota Supreme Court apMathis v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co., 127 Kan. 93, 272 P. 183 (1928);
Charon's Case, 321 Mass. 694, 75 N.E.2d 511 (1947); Van Kirk v. Hume-Sinclair Coal
Mining Co., 226 Mo. App. 1137, 49 S.W.2d 631 (1932); Sullivan v. Roman Catholic
Bishop, 103 Mont. 117, 61 P.2d 838 (1936); Emmick v. Hanrahan Brick & Ice Co., 206
A.D. 580, 201 N.Y.S. 637 (1923); Pope v. Goodson, 249 N.C. 690, 698, 107 S.E.2d 524,
529-30 (1959); Consolidated Pipe Line Co. v. Mahon, 152 Okla. 72, 3 P.2d 844 (1931);
Oman Constr. Co. v. Hodge, 205 Tenn. 627, 329 S.W.2d 842 (1959); Mason-Dixon Lines
v. Lett, 201 Tenn. 171, 297 S.W.2d 93 (1956); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Rochester, 281 S.W. 306 (Tex. Civ. App.), af'd, 115 Tex. 404, 283 S.W. 135 (1926) (per curiam).
In the following cases compensation was granted because wet surroundings attracted
lightning: Truck Ins. Exch. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 77 Cal. App. 2d 461, 175
P.2d 884 (1946); Lyng v. Rao, 72 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1954); McKiney v. Reynolds & Manley
Lumber Co., 79 Ga. App. 826, 829-30, 54 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1949); Bauer's Case, 314 Mass.
4, 49 N.E.2d 118 (1943); Jackson v. Bailey, 234 Miss. 697, 107 So. 2d 593 (1958); Bergren
v. S.E. Gustafson Constr. Co., 75 S.D. 497, 68 N.W.2d 477 (1955).
Trees have also been found to be efficient conductors resulting in compensation
awards. See Chiullo De Luca v. Board of Park Comm'rs, 94 Conn. 7, 107 A. 611 (1919);
Fort Pierce Growers Ass'n v. Storey, 158 Fla. 192, 29 So. 2d 205 (1946); State ex rd. Peoples Coal & Ice Co. v. District Court, 129 Minn. 502, 153 N.W. 119 (1915).
331. See 129 Minn. at 503, 153 N.W. at 119. Similarly, in Esparaza v. Hollandale
Asparagus Growers Ass'n, 20 Minn. Workmen's Comp. Dec. 48 (1957), the compensation
court held that the widower of an employee killed by lightning while working in a field
was entitled to compensation because the nature of the terrain and "other conditions"
made the employee more susceptible to being struck by lightning.
332. The leading American authority on this rule is Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 26
N.E.2d 328 (1940). In that case an employee was injured by a wall blown over by a
hurricane. Id. at 501, 26 N.E.2d at 329. Other jurisdictions have followed the Massachusetts courts' lead. I A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 8.30 (1979). See generally 6 W. SCHNEIDER,
supra note 1, § 1552.
333. See note 332 supra.
334. Brooker v. Thomas Borthwick & Sons (Australasia), Ltd., [1933] A.C. 669, 678.
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parently used this theory to allow recovery in Dunnigan v. Clinton
Falls Nursey Co. 335 In Dunn'gan the employee, while working in an
open field, was injured when a flash of lightning struck his team of
horses. 336 The horses fell forward and caused a jerk on the lines
wrapped around the employee's hands. 337 The sudden stopping of
the harrow while he was walking immediately behind it, coupled
with the jerk and the momentum of his body, caused the employee
to fall on the harrow teeth and fracture his skull. 338

In its brief

opinion, the court emphasized the fact that the injury was not
caused by lightning, but resulted from the employee striking his
head on the harrow teeth. 339 It is uncertain whether the Dunnigan
court would not have granted compensation if the lightning had
struck the employee directly.
Some courts have rejected the increased-risk rule and, in its
place, have apparently adopted an actual-risk theory. 34 This theory is a more liberal approach to the problem of determining compensability of injuries caused by acts of nature. 34 1 Under the
actual-risk theory, compensation is allowed if employment exposes
an employee to any risk of injury. 342 Significantly, the likelihood
34 3
of similar harm to others in the community is not examined.
This theory is especially applicable to exposure cases, because the
danger of freezing or sunstroke is common to many people in a
designated area. For example, several courts applying the increased-risk theory have denied compensation to employees who
suffered a heat stroke, 344 or exposure,3 45 because everyone in the
335. 155 Minn. 286, 193 N.W. 466 (1923).
336. See id. at 287, 193 N.W. at 466.
337. See id. at 288-89, 193 N.W. at 466-67.
338. See id. at 287-89, 193 N.W. at 466-67.
339. Id.
340. See Harding Glass Co. v. Albertson, 208 Ark. 866, 869, 187 S.W.2d 961, 963
(1945) (glass cutter died from heat stroke); McKiney v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co.,
79 Ga. App. 826, 54 S.E.2d 471 (1949) (worker in lumber yard struck by lightning);
Hughes v. Trustees of Saint Patrick's Cathedral, 245 N.Y. 201, 156 N.E. 665 (1927) (per
curiam) (heat stroke); Deziley v. Semet-Solvay Co., 272 A.D. 985, 72 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1947)
(employee struck by lightning enroute to job); Eagle River Bldg. & Supply Co. v. Peck,
199 Wis. 192, 225 N.W. 690 (1929) (foot frozen in extreme weather).
341. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1,§§ 6.40, 8.43.
342. See id.
343. See note 340 supra.
344. See Weicher v. Insurance Co. of North America, 434 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. 1968). In
Weicher the employee proved that insufficient ventilation in the employer's plant caused a
heat stroke. Nevertheless, the Texas court denied compensation because the employee had
not proved that the conditions at work intensified the natural heat outside to which the
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surrounding area was subject to the same risk. Courts that apply
the actual-risk theory have allowed compensation in similar situations because the employment required the employee to be exposed to the injury-causing harm. 346 The actual-risk theory
eliminates the problem of defining the scope of the term "general
347
public" found in the increased-risk theory.
A small minority of courts has adopted a more liberal test-the
positional-risk theory. 348 Under this approach, compensation is allowed when employment causes an employee to be in the position
349
in which the injury is received, regardless of the risk involved.
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission 350 is illustrative of
this approach. In Aetna Life Insurance Co., the Colorado court al35
lowed recovery for the death of a farmhand killed by lightning. 1

The theory that supported compensation was summarized in a
concurring opinion:
[W]hen one in the course of his employment is reasonably required to be at a particular place at a particular time and there
meets with an accident, although one which any person then
and there present would have met irrespective of his employment, that accident is one "arising out of" the employment of
352
the person so injured.
general public was subjected. Id. at 107-09. Similarly, in Lewis v. Industrial Comm'n,
178 Wis. 449, 190 N.W. 101 (1922), the court denied compensation to a coalheaver who
suffered a sunstroke stating, "[i]t is urged that physical labor has a tendency to induce
sunstroke. No doubt it has, but physical labor is not a hazard peculiar to a coalheaver."
Id. at 453, 190 N.W. at 102.
345. See, e.g., Robinette v. Kayo Oil Co., 210 Va. 376, 171 S.E.2d 172 (1969). In Robinette the employee died from pneumonia contracted as a result of several days' exposure to
rain, snow and cold weather on the employer's premises.
346. See Hughes v. Trustees of St. Patrick's Cathedral, 245 N.Y. 201, 156 N.E. 665
(1927). In granting compensation to an employee who suffered a heat stroke, the Hughes
court stated, "[a]lthough the risk may be common to all who are exposed to the sun's rays
on a hot day, the question is whether the employment exposes the employee to the risk."
Id. at 202-03, 156 N.E. at 665.
347. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 6.40, 8.43.
348. This theory is explained in I A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 6.50. For courts that use
this approach, see Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Colo. 233, 254 P. 995
(1927) (farm hand struck by lightning); Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Co., 199 La.
720, 6 So. 2d 747 (1942) (cyclone demolished building and resulted in death of employee);
Gargiulo v. Gargiulo, 13 N.J. 8, 97 A.2d 593 (1953) (employee struck by arrow fired by
child); Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 266 Wis. 81, 62 N.W.2d 567 (1954)
(employee assaulted by fellow employees for signing peace petition).
349. See I A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 6.50; note 348 supra.
350. 81 Colo. 233, 254 P. 995 (1927).
351. See id. at 233-34, 254 P. at 995.
352. Id. at 236, 254 P. at 996 (Burke, C.J., concurring specially).
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Although the Minnesota court has never adopted the positionalrisk approach for injuries resulting from acts of nature, 353 it has
applied the theory to certain "street risk" injuries. 354 While the
positional-risk theory is attractive because of its simplicity of application, the increased-risk theory strikes a better balance between
the humanitarian purposes of the compensation act and the reasonable obligations of the employer. For this reason, it is recommended that the Minnesota Supreme Court retain the increasedrisk theory not only in cases involving injuries resulting from acts
of nature, but in all other situations not involving a street risk.
B. Steppzng Aside from Regular Duties to Assist Others
Although an act outside an employee's regular duties that is undertaken in good faith to enhance the employer's interests is usually within the course of employment, 355 some injuries sustained
after an employee steps aside from regular duties to assist others
may not be compensable. 356 These situations may be conveniently
grouped into three categories. In the first category, the employee
sustains an injury while stepping aside pursuant to some type of
command to assist others. 35 7 In the second category, the employee
is injured while stepping aside from the regular employment to
assist others without any direction from the employer.3 58 In the
third category, the employee sustains injuries while attempting to
rescue others. 359 Each of these situations is examined below.
353. See K. Kirwin, Cases and Materials on Minnesota Workers' Compensation 207-08
(1980) (course material on reserve in William Mitchell College of Law Library).
354. See Bookman v. Lyle Culvert & Road Equip. Co., 153 Minn. 479, 190 N.W. 984
(1922).
355. Swenson v. Zacher, 264 Minn. 203, 118 N.W.2d 786 (1962), in which the court,
quoting from Professor Larson's treatise stated, "An act outside an employee's regular
duties which is undertaken in good faith to advance the employer's interests, whether or
not the employee's own assigned work is thereby furthered, is within the course of employment." Id. at 211, 118 N.W.2d at 791.
356. See, e.g., Stepan v. J.C. Campbell Co., 228 Minn. 74, 36 N.W.2d 401 (1949) (employee held to be outside course of employment when injured on off hours assisting coemployee putting up ceiling in employer's temporary shack); Ridler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
224 Minn. 256, 28 N.W.2d 859 (1947) (employee held to be outside scope of employment
when injured voluntarily assisting third person to unload truck).
357. The compensability of such injuries is discussed in IA A. LARSON, supra note 1,
§ 27.40 (1979).
358. The compensability of such injuries is discussed in IA A. LARSON, supra note 1,
§ 27.40 (1979).
359. The compensability of such injuries is discussed in IA A. LARSON, supra note 1,
§§ 28.00-.32 (1979); W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, §§ 1650-1656.
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1. Stepping Aside by Direction
In O'Rourke v. Percy Vittum Co., 36° the Minnesota court determined that an employee fatally injured while assisting his supervisor on the supervisor's personal farm sustained a compensable
injury even though the farm was not operated as a part of the
employer's business. 36 1 The court emphasized that the employee
did not have any knowledge or reason to believe that the farm was
not being operated as a part of the employer's business. 362 By way
of limitation, however, the court noted that if the employee undertook the work resulting in his death merely as an accommodation
363
to his supervisor personally, his employer would not be liable.
Implicit in the court's reasoning is the caveat that if an employee's
"supervisor" is a lower level manager whose authority to give an
order might be questioned, the activity may not be within the employee's course of employment.3 64 This is inconsistent with the position in Professor Larson's treatise 36 5 and the general rule in other
jurisdictions-when an employee is ordered by any supervisor to
act outside the course of his normal duties for the private benefit of
the supervisor, the activity, no matter how remote, is compensable.3 66 This approach is preferable because it avoids placing the
employee in the dilemma of following orders and losing compensa367
tion or refusing orders and losing his job.
2. Stepping Aside Wihout Direction
In Ramczik v. Wznona Machine & Foundy Co., 368 the employee had
360. 166 Minn. 251, 207 N.W. 636 (1926).
361. Id. at 256-57, 207 N.W. at 638.
362. Id. at 256, 207 N.W. at 638.
363. See id. at 257, 207 N.W. at 638.
364. Such reasoning would be consistent with cases that have refused to impose liability upon an employer for injuries sustained by an employee who was complying with an
order given by one, who in effect, was only a coemployee. See Carnahan v. Mailometer
Co., 201 Mich. 153, 167 N.W. 9 (1918) (employee ordered by shipping clerk to deliver box
of books).
365. See IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 27.40 (1979).
366. Set Collins' Dependent's Case, 342 Mass. 389, 173 N.E.2d 641 (1961); Nichols v.
Davidson Hotel Co., 333 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. App. 1960); Arrington v. Murray, 182 Va. 1, 28
S.E.2d 19 (1943).
The Nihols court commented that "In our industrial society we may take judicial
notice that corporate employees who fail to take 'suggestions' made by corporate officers
are apt to become ex-employees." 333 S.W.2d at 543.
367. See Nichols v. Davidson Hotel Co., 333 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. App. 1960); Arrington v.
Murray, 182 Va. 1, 28 S.E.2d 19 (1943); IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 27.40 (1979).
368. 174 Minn. 156, 218 N.W. 545 (1928).
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gone onto his employer's premises to get a drink of water after his
regular hours of work. 369 While on the premises he was requested
by three co-workers to help them lift a heavy iron form. 370 In assisting his co-workers, the employee sustained a serious injury. 37'
The employer argued that the injury did not arise out of and in
the course of employment because the employer never requested
the employee to assist in lifting the iron form. 372 The Ramcz'k
court correctly rejected this argument because the work being per373 Implicit
formed was in furtherance of the employer's business.
in the Ramczzk court's holding is the recognition that it would be
contrary to the employer's best interests to forbid employees to assist one another just because the assistance is technically not within
the scope of one employee's present duties. 374 Thus, an employee
who in good faith attempts to further his employer's interests by
some act outside his fixed duties is normally held to be within the
course and scope of employment if an injury occurs while assisting
a coemployee.

3 75

The employer, however, must be allowed some authority to keep
employees within their respective employment spheres. 376 The
Minnesota Supreme Court recognized this right in Stepan v. JC
Campbell Co. 3 77 In Stepan the employee was injured while assisting
369. Id. at 157, 218 N.W. at 545.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 156, 218 N.W. at 545.
372. See i. at 157, 218 N.W. at 545.
373. Id. at 157-58, 218 N.W. at 545-46. The Ramcztk case is consistent with the general
rule that an activity undertaken in good faith by an employee to assist a coemployee in the
latter's performance of his work is compensable. See IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 27.11
(1979). For other cases that apply this rule, see Stoddard v. Industrial Comm'n, 23 Ariz.
App. 235, 532 P.2d 177 (1975); Scott v. Pacific Coast Borax Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 173, 294
P.2d 1039 (1956); Groves v. Marvel, 213 A.2d 853 (Del. 1965); B.F. Gump Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 411 111. 196, 103 N.E.2d 504 (1952); Laird v. Springer, 31 A.D.2d 682, 295
N.Y.S.2d 872 (1968); Maher v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 207 Pa. Super. 472, 218 A.2d 593
(1966).
374. In commenting on the Ramczik case, Professor Larson states, "The reason for this
holding is simple: it would be contrary not only to human nature but to the employer's
best interests to forbid employees to help each other on pain of losing compensation benefits for any injuries thereby sustained." IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 27.12 (1979).
375. See cases cited note 373 supra.
376. Recognizing this need, Professor Larson comments:
Of course, it would be going too far to say that every act which benefits the
employer is in the course of employment. The employer must be conceded some
right to keep the employees within their respective spheres. He could hardly run
a factory with the employees playing musical chairs with their jobs.
IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 27.13 (1979).
377. 228 Minn. 74, 36 N.W.2d 401 (1949).
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a fellow employee in putting up a ceiling in a temporary shack at a
lumber camp. 378 The injured employee was never requested by his
supervisor to assist in improving his friend's shack and the injury
occurred during non-working hours. 37 9 Under these circumstances, a finding that the employee's injuries did not arise out of
and in the course of employment was properly sustained, even
though the activity was in furtherance of the employer's interests.

380

3.
a.

Rescue Doctrine

Rescue for Benefit of Employer

As a general rule, any rescue activity resulting in injury to an
employee will be within the course of employment if the employer
is benefited by the rescue. 38 ' Included within this general rule is
the recognition that any injury an employee sustains in an effort to
3
save himself in emergencies, whether real31
or apparent, 38 3 is com-

pensable.
There is little dispute that injuries sustained during emergency
efforts to save the employer's property from theft,38 4 fire,3 8 5 or

other hazards38

6

also are within the course of employment. More-

378. Id. at 76, 36 N.W.2d at 402.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 77, 36 N.W.2d at 403. The result in Stepan is consistent with the holdings in
Bivens v. Marshall R. Young Drilling Co., 251 Miss. 264, 169 So. 2d 446 (1964) (employee
denied compensation for injuries sustained when requested by immediate superior, who
had no authority to ask employee to leave his post, to depart on a squirrel-hunting trip);
Foster v. Mallory S.S. Co., 244 N.Y. 612, 155 N.E. 919 (1927) (widow denied compensation for death of employee who was struck by automobile while delivering pay envelope to
fellow employee); Hinton Laundry Co. v. De Lozier, 143 Tenn. 399, 225 S.W. 1037 (1920)
(laundry employee not entitled to compensation for injury received while pressing clothes
as favor to fellow employee after working hours and in violation of company rule); Olson
Rug Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 215 Wis. 344, 254 N.W. 519 (1934) (foreman of crew of
traveling salesmen denied compensation for injury resulting from car accident that occurred while taking an ill crew member to his parents' home).
381. See IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 28.00 (1979).
382. See id. § 28.11.
383. Globe Indem. Co. v. Legien, 47 Ga. App. 539, 171 S.E. 185 (1933) (employee
injured while attempting to evade dog he thought to be vicious).
384. See Martinez v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 982, 544 P.2d
1350, 127 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1976); Johnson v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 69 S.D. 111, 7 N.W.2d
145 (1942).
385. See Stresenreuter v. Industrial Comm'n, 322 I11. 187, 152 N.E. 548 (1926); Andrews v. Emporium Forestry Co., 250 N.Y. 592, 166 N.E. 336 (1929) (per curiam); Associated Employer's Reciprocal v. State Indus. Comm'n, 82 Okla. 229, 200 P. 174 (1921).
386. McCue v. Industrial Comm'n, 5 Ariz. App. 194, 424 P.2d 842 (1967) (bank guard
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over, even if the rescue takes place during non-working hours,
compensation will be awarded because the employer's interests are
being served. 38 ' Compensation also is clearly proper for injuries an

employee sustains while rescuing coemployees because the injured
employee is merely complying with the employer's duty to aid employees in danger. 38

The more difficult question of the compen-

sability of injuries sustained while rescuing strangers is explored
below.

38 9

b.

Rescue of Strangers

Although not frequently encountered, one of the more controversial issues in workers' compensation law is whether injuries in39
curred in the rescue of strangers should be compensable. 0
Although injuries sustained by employees who attempt to rescue
strangers threatened by dangers from beyond the employment environment might, at first, seem to lack a sufficient employment
connection, they often are found to be covered by the compensation act because rescue cases have a humanitarian appeal. 39' The

case most frequently cited and relied on by claimants is the United
States Supreme Court decision, O'Leary v. Brown-Paciftc-Maxon,
Inc. 3 9 2 In O'Leary the employer was a government contractor on
the island of Guam. 393 The contractor maintained a recreation

center for its employees near a channel on the shoreline. The
channel created such a danger for swimmers that its use was forstruck by car when investigating accident near bank); Sebo v. Libby, McNeil & Libby,
216 Mich. 351, 185 N.W. 702 (1921) (employee injured stopping runaway horses); Baum
v. Industrial Comm'n, 288 Ill.
516, 123 N.E. 625 (1919) (protecting employer's property
from destruction by strikers).
387. See Meaney v. Keating, 200 Misc. 308, 102 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1951) (employee injured during middle of night while fighting fire at employer's factory); Andrews v. Emporium Forestry Co., 250 N.Y. 592, 166 N.E. 336 (1929) (per curiam) (employee suffered
heart attack while running to put out fire in building owned by employer); IA A. LARSON,
supra note 1, § 28.11 (1979).
388. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 174
Cal. 616, 163 P. 1013 (1917); Brock-Haffner Press Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 68 Colo. 291,
187 P. 44 (1920); Dragovich v. Iroquois Iron Co., 269 Ill.
478, 109 N.E. 999 (1915); Adams
v. Bryant, 274 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. 1955).
389. See notes 390-415 infra and accompanying text.
390. See IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 28.21 (1979).
391. Davis, Workmen's Compensation in Connecticut-The Necessayy Work Connection, 7
CONN. L. REV. 199, 210 (1975).
392. 340 U.S. 504 (1951).
393. Id. at 505.
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bidden and warning signs were posted. 394 The employee was waiting for a bus at the center when he noticed two men standing on
the reefs beyond the channel motioning for help. 395 He jumped
into the water in an attempt to rescue the men. 396 Unfortunately,
the employee drowned while trying to swim the channel. 397 In upholding an award under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 3 98 the Court stated:
All that is required is that the "obligations or conditions" of
employment create the "zone or special danger" out of which
the injury arose. A reasonable rescue attempt, like pursuit in
aid of an officer making an arrest, may be "one of the risks of
the employment, an incident of the service, foreseeable, if not
'399
foreseen, and so covered by the statute.
Professor Larson correctly characterizes the O'Leag case as falling within the positional-risk doctrine because the Court indicated
that "[t]he test of recovery is not a causal relation between the
nature of employment of the injured person and the accident. '40 0
Finding a work connection merely because the employment brings
the employee to the place where a moral obligation to rescue a
stranger is encountered, however, is apparently inconsistent with
Minnesota law. For example, in Weidenbach v. Miller,4° 1 the employee, a truck driver, accompanied by his employer, was driving
along a lake when they observed a man who had fallen through
the ice.40 2 The employer indicated that they should investigate. 40 3
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-941, 944-950 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
399. 340 U.S. at 507 (citations omitted).
400. IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 28.23, at 5-340 (1979) ("The Brown-Paqft-Maxon
case adopts the positional risk theory in its present form, by finding work-connection if the
employment merely brings the employee to the place where he encounters a moral obligation to rescue a stranger."). Professor Riesenfeld views the O'Leay case in a different light.
He characterizes O'Leay as falling within the "twilight zone in which the expert judgment
of the administrative agency" is controlling. Riesenfeld, supra note 1, at 544.
401. 237 Minn. 278, 55 N.W.2d 289 (1952).
402. See id. at 279, 55 N.W.2d at 289.
403. The testimony of the employer at the compensation hearing was as follows:
Q. And what were those men doing?
A. Well, there wasn't two men, only one that we saw.
Q. One man. What was the one man doing?
A. He was floundering in the water and hollering for help.
Q. What did you do?
A. Well, we stopped the truck and-that is, Earl [the employee] stopped the
truck, he was driving, and run over to where the accident was.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol6/iss3/2

64

Bradt: An Examination of the "Arising out of" and the "in the Course of"

19801

"ARISING OUT OF" AND "IN THE COURSE OF"

The employee immediately stopped the truck and ran out onto the
frozen lake. 40 4 During the rescue attempt the ice gave way and the
employee drowned. 40 5 Although the court cited numerous cases
that allowed compensation in analogous situations, 4° 6 it ultimately
denied compensation. In doing so, it framed the issue as follows:
"Can it be said that assistance to any person observed to be in peril
off the highway, regardless of the distance separating such person
from the highway is incidental to the employment so long as such
person is in the range of the employee's vision?" 40 7 Answering this
question in the negative, the court denied compensation. 40 8 As to

the argument that the employer enlarged the employment scope
by ordering the employee to stop, the court stated that there was
no express direction to go to the aid of a stranger; at best, the employer inquired of the employee whether they should not do so.409
The Weidenbach decision, however, may have been impliedly
Q.

Did you make any statement to Earl before he stopped the truck?
My recollection-I don't remember the exact words but the sum and substance was, I said: "There is a man in the lake," and I believe that I-I am
not positive now, it has been a long time; seems to me I said, "We better
stop."
Q. "Better stop"?
A. There might be a possibility-I don't remember whether I said that or not.
Id. at 279-80, 55 N.W. at 290.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. See id. at 284-90, 55 N.W.2d at 292-96.
407. Id. at 291, 55 N.W.2d at 296.
408. Id. at 293, 55 N.W.2d at 297.
409. Id. The Minnesota court's reasoning in this regard was correct. Because of an
ever-present "[r]eluctance to countenance 'nonfeasance' as a basis of liability, the law [in
America] has persistently refused to recognize the moral obligation of common decency
and common humanity, to come to the aid of another human being [whose life] is in
danger." W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 56, at 340. In contrast to the indifference of American law, at least 13 European countries have specific provisions in their criminal codes
imposing a duty of rescue on individuals able to assist the less fortunate. See Rudzinski,
The Duty to Rescue- A ComparativeAnalysis, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 91-92
(J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966).
Interestingly, Vermont is the only state that imposes a general duty to rescue. The
Vermont statute reads in relevant part as follows:
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall,
to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or
without interference with important duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless the assistance or care is being provided by
others.
A.

(c) A person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined
not more than $100.00.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973). For a discussion of the Vermont statute, see Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue.- A Comment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1972).
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overruled in 1974 by Carey v. Sadther.41° In Carey compensation

was awarded to the widow of a feed salesman who died while attempting to help an individual who had been working in a well
approximately 100 feet from the coffee shop in which the employee was visiting with area farmers. 4 11 After being in the hole

about fifteen seconds, the employee yelled "I smell something, pull
me up. ' 4 12 Seconds later, while being hoisted from the hole, the
employee collapsed and died from asphyxiation. In indicating
that the death arose out of and in the course of employment, the
court framed the crucial issue as follows: "Was Carey's act in going to the aid of a man lying at the bottom of a well the type of
conduct encouraged by his employer? The record unequivocally
shows that the company actually encouraged its salesman to repre' 3
sent the company by being helpful. 41

By framing the question in this fashion, the court was able to
award compensation. 4 14 Although the claimant clearly died in a
brave act of selfless service to humanity, workers' compensation
benefits should not be given in lieu of medals. To surmise that
Carey rendered assistance only because of his employment training implies that absent that training he would have stood idly by
and let the stranger perish, a supposition that gives little credit to
Carey's character and bravery. A better approach in Carey would
have been to find an implied contract of hire between Carey and
the employer of the well diggers as it was this employer that
4 15
benefitted from Carey's acts.
410. 300 Minn. 88, 219 N.W.2d 76 (1974).
411. Id. at 90, 219 N.W.2d at 77.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 93, 219 N.W.2d at 79.
414. See id. at 96, 219 N.W.2d at 80. The court found persuasive the claimant's arguments that the employee would be a more successful salesman if he used the sales "technique" of being friendly and being of service to potential customers. Se id. at 89, 219
N.W.2d at 77.
415. Such a result finds support in State cx rel. Nienaber v. District Court, 138 Minn.
416, 165 N.W. 268 (1917). In that case, the employee of a coal delivery company requested the claimant to assist him in pushing his wagon out of an area where it was mired
in mud. While pushing the wagon, the claimant was injured. The court held that the
claimant was entitled to compensation because "the driver of the coal wagon was engaged
in the discharge of the duties of his employment, was confronted with an emergency, relief
from which required assistance, and was within his implied authority in employing plaintiff to render the necessary help." Id. at 417, 165 N.W. at 268 (emphasis added).
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C. Recreational Activities and Employer-Sponsored Social Events
One of the fringe benefits provided by employers is the sponsoring, encouraging, or permitting of recreational and social activities. 41 6 These activities may vary from holding a company picnic
during normal working hours, 41 7 to sponsoring employee's softball
teams. 41 8 The developing law in this area can be separated into

two categories: recreational activities41 9 and employer-sponsored
420
social events.
1.

RecreationalActivities

An examination of the cases dealing with recreational activities
indicates a lack of uniformity in the decisions, 42' usually resulting
416. Professor Larson notes that "[a] comparatively recent development in the 'employment environment' is the widespread and increasing prevalence of recreational activities sponsored, encouraged or permitted in varying degrees by employers." IA A.
LARSON, supra note 1, § 22.00, at 5-71 (1979).
417. See Tietz v. Hastings Lumber Mart, Inc., 297 Minn. 230, 210 N.W.2d 236 (1973).
In Tttz an employee drowned at a company picnic. Because full attendance was encouraged and the picnic was held during normal working hours, the court granted compensation. TetZ should be contrasted with Ethen v. Franklin Mfg. Co., 286 Minn. 371,
176 N.W.2d 72 (1970), in which compensation was denied to an employee injured at a
company picnic during non-working hours with attendance voluntary.
418. See LeBar v. Ewald Bros. Dairy, 217 Minn. 16, 13 N.W.2d 729 (1944); cf. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. v. Sommer, 44 Ohio App. 2d 69, 335 N.E.2d 743 (1974) (employersponsored basketball).
419. For a general discussion of the compensability of recreational activities, see IA A.
LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 22.00-.30 (1979); 6 W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, §§ 1594-1595;
Schneider, Compensability of Injuries Durng Employer-SponsoredRecreational Events, 2 NAT'L A.
CLAIMANT'S COMPENSATION ATTORNEYS L.J. 62 (1948); Note, RecreationalInjuies: Infusion of Common Law, Agency-Tort Concepts, 34 IND. L.J. 310 (1959); Note, Injuiy from RecreationalActivities as Artiing out of the Course of Employment, 28 MINN. L. REV. 414 (1944); Note,
Recoveryfor RecreationalInjurtes, 25 N.Y.U. L. REv. 149 (1950); Note, RecreationalInjuries, 24
TENN. L. REv. 870 (1957); Note, Workmen's Compensationfor Injuries Arsng out of Recreational
Activity, 1951 WASH. U.L.Q. 87.
420. For a general discussion of the compensability of employer-sponsored social
events, see IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 22.21 (1979); 7 W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1,
§ 1666.
421. Compare Federal Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 90 Cal. App.
357, 265 P. 858 (1928) (awarding compensation) andJewel Tea Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
6 Ill. 2d 304, 128 N.E.2d 699 (1955) (same) and LeBar v. Ewald Bros. Dairy, 217 Minn. 16,
13 N.W.2d 729 (1944) (same) andComplitano v. Steel & Alloy Tank Co., 34 N.J. 300, 168
A.2d 809 (1961) (same) andColumbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. v. Sommer, 44 Ohio App. 2d 69,
335 N.E.2d 743 (1974) (same) with Lindsay v. Public Serv. Co., 146 Colo. 579, 362 P.2d
407 (1961) (denying compensation) and Keystone Steel & Wire Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
40 Il. 2d 160, 238 N.E.2d 593 (1968) (same) and McDonald v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 288 Minn. 452, 183 N.W.2d 276 (1970) (same) and Youngberg v. Donlin Co., 264
Minn. 421, 119 N.W.2d 746 (1963) and Biggs v. Presto Lite Div. of Eltra Corp., 462 P.2d
641 (Okla. 1969) (same).
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from the different "mix" in the fact situations. 422 The leading
Minnesota case awarding compensation for a recreational injury is
Le Bar v. Ewald Brothers Da'o,.423 In Le Bar an employee sustained
an injury while playing for a company-sponsored softball team in
a commercial league. 424 The court concluded from the manner in
which the employer had supported employee sporting activities
that the employer considered the athletic contests an essential part
of its business. 425 The Le Bar court also indicated that compensation was appropriate because there was evidence of significant advertising and public relations value to the employer, as well as
426
employer sponsorship.
The Le Bar court's rather liberal interpretation of the requirement that an employer benefit from the recreational activity, however, must be read in conjunction with dictum in the 1963
Minnesota decision, Youngberg v.Donhn Co. 427 In Youngberg the
court indicated that the benefit the employer receives from the employee's attendance at the recreational activity must be something
"beyond the intangible value of improvement in the employee's
health or morale that is common to all kinds of recreation and
8

'42
social life."

In its most recent decision involving employer-sponsored recreation activities, the Minnesota court indicated that four factors
would be considered in determining whether compensation was
appropriate: 4 29 whether the activity took place on or off the em422. McDonald v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 288 Minn. 452, 454, 183 N.W.2d
276, 277 (1970); IA A. LARSON, supra note 1,§ 22.24 (1979).
423. 217 Minn. 16, 13 N.W.2d 729 (1944).
424. Id. at 17-18, 13 N.W.2d at 729.
425. Id. at 20, 13 N.W.2d at 730.
426. See id. at 18-20, 13 N.W.2d at 730.
427. 264 Minn. 421, 119 N.W.2d 746 (1963).
428. Id. at 427, 119 N.W.2d at 750. In Youngberg the court denied compensation for an
injury suffered in the course of a return trip from a company-sponsored bowling event.
The claimant's argument that the "decedent was returning from the performance of a
work-related, recreational activity which was in the nature of a special errand or mission
requested by his employer" was also unsuccessful. Id. at 424-26, 119 N.W.2d at 748-49.
429. See McDonald v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 288 Minn. 452, 183 N.W.2d 276
(1970). In McDonald the claimant was injured in a softball game sponsored by the Clock
and Globe Club, a social association of fellow employees. Although the employer reserved
the right to restrict activities of this association that were detrimental to the company, and
the funds for the operation of the association came from the profits made from the employer's vending machines, the court denied compensation. In so doing, the court emphasized that the employee's injury took place off the premises, after working hours, and with
insufficient employer control. Id. at 455-56, 183 N.W.2d at 278.
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ployer's premises during working hours; 4 30 the degree of employer
initiative and control of the activity; 43' the amount of employer

contribution of money or equipment

432

and, the quantity and type

of employer benefit derived from the activity. 4 33 These factors,

properly analyzed and weighted, should allow courts and practitioners to determine with little difficulty when an employee has
sustained a compensable injury during an employer-sponsored recreational event.
2.

Employer-SponsoredSoczal Events

The law with respect to company-sponsored social events also
has not been uniformly applied. 434 The reason for the varying results is again attributable to the different "mix" in each fact situation. 4 35 The Minnesota Supreme Court was not confronted with a
case involving an injury occurring during an employer-sponsored
social event until 1970 when it considered Ethen v. FrankhnManufacturing Co. 436 In Ethen the employee was requested by his foreman

to take part in a tug-of-war at a company-sponsored picnic. 437 For
some reason, the tug-of-war was cancelled, but the employee attended the picnic anyway. 438 The employee met his foreman, at
the foreman's request, at a bridge where the foreman was directing
traffic. 439 Finding that the foreman did not need assistance, the
430. See id. at 454, 183 N.W.2d at 277.
431. See id.
432. See id.
433.

See id.

434. Compare Tietz v. Hastings Lumber Mart, Inc., 297 Minn. 230, 210 N.W.2d 236
(1973) (benefits awarded to employee's dependents after he drowned at company-sponsored picnic held on weekday during normal working hours) and Ricciardi v. Damar
Prods. Co., 45 N.J. 54, 211 A.2d 347 (1965) (compensation awarded to an employee's
dependents after he drowned at company-sponsored picnic held on non-work day; no required attendance) with Ethen v. Franklin Mfg. Co., 286 Minn. 371, 176 N.W.2d 72
(1970) (benefits denied to an employee injured at company picnic) and Dapp v. New York
State Liquor Auth., 50 A.D.2d 250, 377 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1975) (same).
435. Professor Larson has noted that:
As to company-sponsored picnics, with which may be included various other
kinds of outings such as business meetings held at country or lake houses, awards
banquets, dinner dances, "fun weekends," and golf outings, there are a number
of cases awarding and denying compensation, but, except perhaps as to a few
earlier cases, this reflects more a difference in the strength of the fact situation
presented than a difference in the tests and rules being applied.
IA A. LARSON, sepra note 1, § 22.23 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
436. 286 Minn. 371, 176 N.W.2d 72 (1970).
437. Id. at 372, 176 N.W.2d at 73.
438. See id.
439. See id.
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employee started back to another part of the picnic area to socialize. 440

To shorten his trip, the employee jumped on a running

board of a company truck as it passed him. 44' In so doing, the
employee fell off the truck and sustained serious injuries. 442 The
employer financed the cost of the picnic; the picnic was on a nonworking day for most employees; the employees for whom it was a
working day remained at work and did not attend the picnic; no
wages were paid; and, attendance was voluntary. 443 In holding
that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of the employee's employment, the Ethen court concluded that the employer
"did not derive a substantial direct benefit from the employees'
attendance at the picnic beyond the intangible value of improvement in the employee's health and morale that is common in all
'444
kinds of recreation and social life."
Subsequently, in Tietz v. Hastings Lumber Mart, Inc., 445 the Min-

nesota Supreme Court was presented with a similar fact situation,
except that the employees' attendance was mandatory and those
employees that did not attend the picnic received a reduction in
wages. Because of this factual difference, the court correctly
awarded compensation. 446 The court indicated that six factors
should be considered in determining whether injuries sustained
447
during an employer-sponsored social event are compensable.
448
First, did the employer sponsor the event?
Second, to what ex449
tent was attendance voluntary?
Third, was there some degree of
440. See ia.
441. See id.
442. See id. at 372-73, 176 N.W.2d at 73.
443. See id.
444. Id. at 374, 176 N.W.2d at 74 (quoting Youngberg v. Donlin Co., 264 Minn. 421,
427, 119 N.W.2d 746, 750 (1963)).
445. 297 Minn. 230, 231, 210 N.W.2d 236, 237 (1973).
446. See id. at 232, 210 N.W.2d at 237. Courts in other jurisdictions have awarded
compensation when faced with similar facts. See, e.g., Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery
v. Industrial Comm'n, 36 Ill. 2d 410, 223 N.E.2d 150 (1967); Noble v. Zimmerman, 237
Ind. 556, 146 N.E.2d 828 (1957); Sica v. Retail Credit Co., 245 Md. 606, 227 A.2d 33
(1967); Kelly v. Hackensack Water Co., 23 N.J. Super. 88, 92 A.2d 506 (1952).
447. The Tietz court stated, "We have weighed the factors which we regard governing." Tietz v. Hastings Lumber Mart, Inc., 297 Minn. 230, 232, 210 N.W.2d 236, 237
(1973) (footnote omitted). In so doing, the court cited to Professor Larson's treatise, see IA
A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 22.23 (1979), which indicates that six factors must be considered in determining whether injuries received at company-sponsored social events are
compensable.
448. Tietz v. Hastings Lumber Mart, Inc., 297 Minn. at 232, 210 N.W.2d at 237.
449. Id.
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encouragement to attend, such as taking a record of attendance, or
paying for time spent at the social event? 4 50 Fourth, did the employer finance the occasion to a substantial extent? 45' Fifth, did
the employees regard it as an employment benefit to which they
were entitled as of right? 452 Finally, did the employer benefit from

the event, not merely in a vague way through better morale and
good will, but through such tangible advantages as having an op453
portunity to make speeches and awards?

Based on the aforementioned factors, the court denied compensation in two cases in which employees sustained injuries in automobile accidents while driving to their employer's Christmas
parties. 454 In Dahmen v. River Towers Corp.,4 5 5 however, the court
appears to have deviated from its prior well-reasoned decisions in
this area. In Dahmen the court affirmed an award of compensation
when the employee's supervisor told the employee not to take a
taxi cab home from an on-premises Christmas party held during
working hours, but to ride home with a coemployee selected by the
supervisor. 4 56 The employee sustained an injury when she slipped
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. See Pasko v. Beecher Co., 301 Minn. 61, 221 N.W.2d 127 (1974) (per curiam);
Ramaker v. Marjae, Inc., 301 Minn. 58, 221 N.W.2d 125 (1974) (per curiam).
Ramaker involved a minor who was a part-time busboy at a restaurant that the employer closed early so employees could attend a Christmas party. At that party, the employer furnished all the food and liquor and also gave a short welcoming speech. The
minor was injured in an automobile accident that occurred during the ride home. In
affirming a denial of benefits, the court stated:
His attendance . . . was neither compulsory nor rewarded by gifts or wages.
Further, it appears that the party was scheduled merely for the pleasure of the
employees rather than as an incident of the employment relationship or as a
benefit to the employer. Any benefit derived by the employer would have to be
classified as the intangible improvement of morale, falling far short of meeting
the direct and substantial benefit test.
Id. at 60, 221 N.W.2d at 127.
In commenting on office Christmas parties in general, Professor Larson indicates:
If there is anything more hazardous than the softball game at the first company
picnic in spring, it is the Christmas office party. Rivalries and jealousies dormant during the year flare up as co-workers begin to drink and dance together,
and compensation law cannot avoid the necessity of deciding whether it covers
injuries resulting from contests over who gets what girl or who can drink with
whom under the table.
IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 22.23, at 5-93 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
455. 300 Minn. 514, 218 N.W.2d 702 (1974) (per curiam).
456. See id. at 514, 218 N.W.2d at 703.
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and fell on the front steps while being assisted to her door.457 The
court indicated that it affirmed the award of compensation because the employer ordered the employee to take a special means
of transportation home. 4 58 The result in Dahmen would appear to
be in error because the employee would have had to climb the
steps of her home even if she had taken a taxi cab home. Neither
the employer's Christmas party, nor the "order" to the employee
to ride home with a coemployee had anything to do with her injury. Aside from the result in the Dahmen case, however, the factors enunciated by the court in Tziez provide the necessary
assistance to determine which injuries occurring during employersponsored social events are compensable.
D.

Idiopalhic Falls

Difficult proof problems for employees arise in idiopathic fall
cases. An idiopathic fall is one caused by a purely personal condition, such as a heart attack or an epileptic seizure. 4 59 When an
employee falls at work solely because of an underlying personal
condition, and as a result suffers injuries upon contact with the
floor, the question presented is whether the injury arises out of the
employment. 460 As a general rule, falls on the employer's premises
are compensable if the employment places the employee in a position increasing the likelihood or the dangerous effects of a fall, 46 1

such as on a sharp corner 462 or from a height. 463 The controversial
457. See id.
458. See id.at 515, 218 N.W.2d at 703.
459. See generally 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 12.11. Schmidt's Attornqs' Dictionar of
Medicine and Word Finder defines "idiopathic" as being of "spontaneous origin" or "selforiginating." 1 J. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER
1-4 (1977). A North Carolina court defined an idiopathic fall as "one due to the mental or
physical condition of the particular employee." Cole v. Guilford County, 131 S.E.2d 308,
311 (N.C. 1963).
460. See I A. LARSON, supra note 1,§ 12.11. See generally Stenberg v. Raymond Coop.
Creamery, 209 Minn. 366, 296 N.W. 498 (1941).
461. See Riley v. Oxford Paper Co., 149 Me. 418, 420, 103 A.2d 111, 113 (1954); accord,
Irby v. Republic Creosoting Co., 288 F.2d 195, 198-99 (5th Cir. 1955) (fall from three-foot
platform); Industrial Comm'n v. Nelson, 127 Ohio St. 41, 42, 186 N.E. 735, 736 (1933)
(fall onto base of welding machine); Corry v. Commissioned Officers' Mess, 78 R.I. 264,
268, 81 A.2d 689, 692 (1951) (fall from forty-foot terrace).
462. See Kennelly v. Travelers Ins. Co., 273 F.2d 479, 481 (5th Cir. 1960) (fall into
machinery); Stasel v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 278 S.W.2d 721,
724 (Ky. 1955) (fall onto hot stove).
463. See Baltimore Dry Docks & Ship Bldg. Co. v. Webster, 139 Md. 616, 617, 116 A.
842, 843 (1922) (fall of 45 feet); Corry v. Commissioned Officers' Mess, 78 R.I. 264, 268, 81
A.2d 689, 692 (1951) (fall of 40 feet); Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co. v. Industrial
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question is whether an idiopathic fall on a level surface should be
4 64
viewed as arising out of the employment.
The majority of jurisdictions deny compensation for injuries attributable to idiopathic falls on level surfaces because no special
risk or hazard peculiar to the employment exists. 46 5 Cnmzno's
Case,466 the first American case involving compensability of an injury or death caused by an idiopathic fall, held that no causal connection was established between the hazard and the injury,
because a concrete floor was not a danger created by the employment. 46 7 Courts that have followed the reasoning in Cznmno's Case
require a causal connection between the employment injury and
special hazard before allowing compensation. Under the majority
view, a level floor is not recognized as a hazard or risk of employment because level surfaces are conditions the general public encounters daily whether on a sidewalk or in a home. 46 8 The

majority view rejects the argument that, but for the claimant performing the duties of employment, the injury would never have
46 9
occurred.
Apparently, the majority view is based on the rationale that extending the Workers' Compensation Act to provide employees
with protection against everyday accidents, to which the general
public is exposed, would make these employees a "privileged
class." '4 70

Consequently, because injuries from idiopathic falls on

Comm'n, 212 Wis. 227, 229, 247 N.W. 841, 843-44 (1933) (fall from three or four steps
above floor).
464. See I A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 12.14.
465. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 69 Ariz. 320, 324, 213 P.2d 672,
676 (1950); Dustin v. Lewis, 99 N.H. 404, 408, 112 A.2d 54, 57 (1955); Zuchowski v.
United States Rubber Co., 102 R.I. 165, 170, 229 A.2d 61, 66 (1967). See generally I A.
LARSON, supra note 1, § 12.14. Indicative of this rule is the statement made in Howard v.
Ford Motor Co., 363 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. App. 1962), that:
[niumerous cases have held as a matter of law that a concrete floor is not such a
hazard or special risk for the very simple reason that it is not peculiar to the
employment, but is found on most sidewalks, streets and in the flooring of many
public and private buildings.
Id. at 67.
466. 251 Mass. 158, 146 N.E. 245 (1925).
467. See id. at 159, 146 N.E. at 246.
468. See, e.g., Howard v. Ford Motor Co., 363 S.W.2d 61, 67 (Mo. App. 1962);
Zuchowski v. United States Rubber Co., 102 R.I. 165, 169, 229 A.2d 61, 66 (1967);
Kraynick v. Industrial Comm'n, 34 Wis. 2d 107, 110, 148 N.W.2d 668, 671 (1967).
469. See, e.g., Borden Foods Co. v. Dorsey, 112 Ga. App. 838, 840, 146 S.E.2d 532, 534
(1965).
470. E.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 69 Ariz. 320, 323, 213 P.2d 672,
675 (1950).
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level surfaces originate basically from a personal risk, and the
Workers' Compensation Act is not a general health insurance law
requiring compensation for every injury an employee suffers, the
the employee is entitled to
majority view rejects any notion that
47 1
falls.
idiopathic
for
compensation
A significant minority of courts, however, have allowed recovery
for idiopathic level floor falls, 47 2 and some notable dissenting opinions have been written in cases that have followed the majority
rule. 4 73 The minority view developed primarily because of the difficulty in distinguishing falls from small heights or falls into objects
from falls onto level surfaces. 474 Injuries sustained in falls from
heights or into machinery or other objects usually have been compensated because the employment created a special risk. 47 5 Courts
that follow the minority rule view recovery for injuries sustained
from an idiopathic fall on a level floor as a logical extention of this
rule. 476 At least one commentator has indicated that the current
477
trend is toward compensating employees for these injuries.

In Slenberg v. Raymond Cooperative Creamety,

4 78

the Minnesota

Supreme Court was faced with its first case dealing with an idiopathic fall on a level floor. The court held that the employee's
injuries arose out of his employment, reasoning that the employment and injury were causally connected. 4 79 In so holding, the
court did not indicate that idiopathic level floor falls were an area
of controversy in compensation theory and that the majority of
471. See, e.g., Zuchowski v. United States Rubber Co., 102 R.I. 165, 169, 229 A.2d 61,
66 (1967).
472. See Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 41 Cal. 2d
676, 679, 263 P.2d 4, 7 (1953) (fall on concrete floor); Savage v. St. Aeden's Church, 122
Conn. 343, 345, 189 A. 599, 601 (1937); Pollock v. Studebaker Corp., 97 N.E.2d 63 (Ind.
App. 1951); George v. Great E. Food Prods., Inc., 44 N.J. 44, 47, 207 A.2d 161, 163 (1965);
1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 12.14.
473. See Henderson v. Celanese Corp., 16 N.J. 208, 213, 108 A.2d 267, 271 (1954)
(Brennan, J., dissenting), majort'y opinion overruled, George v. Great E. Food Prods., Inc., 44
N.J. 44, 207 A.2d 161 (1965); Stanfield v. Industrial Comm'n, 146 Ohio St. 583, 586, 67
N.E.2d 446, 448 (1946) (Bell and Williams, J.J., dissenting).
474. See Riley v. Oxford Paper Co., 149 Me. 418, 422, 103 A.2d 111, 114 (1954). See
generally 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 12.14.
475. See note 462 supra.
476. See, e.g., George v. Great E. Food Prods., Inc., 44 N.J. 44, 46, 207 A.2d 161, 162
(1965). See generaly 1 A. LARSON, su0ra note 1, § 12.14.
477. See Henderson, Should Workmen's Compersation Be Extended to Nonoccupational Injuries?, 48 TEX. L. REV. 117, 125-26 (1969).

478. 209 Minn. 366, 296 N.W. 498 (1941).
479. See id. at 371-72, 296 N.W. at 501.
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courts have denied compensation for such injuries. Rather, in an
almost nonchalant manner, the Stenberg court simply indicated
that the injury arose out of the employee's employment. 480 Until
recently, Minnesota cases have followed the Stenberg court's reasoning without examining the issue in any greater detail.48 1 Under
Stenberg and its progeny, a fall on a level surface appears to be
compensable as a matter of law. 48 2 Fortunately, a 1979 Minnesota
decision, O'Rourke v. North Star Chemicals, Inc.,4 83 may be viewed as

ending the Stenberg court's simplistic handling of idiopathic falls.
In O'Rourke the court, without making any reference to prior idiopathic fall cases, held that the employment must "aggravate the
48 4
effects of the fall" before the resulting injury is compensable.
The O'Rourke court's holding, therefore, appears to bring Minnesota within the majority rule regarding idiopathic falls.
E.

Attending Personal Needs During Working Hours

On several occasions during each working day, employees turn
aside briefly from their regular duties to attend to personal needs.
As a general rule, employees who engage in acts that minister to
their personal comfort may recover compensation when injured,
unless the extent of the departure is so great that an attempt to
abandon employment may be inferred as a matter of law. 485 The

rationale supporting this general rule is that, although personal
needs by definition involve personal risks, they are nevertheless incidental to the employment relationship. 486 Based on this rationale, numerous decisions have awarded compensation for injuries
occurring while smoking, 48 7 having lunch, 488 seeking shelter from
480. See id. at 372, 296 N.W. at 501.
481.

See Miller v. Goodhue-Rice-Wabasha Citizens Action Council, Inc., 293 Minn.

454, 455, 197 N.W.2d 424, 424-25 (1972) (per curiam); Barlau v. Minneapolis-Moline
Power Implement Co., 214 Minn. 564, 578-79, 9 N.W.2d 6, 13 (1943).
482.

See notes 478-81 supra.

483. 281 N.W.2d 192 (Minn. 1979).
484.

Id. at 194.

485. See IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 21.00 (1979). For a general discussion of the
personal comfort doctrine, see id. §§ 21.00-.84; 7 W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, §§ 16171631; Comment, Workmen's Compensation: The PersonalComfort Doctrine, 1960 Wis. L. REV.
91.

486. See, e.g., Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ariz. 398, 415, 158
P.2d 511, 518 (1945); Prater v. Indiana Briquetting Corp., 253 Ind. 83, 88, 251 N.E.2d
810, 812 (1969); Sweet v. Kolosky, 259 Minn. 253, 255, 106 N.W.2d 908, 910 (1960); Olson
v. Trinity Lodge No. 282, 226 Minn. 141, 146-47, 32 N.W.2d 255, 258 (1948); Collums v.
Caledonia Mfg. Co., 237 Miss. 607, 612, 115 So. 2d 672, 673 (1959).
487. See, e.g., Natco Corp. v. Mallory, 262 Ala. 595, 80 So. 2d 274 (1955); Whiting-
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the elements, 48 9 answering calls of nature, 49° quenching thirst,491
Mead Commercial Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 178 Cal. 505, 173 P. 1105 (1918);
Lovallo v. American Brass Co., 112 Conn. 635, 638-39, 153 A. 783, 784 (1931); Hailer v.
City of Lansing, 195 Mich. 753, 162 N.W. 335 (1917); Kaletha v. Hall Mercantile Co., 157
Minn. 290, 196 N.W. 261 (1923); Wickham v. Glenside Woolen Mills, 252 N.Y. 11, 168
N.E. 446 (1929) (per curiam); State Treasurer v. Ulysses Apartments, Inc., 232 A.D. 393,
250 N.Y.S. 190 (1931); Dzikowska v. Superior Steel Co., 259 Pa. 578, 582-83, 103 A. 351,
352 (1918); Mack v. Branch No. 12, 207 S.C. 258, 265-66, 35 S.E.2d 838, 840-41 (1945).
488. See, e.g., Royall v. Industrial Comm'n, 106 Ariz. 346, 351, 476 P.2d 156, 161
(1970); Lassila v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 302 Minn. 350, 224 N.W.2d 519 (1974) (per
curiam); Krause v. Swartwood, 174 Minn. 147, 149, 218 N.W. 555, 556 (1928).
In Lassila the court upheld an award to an employee injured during "an unpaid,
unsupervised lunch period in a cafeteria operated by the employer on its premises exclusively for the convenience of its employees," reasoning:
The lunch break, whether compensated or not, is a period of activity instrumental to employment just as a coffeebreak, a visit to the toilet, or a pause for a
cigarette. When taken on the employer's premises in an area provided specifically and exclusively for that purpose, it may reasonably be assumed to be of
some benefit or advantage to the employer in the operation of his business or the
advancement of his interests.
302 Minn. at 350, 224 N.W.2d at 519-20 (footnotes omitted).
489. See, e.g., Naranja Rock Co. v. Dawal Farms, 74 So. 2d 282, 286-87 (Fla. 1954);
Ervin v. Industrial Comm'n, 364 11. 56, 62-63, 4 N.E.2d 22, 25-26 (1936); Wabash Ry. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 360 Ill. 92, 195 N.E. 526 (1935); Allen v. Columbus Mining Co., 207
Ky. 183, 185, 268 S.W. 1073, 1074 (1925); Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Walters, 287 S.W.2d
921 (Ky. App. 1956); Rogers v. Mengel Co., 189 La. 723, 730, 180 So. 499, 501 (1938);
Smith v. Walker, 35 So. 2d 766, 768 (La. App. 1948); Geibig v. Ann Arbor Asphalt Constr.
Co., 238 Mich. 560, 562-63, 214 N.W. 90, 91 (1927); McKenzie v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 205 Minn. 231, 233, 285 N.W. 529, 530 (1939); Gillmore v. Ring Constr. Co.,
227 Mo. App. 1217, 1220, 61 S.W.2d 764, 766 (1933); Bubis v. Flockhardt Foundry Co.,
119 N.J.L. 136, 194 A. 781 (1937), aft'd, 120 N.J.L. 177, 198 A. 851 (1938) (per curiam);
Ziolkowski v. American Radiator Co., 247 N.Y. 513, 161 N.E. 164, 224 N.Y.S. 942 (1928)
(per curiam); Volz v. Southerland, 200 Tenn. 344, 350, 292 S.W.2d 385, 387-88 (1956);
United Employers Cas. Co. v. Barker, 148 S.W.2d 260, 263 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Northwestern Iron Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 160 Wis. 633, 152 N.W. 416 (1915).
490. See, e.g., Employers' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Colo. 84, 230 P. 394
(1924); Hunter Packing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 1 111.2d 99, 104, 115 N.E.2d 236, 239
(1953); Sachleben v. Gjellefald Constr. Co., 228 Iowa 152, 290 N.W. 48 (1940); Haskins'
Case, 261 Mass. 436, 437, 158 N.E. 845, 845 (1927); State ex rel. Great N. Express Co. v.
District Court, 142 Minn. 410, 413, 172 N.W.2d 310, 311 (1919); Equity Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 238 Mo. App. 4, 15, 175 S.W.2d 153, 159 (1943);
Zabriskie v. Erie R.R., 85 N.J.L. 157, 88 A. 824 (1913), afd, 86 N.J.L. 266, 92 A. 385
(1914); Coulter v. Nassau-Suffolk B & M Corp., 259 A.D. 942, 19 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1940) (per
curiam); Welden v. Skinner & Eddy Corp., 103 Wash. 243, 248, 174 P. 452, 453 (1918);
Karlslyst v. Industrial Comm'n, 243 Wis. 612, 614, 11 N.W.2d 179, 180 (1943).
491. See, e.g., Alabama Concrete Pipe Co. v. Berry, 226 Ala. 204, 206, 146 So. 271, 272
(1933); Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ariz. 398, 415, 158 P.2d 511,
518 (1945); Vendome Hotel v. Gibson, 122 Ind. App. 604, 608-10, 105 N.E.2d 906, 910
(1952); Gilliland v. Edgar Zinc Co., 112 Kan. 39, 40-41, 209 P. 658, 659 (1922); St. Alexandre v. Texas Co., 28 So. 2d 385, 388-89 (La. App. 1946); Collums v. Caledonia Mfg.
Co., 237 Miss. 607, 611-12, 115 So. 2d 672, 673 (1959); Goetz v. J.D. Carson Co., 357 Mo.
125, 132, 206 S.W.2d 530, 534 (1947); Moldove v. Rosenhein Co., 266 A.D. 931, 43

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol6/iss3/2

76

1980]

Bradt: An Examination of the "Arising out of" and the "in the Course of"
"ARISING OUT OF" AND "IN THE COURSE OF"

seeking fresh air, 492 relaxing during work breaks, 493 and even making or answering telephone calls. 494 Although compensation in
these cases appears proper, the Minnesota rule, which requires em95
ployer acquiesence, needs clarification4
Emphasizing employer approval instead of general custom may
result in considerate employers paying compensation and exempting from liability those employers with restrictive rules. 496 Basing
compensation on a general custom, instead of the practice of a parN.Y.S.2d 888 (1943) (per curiam); Menendes v. Dravo Constr. Co., 109 Pa. Super. 224,
167 A. 423 (1933); Bradshaw v. Aronovitch, 170 Va. 329, 337-38, 196 S.E. 684, 687 (1938);
Shapaka v. State Compensation Comm'r, 146 W. Va. 319, 323-24, 119 S.E.2d 821, 824
(1961).
492. See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 17 Cal. 2d 634,
637, 111 P.2d 313, 314 (1941); Sparks Milling Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 293 I11.350, 356,
127 N.E. 737, 739-40 (1920); Von Ette's Case, 223 Mass. 56, 61, 111 N.E. 696, 698 (1916);
Crotty v. Driver Harris Co., 49 N.J. Super. 60, 69, 139 A.2d 126, 131-32 (1958); Daly v.
State Ins. Fund, 284 A.D. 174, 176-77, 130 N.Y.S.2d 440, 442 (1954); Rewis v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 226 N.C. 325, 328, 38 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1946); Booker v. State Compensation
Comm'r, 113 W. Va. 657, 169 S.E. 483 (1933).
493. See, e.g., Broderick Co. v. Flemming, 116 Ind. App. 668, 681, 65 N.E.2d 257, 262
(1946); United Employers Cas. Co. v. Barker, 148 S.W.2d 260, 263 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
494. See, e.g., Kent v. Kent, 202 Iowa 1044, 1048-49, 208 N.W. 709, 711 (1926); Cox's
Case, 225 Mass. 220, 222, 114 N.E. 281, 282 (1916); Adams v. Colonial Colliery Co., 104
Pa. Super. 187, 158 A. 183 (1932).
495. For example, in Callaghan v. Brown, 218 Minn. 440, 16 N.W.2d 317 (1944), an
employee who for 30 years had crossed the street daily to a small cafe for a coffee break
was struck by an automobile and killed. In denying compensation, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that his death did not arise out of and in the course of his employment because "[hie was where he was solely in furtherance of his own personal desires and
accommodation." Id. at 441, 16 N.W.2d at 318.
Subsequently, in Sweet v. Kolosky, 259 Minn. 253, 106 N.W.2d 908 (1960), the court
awarded compensation to a supermarket employee who fell on a public street after a coffee break. The court based its decision on the basis that the employee was guaranteed a
coffee break in her union contract and the only way she could exercise her right was to
leave the market because there were no facilities on the premises for making coffee. Id. at
255, 106 N.W.2d at 910. In this way, the Sweet court did not have to overrule the Callaghan case but was able to distinguish it on the theory that the employee had employer
acquiescence in taking a coffee break. Id. at 256, 106 N.W.2d at 910-11.
Arguably, the employer in Callaghan also acquiesced in his employee's coffee breaks,
because such behavior occurred over a 30-year period. Thus, it would appear that the
acquiescence needed in Minnesota has to be a contractual one. Such a result is inconsistent with the theoretical underpinnings of the personal comfort doctrine because that doctrine does not depend on the technical terms of an employment contract, but considers
and recognizes that a rest break is an incident of employment because it is beneficial to
both the employee and employer. See IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 21.00-.84 (1979).
For a criticism of the Callaghan case, see Krause v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 3 Wis. 2d 61,
71, 87 N.W.2d 875, 881 (1958).
496. See Tiralongo v. Stanley Works, 104 Conn. 331, 133 A. 98 (1926).
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ticular employer, is the preferable standard. 497

F

Horseplay

Should employees who sustain horseplay injuries receive compensation? "Horseplay," of course, is a colloquial term used to describe playful and sportive acts that occasionally result in
employee injuries. 49 8 The early American cases denied compensa-

tion even to nonparticipating victims of horseplay. 499 This attitude followed rather blindly from the English courts' reasoning
that any employee horseplay injury was foreign to the inherent
risks of employment.5 0 0 Not until Mr. Justice Cardozo's 1920
opinion in Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills ,5

1

did American courts

consistently award compensation to a nonparticipating victim of
horseplay.

50

2

Although some early twentieth century American courts attempted to avoid the general rule of nonliability in horseplay situations by finding exceptions when the employer had notice, 50 3 or
497.

See Davis, The Effct of Employer Approval on Workmen 'r Compensation Decisions-LetCORNELL L. REV. 97, 102-03 (1968).
498. See, e.g., McKnight v. Consolidated Concrete Co., 279 Ala. 430, 186 So. 2d 144
(1966) (decedent fatally injured while riding on bucket of crane); Hughes v. Tapley, 206
Ark. 739, 177 S.W.2d 429 (1944) (employee injured while lighting powder fuse to frighten
co-worker); Derhammer v. Detroit News, 229 Mich. 658, 202 N.W. 958 (1925) (truckdriver
injured in water throwing fight), overruled,Crilly v. Ballou, 353 Mich. 303, 327, 91 N.W.2d
493, 506 (1958); Cunning v. City of Hopkins, 258 Minn. 306, 103 N.W.2d 876 (1960)
(employee injured in fall off pickup truck). For a general discussion of the horseplay doctrine, see IA A. LARSON, supra note 1,§§ 23.00-23.66 (1979); 1 W. SCHNEIDER, supra note
1, §§ 1609-1616; Brown, "Arising out of and i'n the Course of Employment"zn Workmen's Compensation Laws-Part IV, 8 Wis. L. REV. 217 (1933); Horovitz, Assaults and Horseplay Under
Workmen's Compensation Laws, 41 ILL. L. REv. 311 (1946); 33 CALIF. L. REV. 458 (1945).
499. See, e.g., Coronado Beach Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 682, 158 P. 212 (1916), overruled, Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 26 Cal. 2d 286, 294, 158
P.2d 9, 14 (1945); Payne v. Industrial Comm'n, 295 Ill. 388, 129 N.E. 122 (1920); Tarpper
v. Weston-Mott Co., 200 Mich. 275, 166 N.W. 857 (1918), overruled, Crilly v. Ballou, 353
Mich. 303, 327, 91 N.W.2d 493, 506 (1958). Interestingly, as late as 1926, the rule denying
compensation to horseplay victims was defended by law review commentators. See 14 Ky.
L.J. 262 (1926), in which the writer, examining a case allowing no recovery for an air hose
injury, states, "[t]his case not only seems to be with the weight of authority, but also seems
to reach a just result." Id. at 263.
500. The English rule is well expressed in Armitage v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry.
[1902] 2 K.B. 178.
501. 229 N.Y. 470, 128 N.E. 711 (1920).
502. See IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 23.10, at 5-124 (1979).
503. See Kokomo Steel & Wire Co. v. Irick, 80 Ind. App. 610, 612, 141 N.E. 796, 796
(1923); Stuart v. Kansas City, 102 Kan. 307, 310, 171 P. 913, 914 (1918); Glenn v. Reynolds Spring Co., 225 Mich. 693, 696-97, 196 N.W. 617, 619-20 (1924).

ling Afected Parties Communicate Standards, 54
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when the custom of horseplay existed, 50 4 Justice Cardozo rejected
such fictitious thinking and predicated liability on the ground that
the employment environment included the natural tendency of
50 5
employees to indulge in occasional horseplay.
Since Justice Cardozo's opinion, most courts have allowed only
"innocent" horseplay victims to recover compensation. 50 6 Professor Horovitz blames this result on courts throwing "a judicial bone
of solace" to the losing employer. 50 7 Unfortunately, the courts
continued to echo the innocent horseplay doctrine, resulting in the
establishment of a simple legal formula for deciding horseplay
cases. 508 If the claimant was not the aggressor, compensation was
permitted. 50 9 Conversely, all horseplay aggressors were denied
5 10
compensation.
Courts rationalized the denial of compensation to horseplay aggressors on several grounds. Perhaps the foremost reason was the
common precept that one must not profit from a wrong.51 1 Additional reasons included the assumption that horseplay aggressors:
were not performing employment duties; 51 2 were not advancing
any interest of the employer; 51 3 and were abandoning their employment. 51 4 Professor Horovitz correctly characterizes these
methods of sustaining the horseplay aggressor defense as "meta'
physic[al] and hairline distinctions. "515
A leading case awarding compensation to an aggressor in a
horseplay situation is the 1960 Minnesota Supreme Court decision
504. See White v. Kansas City Stockyards Co., 104 Kan. 90, 91, 177 P. 522, 522 (1919);
Markell v. Daniel Green Felt Shoe Co., 221 N.Y. 493, 116 N.E. 1060, 161 N.Y.S. 1134
(1917); Anderson & Kerr v. State Indus. Comm'n, 155 Okla. 137, 7 P.2d 902 (1932). At
least two early court decisions predicated liability on an employer's duty to prevent employees from engaging in horseplay. See Glenn v. Reynolds Spring Co., 225 Mich. 693,
196 N.W. 617 (1924); Phil Hollenbach Co. v. Hollenbach, 181 Ky. 262, 283, 204 S.W. 152,
161 (1918).
505. See Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N.Y. at 472, 128 N.E. at 711.
506. See Horovitz, supra note 498, at 322-23.
507. See id. at 323.
508. See generally IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 23.30 (1979).
509. See id.
510. See id.
511. See Horovitz, supra note 498, at 323.
512. See Stillwagon v. Callan Bros., 183 A.D. 141, 145, 170 N.Y.S. 677, 679 (1918).
513. See Marion County Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 292 Ill.
463,466,127 N.E. 84,
85 (1920).
514. See Armour & Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 397 Ill. 433, 437, 74 N.E.2d 704, 706
(1947).
515. See Horovitz, supra note 498, at 359.
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Cunning v. City of Hopkins. 5 16 The court in Cunning awarded compensation based on its reasoning in the earlier assault case of Petro
v. Martin Bakzg Co. 51 7 The Petro court had awarded compensation

to the widow of an employee killed in a work-connected quarrel in
which he was the aggressor. 5 18 The injuries in Petro were held to
have arisen out of and in the course of employment because the
dispute stemmed from the work environment and its associations. 51 9 Recognizing that the Petro decision had eliminated the
aggressor defense in assault cases, the Cunning court held that an
employee's failure to realize the consequences of a foolish act
should not bar recovery in a horseplay case. 520 Based on this rationale, compensation was awarded to a college student who injured himself while playfully obstructing the vision of the driver of
the truck in which he was riding. 52' Because the transportation
was furnished by the employer as an incident of the employment,
the court emphasized that the injury arose out of and in the course
522
of the employment.
Whether horseplay cases should be examined as an arising out
of or an in the course of question has been the subject of considerable controversy. 523 Professor Larson suggests that it is a mistake to
516. 258 Minn. 306, 103 N.W.2d 876 (1960).
517. 239 Minn. 307, 58 N.W.2d 731 (1953).
518. See id'. at 314, 58 N.W.2d at 736. The employer and insurer in Petro had unsuccessfully contended that "where a man who knows he is suffering from a heart condition
and who must know that an assault will be resisted nevertheless initiates such assault, the
injuries to him resulting from the assault are 'intentionally self-inflicted.' " See id. In rejecting the employer's and insurer's argument, the Petro court cited Justice Rutledge's
formulation of the work environment concept in Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 649 (1940):
[T]he environment includes associations as well as conditions, and . . . associations include the faults and derelictions of human beings as well as their virtues
and obediences. Men do not discard their personal qualities when they go to
work. Into the job they carry their intelligence, skill, habits of care and rectitude. Just as inevitably they take along also their tendencies to carelessness and
camaraderie, as well as their emotional make-up. In bringing men together,
work brings these qualities together, causes frictions between them, creates occasions for lapses into carelessness, and for fun-making and emotional flare-up.
Work could not go on if men became automatons repressed in every natural
expression. "Old Man River" is a part of loading steamboats. These expressions
of human nature are incidents inseparable from working together. They involve
risks of injury and these risks are inherent in the working environment.
Petro v. Martin Baking Co., 239 Minn. at 311, 58 N.W.2d at 734-35.
519. Petro v. Martin Baking Co., 239 Minn. at 311-12, 58 N.W.2d at 734-35.
520. See Cunning v. City of Hopkins, 258 Minn. at 317-19, 103 N.W.2d at 884-85.
521. See id. at 307-08, 103 N.W.2d at 878.
522. See id. at 311, 103 N.W.2d at 880.
523. Compare IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 23.61 (1979) (should be treated as an in
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assume horseplay is an arising out of question; he treats it as an in
the course of problem. 524 The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, apparently views the arising out of question as being determinative. 52 5 Interestingly, Dean Pound condemns both approaches
because an in the course of analysis leads to the common-law analogy of agency, while starting the analysis with the arising out of
526
requirement may lead to proceeding by analogy to provocation.
Dean Pound finds this analogy to be inconsistent with compensation theory and suggests a test of serious and willful misconduct to
527
determine horseplay compensability.
In a trilogy of recent compensation decisions, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has denied compensation in horseplay situations.
On each occasion, the court treated horseplay as an arising out of
issue. In Walsh v. Charles Olson & Sons, Inc.,528 the claimant was
injured while operating power equipment that he had been instructed not to use. 529 The referee, relying on the Cunning decision,
awarded benefits because, "[t]he activity was nothing more than
pure and simple 'horseplay' by a young, inquisitive and naturally
curious boy." 530 The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, rejected this reasoning because the claimant's act could not reason53
ably have been foreseen by the employer. '
Four years after Walsh, in Elfelt v. Red Owl Stores,532 an employee, who suffered an amputation after his ring finger became
stuck when he jumped up to touch his hand on rafters above the
employer's doorway, was denied compensation because "[t]his action took him outside the scope of his employment. ' 533 Finally,
the Court affirmed a denial of benefits to a claimant injured "when
the course of question) with Vitas v. Grace Hosp. Soc'y, 107 Conn. 512, 141 A. 649 (1928)
(should be treated as an arising out of question) and Pound, Comments on Recent Important
Workmen's Compensation Cases, 14 NAT'L A. CLAIMANTS' COMPENSATION ATTORNEYS L.J.
47, 65 (1954) (should be treated by examining whether employee's conduct constituted
serious and willful misconduct).
524. See IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 23.61 (1979).
525. See Kerpen v. Bill Boyer Ford, Inc., 305 Minn. 47, 48, 232 N.W.2d 21, 22 (1975);
Cunning v. City of Hopkins, 258 Minn. 306, 318, 103 N.W.2d 876, 884 (1960).
526. See Pound, supra note 523, at 65.
527. See id.
528. 285 Minn. 260, 172 N.W.2d 745 (1969).
529. See id. at 261, 172 N.W.2d at 747.
530. Id. at 262, 172 N.W.2d at 747.
531. See ia. at 263, 172 N.W.2d at 747-48.
532. 296 Minn. 41, 206 N.W.2d 370 (1973).
533. Id. at 42, 206 N.W.2d at 371.
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he submitted to a massage of his back by a fellow employee, ' 534 in
Kerpen v. Bill Boyer Ford,Inc. 535 In so holding, the court stated that
the injury did not arise out of the employment, because the causative danger was not "incidental to the character of the busi5 36
ness."
Perhaps no aspect of the workers' compensation system is more
difficult for an employer to accept than the awarding of compensation to an aggressor in a horseplay incident. Not only is the employee not furthering the employer's interests, but he is also
generally disrupting the work of a fellow employee. Then, to his
further dismay, the employer finds himself in the anomalous position of paying the employee for injuries that result from such conduct.
The author recognizes that precepts of the workers' compensation law should not be founded solely on the self-serving desires of
employers. Yet it seems that courts have made the struggle with
this question more ponderous than necessary and that the tests advanced by other writers do not provide the necessary simplicity of
application. It is suggested here that the resolution of this problem
be made on the basis of the following general premises: first, the
innocent victims of horseplay should be compensated; second,
horseplay aggressors should be denied compensation unless the
employer knew of the conduct and acquiesed in it or the horseplay
activity was of an apparently spontaneous and innocent nature.
The latter exemption permits the fact finder to recognize that
momentary, apparently harmless departures from the tedium of
the work day need not necessarily exclude from coverage one who
unexpectedly sustains injury, while at the same time permitting a
denial of benefits to one injured while engaging in an elaborate or
inherently dangerous activity that bears no relationship to the furtherance of his employer's interests. This test has a legal as well as
an equitable basis, since it can be stated that momentary, innocent
actions can be expected among individuals working in a repetitious fashion, side-by-side, over extended periods of time and thus
arise out of and in the course of employment. The other less innocent actions do not.
534. Kerpen v. Bill Boyer Ford, Inc., 305 Minn. 47, 47-48, 232 N.W.2d 21, 21 (1975)
(footnote omitted).
535. 305 Minn. 47, 232 N.W.2d 21 (1975).
536. Id. at 48, 232 N.W.2d at 22.
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C.

Violation of Emp/oyer Rules or Instructions

In some situations, a violation of employer rules or instructions
will bar recovery of compensation benefits. 537 Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated in a 1973 decision that when "injuryproducing conduct is in violation of a specific instruction or order
of the employer, benefits are denied. '5 38 For example, a machinist

injured by an explosion while making souvenirs out of shell cases,
in violation of the employer's rule banning personal use of the ma537. See, e.g., Bartley v. C-H Riding Stables, Inc., 296 Minn. 115, 206 N.W.2d 660
(1973) (injury suffered when employee thrown from horse he was instructed not to ride
held noncompensable); Walsh v. Charles Olson & Sons, Inc., 285 Minn. 260, 172 N.W.2d
745 (1969) (injury suffered while using power jointer earlier prohibited from use not compensable); Anderson v. Russell Miller Milling Co., 196 Minn. 358, 267 N.W. 501 (1936)
(death of mill employee from fumigating gas held not compensable when employee violated instructions not to enter mill); McQuivey v. International Ry., 210 A.D. 507, 206
N.Y.S. 851 (1924) (denying compensation to an employee who was fatally burned while
sleeping on premises after being instructed to sleep elsewhere). See generally IA A. LARSON,
supra note 1, §§ 31.00-33.40 (1979); 6 W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1,§§ 1577-1582; Schmidt
& German, Employer Misconduct as Aecting the Exclusiveness of Workmen's Compensation, 18 U.
PrI-r. L. REv. 81 (1956); Note, Misconduct of an Employee Which Wi/1 Prevent Recovery Under the
Workmen's Compensation Law of Pennsylvania, 27 TEMP. L.Q. 470 (1954). Professor Larson
comments:
The right to compensation benefits depends on one simple test: Was there a
work-connected injury? Negligence, and, for the most part, fault, are not in issue
and cannot affect the result. Let the employer's conduct be flawless in its perfection, and let the employee's be abysmal in its clumsiness, rashness and ineptitude: if the accident arises out of and in the course of the employment, the
employee receives his award.
I A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 2.10 at 5. The Minnesota Supreme Court has also indicated
that employee negligence is irrelevant in determining compensation questions. See Snyder
v. General Paper Corp., 277 Minn. 376, 384, 152 N.W.2d 743, 748 (1967) (contributory
negligence of employee immaterial); Radermacher v. St. Paul City Ry., 214 Minn. 427,
435, 8 N.W.2d 466, 470 (1943) (neither negligence of employer, nor contributory negligence of employee relevant); McGough v. McCarthy Improvement Co., 206 Minn. 1, 5,
287 N.W. 857, 860 (1939) (employee fault or blame immaterial), overruled in part on other
grounds, Williams v. Holm, 288 Minn. 371, 374, 181 N.W.2d 107, 109 (1970). The holdings in these cases were mandated by subdivision I of Minnesota Statutes section 176.021
which provides in relevant part:
Every such employer is liable for compensation according to the provisions of
this chapter and is liable to pay compensation in every case of personal injury or
death of his employee arising out of and in the course of employment without
regard to the question of negligence, unless the injury was intentionally self-inflicted or when the intoxication of the employee is the proximate cause of the
injury.
MINN. STAT. § 176.021(1) (1978).
538. See Bartley v. C-H Riding Stables, Inc., 296 Minn. 115, 117, 206 N.W.2d 660, 662
(1973). The court qualified this rule by noting that if "contemporaneously with the violation, the employee was performing work in furtherance of his employer's business" compensation is proper. See id.
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chines, was denied compensation. 539 A similar result occurred
when an office boy injured himself when using a cutting machine
to make a paper pad in defiance of company rules banning per540
sonal use of the machine.
In determining which violations of employer rules or instructions will result in a denial of benefits, several theories have been
used. 541 Some courts distinguish between excluded misconduct
and covered misconduct by using a prohibited method-prohibited
place analysis. 542 Under this theory, employees who merely perform acts using a prohibited method are eligible for compensation,
but employees injured as a result of going to a prohibited place are
denied compensation. 543 This analysis, however, is of little assistance in most situations because it often rests on an unworkable
assumption. The place-method distinction assumes that an employee injured in a prohibited place is only serving a personal purpose. 544 Certainly, many workers injured while using prohibited
freight elevators are merely trying to promote efficiency in their
work. 545 Denying compensation in these situations should not be
based on a theory whose foundation, at best, is suspect. 546
Some courts also have examined problems in this area by utilizing a test that allows compensation unless the employee departed
from work to such an extent that the injury could not be said to
have arisen out of the employment. 547 Because this test has no
539. See Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Gilbert, 65 Ariz. 379, 181 P.2d 624 (1947).
540. See Radtke Bros. & Korsch Co. v. Rutzinski, 174 Wis. 212, 183 N.W. 168 (1921).
541. See notes 542-58 infra and accompanying text.
542. See, e.g., Starkel v. Edward Baif Co., 142 Conn. 336, 114 A.2d 199 (1955); Vitas v.
Grace Hosp. Soc'y, 107 Conn. 512, 141 A. 649 (1928); Mann v. Glastonbury Knitting Co.,
90 Conn. 116, 96 A. 368 (1915); City of Pembroke v. Jones, 109 Ga. App. 296, 136 S.E.2d
139 (1964), afd, 220 Ga. 213, 138 S.E.2d 276 (1964); Lange v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 257 Minn. 54, 99 N.W.2d 915 (1959); Anderson v. Russell
Miller Milling Co., 196 Minn. 358, 267 N.W. 501 (1936).
543. See note 542 supra.
544. See note 542 supra.
545. See, e.g., Olson v. Robinson, Straus & Co., 168 Minn. 114, 210 N.W. 64 (1926).
546. Even if promoting efficiency in work is only one of the injured employee's aims,
compensation may still be mandated based on the dual-purpose rule. This rule is examined in notes 238-75 supra and accompanying text.
547. This used to be the Minnesota test. See Bartley v. C-H Riding Stables, Inc., 296
Minn. 115, 117, 206 N.W.2d 660, 662 (1973) (dictum); Anderson v. Russell Miller Milling
Co., 196 Minn. 358, 361, 267 N.W. 501, 503 (1936); Rautio v. International Harvester Co.,
180 Minn. 400, 405, 231 N.W. 214, 216 (1930); Olson v. Robinson, Straus & Co., 168
Minn. 114, 116, 210 N.W. 64,64 (1926).
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guidelines for its application it lacks appeal, and confuses, rather
than simplifies the issue.
Other courts view time as the crucial consideration. Fowler v.
Baalmann, Inc., 548 a 1950 Missouri decision, illustrates the use of

this theory. In Fowler the employee, a flight instructor, had a flight
cancelled because of bad weather. 549 In violation of his employer's
cancellation rule, the employee flew the plane in bad weather and
crashed. 550 In denying compensation, the court stated that an employer had the unqualified right to limit the scope of the em55
ployee's employment by enacting time limitations. '
Perhaps the theory most often used in employee misconduct
cases is one based on the distinction between the performance of
authorized acts in a prohibited manner and the performance of
prohibited acts. 552 Under this theory, the determinative factor is
whether the employee was performing a prohibited act, or performing a permissible act in a prohibited manner. 553 If the latter,
then compensation is warranted. 554 The only drawback to this
theory is that it can be easily used by a result-oriented court. 55 5 As
long as courts respect the plain meaning of the words used in the
theory to make the distinction, however, there is little reason for
concern. Illustrative of the proper application of this theory is Bartley v. C-HRiding Sables, Inc. 556 In Bartley the Minnesota Supreme
Court reversed an award of compensation to an employee who had
been thrown by a horse that the employer had specifically forbid548. 361 Mo. 204, 234 S.W.2d 11 (1950).
549. See id. at 211, 234 S.W.2d at 16.
550. See id.
551. See id. at 213, 234 S.W.2d at 17. But f. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Boggs, 66 S.W.2d
787, 794 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) ("[i]f it were a part of Boggs' business as [an] employee to
give flying lessons, then the fact that he disobeyed instructions to return the plane at the
time he was directed to do so did not remove him from the course of his employment.").
Perhaps the most poorly reasoned decision denying compensation based on the unauthorized time of performance doctrine is a 1926 Kentucky case that denied compensation
to an employee hired to shovel coal in the daytime, because the injury occurred while he
was shoveling coal in the evening. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Ratliff, 217 Ky. 103, 288
S.W. 1057 (1926).
552. This is the current Minnesota rule as set forth in Bartley v. C-H Riding Stables,
Inc., 296 Minn. 115, 206 N.W.2d 660 (1973).
553. See id. at 117-20, 206 N.W.2d at 662-63.
554. See id.
555. Seegenerally IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 31.21, at 6-19 (1979) ("The only tricky
feature of this distinction is that it can, by a play upon words, be converted into a contradiction of itself.").
556. 296 Minn. 115, 206 N.W.2d 660 (1973).
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den the employee to ride. 557 Although the court indicated that the
employee's acts might have been in furtherance of the employer's
business, because mounting and riding the horse itself was a prohibited act, rather than a prohibited manner of accomplishing a
legitimate goal, the injury did not arise out of the employment.55 8
V.

CONCLUSION

The author's primary purpose in writing this Article has been to
assist practitioners and legal scholars in their analysis of arising out
of and in the course of problems. In preparing this Article, preliminary thought was given to analyzing "arising out of" separately
from the "in the course of" requirement. It was soon discovered,
however, that such an analysis would neither be possible nor helpful because each clause is so intimately interwoven with the other.
Consequently, this Article has discussed Minnesota's arising out of
and in the course of requirement by analyzing time and place and
employee activity problems. Obviously, every potential problem
falling within the ambit of these classifications could not be discussed. No doubt, the numerous types of injuries for which compensation is sought is limited only by the imagination of creative
counsel.
The legislation enacted in 1979 may portend only the beginning
of the Legislature's desire to reformulate Minnesota's workers'
compensation system. As long as Minnesota's statutory scheme includes the arising out of and in the course of requirement, however, these simple but legally complicated terms will continue to
plague practitioners, judges, and scholars in their attempts to determine the compensability of injuries resulting from various fact
situations. The author hopes that some of the solutions suggested
to the problems examined in this Article will assist others in resolving future arising out of and in the course of issues.
557. See id. at 116-17, 206 N.W.2d at 661-62.
558. See id. at 118-20, 206 N.W.2d at 663.
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